

*Civilian Dimension of
International Crisis Management
in Spain: Commitments,
Alternatives and Advantages*

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***Civilian Dimension of International Crisis
Management in Spain: Commitments,
Alternatives and Advantages***

Presentation

The Civilian Dimension of Crisis Management, a Chance to Revamp and Enhance Spain's Foreign Policy

The Toledo International Centre for Peace, sponsored by the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence, organised a meeting at the Centre for Political and Constitutional Studies (part of the Ministry of the Presidency) on 24 February 2006 to which representatives from Spanish institutions which currently play or could play in the future an active role in the field of international crisis management. The representatives discussed in a frank and open way and exchanged ideas and proposals with representatives and counterparts from other countries and international organisations such as the European Union and the OSCE.

The meeting was held after the Centre had completed an extensive research and a series of field missions to Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom and to different European Institutions¹. The subsequent reports on the respective national crisis response systems in third countries led to the final report entitled *Civilian Dimension of International Crisis Management in Spain: Commitments, Alternatives and Advantages*, aimed at triggering and leading the debates².

The document, which was welcomed by the experts attending the meeting, provides a non exhaustive but very complete panorama of existing initiatives in this framework, and put forward arguments on the necessity of pushing further along the lines already established, especially those of the European Union. The conclusions of the 24 February meeting –included at the beginning of this document– reflect points of view that are not always homogenous but that agree on the fact that it is the right moment to open the debate within the most developed and democratic States willing to keep on contributing to the consolidation of peace.

Spain has therefore the opportunity of joining the small vanguard of countries that are currently making significant efforts to create new civilian means for international crisis management. The time is also ripe in the framework of the European Union which, in only three years, has made itself the leading actor in the civilian dimension of the international response to crisis situations in third countries. Spain's input in this field would also fit perfectly into the two main initiatives undertaken by the United Nations: the new integrated missions and, in the immediate future, the work of the Peacebuilding Commission, formally established by the General Assembly and the Security Council on 20 December 2005. It is also the right moment within the framework of the European Union, which in less than three years has consolidated its role as the main world actor in this field.

Although it is not easy to define exactly what is meant by crisis management as part of foreign action, the meeting confirmed the ever growing importance of civilian aspects in peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Even at the apogee of a conflict, the international civilian police –of which the newly established European Gendarmerie Force is a good example– should play a complementary role to the strictly military action, as mere example of the still uncertain concept of *human security*. From there on, international rapid-deployment teams comprising judges and public prosecutors, human rights observers or experts in the fields of rule of law, security sector reforms, media, economic and environmental affairs should begin, or at least plan and anticipate their future action. Within the framework of operations deployed by the relevant international organisations, the new civilian means for crisis management act as conflict prevention tools putting into practice the concept of *effective multilateralism* proclaimed in the 2003 European Security Strategy.

Furthermore, the terms of the modernisation and reform of Spain's Foreign Service should reflect qualitatively the country's increasing presence in the field of international crisis management. Spain's foreign action has undergone an inevitable transformation in the past three decades. Today, the new concepts of cooperative diplomacy, human security, democracy and peace consolidation, constitute implicit guidelines of a necessary renovation. Spanish Foreign Minister and board member of CITpax, Miguel Angel Moratinos, quite rightly pointed out the following in his speech to the special session of the UN Security Council on 22 September 2004, "the civilian aspects of crisis management will only be efficient through dialogue and cooperation between the various stakeholders. They are therefore by themselves a negotiation and commitment seeking tool. In other words, a fundamental input to the rebuilding of a democratic culture in societies devastated by recent conflicts³".

The Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation succinctly summarises the reasons and goals of civilian international action in crisis situations, concentrating thereof on both the benefits it brings to the beneficiary societies and the advantages obtained by the country carrying the action. But this summary also shows that the Toledo International Centre for Peace could itself be considered an element of international crisis management activities promoted and executed from Spain. CITpax could therefore, constitute an active element within the institutional framework we aim to strengthen and consolidate in this project.

Finally, I would like to reiterate, on behalf of the team I run and in my personal capacity, our commitment of taking on this task with responsibility, enthusiasm and thoroughness, while keeping in mind the fact that, as a classic writer put it a few centuries ago, "Peace is always infinitely more laborious and arduous than war".

Emilio Cassinello
Director-General, CITpax

¹ The reports have been written by Mariano Aguirre (FRIDE – Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior), Cristina Churruca (Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict, Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany), Luis Peral (Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales / FRIDE), Gabriel Reyes (CITpax), and Allison Rohe (FRIDE);

² The consolidated report has been drawn up by Luis Peral, with the collaboration of Gabriel Reyes and Juan Garrigues (CITpax).

