Archive / Working Paper
When More is Less: aiding statebuilding in Afghanistan
06/09/2006 By Astri Suhrke
This document examines the nature of international economic and military
assistance to statebuilding in Afghanistan. The central argument is that this assistance has had negative as well as positive effects that combine to create severe internal tensions in the statebuilding project itself.
For all the achievements cited in removing the Taliban and launching an ambitious policy of reconstruction and modernisation, the intervention in 2001 and subsequent aid strategies have also created a rentier state that is totally dependent upon foreign funds and military forces for its survival. Furthermore, this state has weak legitimacy and limited capacity to utilise aid effectively, and it faces a mounting insurgency. In this situation, the premises and structure of the statebuilding project invite critical examination.
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Keywords
Afghanistan Aid policy Al Qaeda Asia External intervention United States War on terrorRelated publications
- Military and Aid Responses: the Afghan Dilemma - Response to Astri Suhrke and Juan Garrigues
- Why Sometimes More is More: military assistance to Afghanistan
Bio author: Astri Suhrke
Astri Suhrke is a political scientist (Ph.D.) and Senior Research Fellow at the Chr. Michelsen Institute in Bergen, Norway. Thematically her work has focused on the social, political and humanitarian consequences of violent conflict, and strategies of response. Currently, she is working on strategies of post-war reconstruction and, more widely, peacebuilding, with particular reference to Afghanistan and East Timor. She is leading a multi-year project funded by the Research Council of Norway on violence in the post-conflict State.