³ Speech by Spain's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Miguel Ángel Moratinos, in the thematic debate of the Security Council on the civilian aspects of crisis management and peacebuilding. New York, 22 September 2004, <http://www.spainun.org/pages/viewfull.cfm?ElementID=2183>

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Acronyms

AA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Germany
BMVg	Ministry of Defence, Germany
BMZ	Ministry of Economic Co-operation and Development, Germany
CIMIC	Civil-Military Co-operation
CIVCOM	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, UE
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
COESPU	Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units
CPC	Conflict Prevention Centre, OSCE
CPS / COPS	Political and Security Committee, UE
CRT	Civilian Response Teams, EU
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
ECHA	Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs, ONU
EGF	European Gendarmerie Force
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
IMTF	Integrated Mission Task Forces
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
ODA	Official Development Aid
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, OSCE
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PCRU	Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
REACT	Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams
SITCEN	Joint Situation Centre, UE
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UN	United Nations

CONCLUSIONS OF THE DEBATE

On the concepts and the need to reflect on Spain's contribution

International crisis management, which includes the resources and procedures to cooperate in the response to an outside crisis, involves both civilian and military aspects. These mechanisms try to respond to two types of crises that can be classified as security crises and humanitarian emergencies. The former, which imply serious social and institutional instability and whose most clear expression is armed conflict. And the later, which can be immediately solved through the provision of basic needs for the affected community, although they point to larger structural problems whose resolution, requires external aid.

The resolution of security crises requires the use of military resources within the framework of an international mission more often than in humanitarian emergencies, but it is worth noting that both civil and military resources need to be used –in the right proportion– in both cases. The need to develop civilian capabilities for international crisis management is therefore independent from the equally necessary process of defining new categories of conflict and new international responses to these conflicts.

In the case of Spain, studies on international issues and in particular the content and alternatives that could be adopted in the field of international crisis management could prove extremely helpful. Furthermore, it would be especially useful to produce a practical and comparative study on how different States are organizing their PRT missions in the framework of the NATO mission to Afghanistan. In addition, and bearing in mind that consolidating peace is the best, if not the only, way to prevent conflict from recurring, there is a need to explore the possibility of using the new different resources that can be used by States in the international crisis management of States whose institutional fragility make them vulnerable to conflict.

Throughout the meeting, the possibility to create or identify an academic and independent institution with ties to the public administration was discussed. Such an institution could coordinate and promote the effort to integrate a doctrine on international crisis management created in Spain. As well as training courses already being done by the *Escuela de Guerra del Ejército* (the Army's War School), the *Instituto Nacional de Administración Pública* (the National Institute of Public Administration) will this year begin courses specifically on civilian aspects of international crisis management. It however seems convenient to systematise the international doctrinal corpus that is beginning to consolidate itself.

The Central Administration as well as certain regions in Spain are willing to create civilian means for the management of international crises to consolidate experiences and share lessons learnt. It is also essential –regardless of what medium is finally chosen– to involve NGOs and private businesses in the debate of the opportunities, cost and impact of Spain's contribution to international crisis management.

When the timing is right there should be an in-depth debate on what will be the main guidelines for international crisis management and how the systems will be put into place. This debate should be taken to Parliament and in particular to the Congress Commissions of External Relations, International Cooperation for Development and Defence. As the *Ley Orgánica 5/2005* on National Defence foresees mechanisms of parliamentary authorisation in the cases of external military deployment, it seems necessary for Parliament to pronounce itself on the criteria applicable for the deployment of civilian personnel in crises of the relevant nature.

On the Spanish institutional framework for international crisis management

The realisation that some Spanish public institutions have made important advances in the field of international crisis management in the past year manifests the need to activate and

develop, or even renovate, an institutional framework established two decades ago and headed by –at least, as far as national and international crisis affect Spanish citizens– the *Comisión Delegada del Gobierno para Situaciones de Crisis* (the Government’s Commission for Crisis Situations).

The objective is to adapt to these new circumstances and others such as the sharp rise of attention given to civilian aspects of crises management in developed States and international organisations. Civilian departments in the Government ready to deploy their own experts should incorporate themselves into civilian crisis management from the planning stage and throughout each of the different stages that guarantee the consolidation of peace.

The consensus established throughout the meeting points to the need for the Spanish institutional framework for international crisis management to be revitalized, restructured or simply created again *ex novo*. Two options voiced in the meeting anticipate how this framework might be changed. On the one hand, to maintain a flexible coordination structure between the Cabinet of the Spanish President and the different ministries, that could stem from the existing departments within the President’s Office, and eventually be strengthened temporarily to respond to international crisis management situations of particular importance to Spain.

On the other hand, a new organ could be created –and to do so where funds would be available– to be linked with the President’s Office and to be backed by an advisory council that would be in charge of designing, planning, coordinating and supervising the deployment of military and civilian resources. In its most complex version, this organ would also be responsible for producing studies and coordinating personnel that could be deployed. Furthermore, the body could also incorporate the work of NGOs and private companies in international crisis management.

With these two options in mind, and considering that the centralisation of the system should be limited to coordinating efforts between the central administration and the *Comunidades Autónomas* (Spanish Autonomous Regions), the possibilities of activating or renovating the Spanish institutional framework for the management of crises are great. The Canadian, Dutch, German or Norwegian models –of differing levels of bureaucracy and flexibility, some with advisory boards and analysis centres and others without– can serve as a reference point to extract the aspects that can best adapt to the contribution that Spain is willing to make.

On the creation and strengthening of civilian resources for international crisis management

It is impossible for any institutional framework for crisis management to work if there are no predetermined tools for international deployment. An over-extensive debate on needs and strategies regarding modalities of international crisis management contributions can lead to paralysis. Moreover, practice confirms that the contribution that each developed State makes to the civilian dimension of international crisis management depends on the capacities it has prior to deployment.

Until now, developed and democratic States have given priority to the creation and strengthening of military resources that can contribute to international crisis management. However, some Spanish institutions have already spontaneously started developing civilian capacities that can be deployed in crisis situations. Throughout the meeting, the willingness of the representatives of Spanish institutions to become involved in this field was evident. *The Consejo General del Poder Judicial* (the Council of the Judiciary) constitutes a significant example as it has created a roster that already counts with 10 senior judges and another 10 junior judges. The *Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales* (Spanish Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs) had to provide an immediate response to the border crisis that took place in Ceuta and Melilla in September 2005 and recommends that the experience gained in mobilizing assistance resources and defending human rights be used. The *Ministerio de Interior* (Ministry of Interior) is also

working actively and has developed that *Agrupación de Proyección Exterior de la Guardia Civil* (the External Projection Task force of the Guardia Civil). Meanwhile, the *Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) works actively to support all initiatives that will strengthen Spain's role in international crisis management. From the experiences gained in other countries, it seems necessary to at least support the development of a system of rosters that includes Spanish civil servants.

Two parallel ideas from Spain and the EU were raised throughout the debate. In the case of Spain, it was proposed that the organisms and mechanisms that form part of the *Sistema Nacional de Conducción de Situaciones de Crisis* (The National System for Crisis Management), which includes the *Comisión Delegada del Gobierno para Situaciones de Crisis* (the Government's Commission for Crisis Situations) and the *Comité Nacional de Planes Civiles de Emergencia* (the National Committee for Civilian Emergency Planning), be adopted and given external deployment capacity. In the case of the EU, the fact that there are no headquarters for civilian capacities is resulting on a debate as to whether it is convenient to use the already available military structures or to move towards the *Civil Protection Mechanism* established at the Helsinki European Council in 1999.

The creation of new civilian capabilities for international crisis management can constitute a first step towards modernising the existing structures of Public Administrations and contribute to a more coordinated action with NGOs and private companies. The problems of lack of resources and bureaucratic resistance can be solved with medium term plans as the true objective is to make the State's foreign policy more efficient and make the most of existing resources. Furthermore, the visibility of foreign policy in crises situations is a basic objective that should also be linked to the possibility of prioritizing –also geographically– the spheres of action in which Spain has a comparative advantage to offer. This way it will be easier to avoid using the lack of resources as an excuse for inaction.

Civil administration and the rule of law were mentioned as two fields where Spain can make valuable contributions. This reflects an issue that in many ways embodies the content and importance of the debate held in the meeting. As the Spanish judicial authorities have already created tools for international crisis situations, especially in the fields of justice administration and rule of law, their coordination with other State tools would make them more effective and more visible. It is therefore crucial to count on a reliable institutional framework capable of stimulating the creation of tools that can be complimentary while maintaining their independence and autonomy. The same reasoning is also applicable to the tools that *Comunidades Autónomas* (Spanish Autonomous Regions) can also create. As the tendency to create new civilian tools for international crisis management appears to be consolidated, it is now time to conceive and apply creative solutions.

AGENDA OF THE WORKING SESSION

Proposals for the Crisis Management Institutional Framework and Civilian Capabilities in Spain

Meeting of representatives and experts from, the European Union, the OSCE, Germany, Canada, Norway, and Spanish Institutions.

February 24th 2006 - Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales (CEPC)
Ministerio de la Presidencia, Plaza de la Marina Española, 9
28071 – Madrid

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09.30-10.00 – Opening

Welcome remarks:

Carlos Closa Montero, *Deputy Director General of Studies and Research, CEPC.*

Presentation:

Emilio Cassinello, *Director-General, CITpax.*

Carles María Casajuana, *Director of the International Policy and Security Department, Cabinet of the Spanish President.*

Arturo Spiegelberg, *Ambassador at Large for Peace Missions, Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation.*

Leopoldo Stampa, *Director General of Institutional Relations, Spanish Ministry of Defence.*

10.00-10.30 – Presentation of the report *Civilian Dimension of International Crisis Management in Spain: Commitments, Alternatives and Advantages.*

Luis Peral, *Senior Researcher, CEPC - FRIDE*

Gabriel Reyes, *Desk Officer, Conflict Prevention and Resolution Programme, CITpax.*

10.30-11.00 – Coffee Break

11.00-12.30 – Presentation of advanced civilian crisis management models in Canada, the European Union, the OSCE, Germany, Canada and Norway (in Spanish alphabetical order)

Moderator: **Emilio Cassinello**

Pedro Serrano de Haro, *Director, DGE IX Civilian Crisis Management, Council of the European Union.*

Jaroslav Pietrusiewicz, *Head of the Operations Unit, Conflict Prevention Centre, OSCE.*

Reiner Eberle, *Head of Division, United Nations, Crisis Prevention and Civilian Peacekeeping, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Germany.*

Joanne Lebert, *Director of Special Projects CANADEM, Canada.*

Tom Brunsell, *Deputy Director-General of the Police, Ministry of Justice and the Police, Norway.*

12.30-14.00 – Efforts undertaken, existing proposals and the current state of Spanish civil action in crisis situations; presentations from Spanish institution representatives

Moderator: **Luis Peral**

- Level of inter-ministerial coordination, competences of the different ministerial departments and existing initiatives in the area of international crisis management in Spain
- What advantages could be gained by a larger and more systematic presence in international crisis management operations? Ministerial and Spanish foreign policy perspectives
- What current initiatives exist to strengthen and/or implement civil crisis management actions in some of the departments of the institutions that they represent?

14.00-15.30 – Lunch

OBJECTIVES AND PROPOSALS REGARDING THE CREATION OF NEW ACTION CAPABILITIES IN SPAIN

16.00-17.30 – Comments, questions and suggestions from representatives and experts from the European Union, the OSCE, Germany, Canada, Norway and Spanish representatives

Moderator: **Leopoldo Stampa**

- What has been and could be the most important contribution of each ministry/institution for the construction of peace?
- What difficulties and obstacles could arise from the creation of new civilian capabilities for international crisis management in each of the ministries and institutions that participate in this area?

- In light of the Headline Goal 2008, adopted by the European Union Council, what could be the realistic prospects for the development of new civil capacities for international crisis management in Spain in the next two years? And in the next five years?
- What recruitment and training modalities could be best adapted to the peculiarities of each ministry/institution?

17.30-18.30 – Debate and conclusions

Moderators: **Emilio Cassinello and Luis Peral**

Options for the Spanish international crisis management policy within a civilian framework.

- Drafting a joint action plan, complementary to the existing official policy documents, with the participation of all the ministries and institutions involved in international crisis management.
- Creating an inter-ministerial coordination body equipped with a small permanent technical office for civil crisis management and/or a specific unit coordinating and planning the deployment of civilian capabilities, inside or outside of the President's Cabinet.
- Developing an advisory body dealing with international crisis management issues, that would include independent experts, and/or establishing flexible links with different research centres and institutes to undertake advisory duties and international crisis response analysis.
- Establishing permanent recruitment, training and deployment structures of civilian personnel (system of rosters and training centres) within each ministry and public institution involved, or one common group structure.
- Identifying two or three civilian crisis management areas in which Spain could visibly and efficiently contribute to the development of its own capabilities.

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

CITpax workshop, 24 February, Centre for Political and Constitutional Studies, Madrid

Celia Abenza Rojo - Director-General of Civil and Emergency Protection, Spanish Interior Ministry.

Mariano Aguirre - Co-Director and Coordinator of the Areas of Peace, Security, and Human Rights, FRIDE, Madrid.

Blanca Antonini - Director, Latin America Programme, CITpax.

Miguel Ángel Ballesteros - Colonel, Head of the Strategy Department, School of the Armed Forces, Spain (CESEDEN).

Shlomo Ben-Ami - Vice-President of CITpax.

Tom Brunsell - Deputy Director-General of the Police, Ministry of Justice and the Police, Norway.

Carles María Casajuana Palet - Director, Department of International Policy and Security, Spanish President Cabinet Office.

Emilio Cassinello - Director-General of CITpax.

José Luis Cerviño - International Cooperation and Coordination Unit, Spanish Police Directorate.

Juan Carlos da Silva Ochoa - Magistrate, General Council of the Judiciary (Consejo General del Poder Judicial).

Carlos Closa Montero - Deputy Director General of Studies and Research, CEPC.

Reiner Eberle - Head of Division, United Nations, Crisis Prevention and Civilian Peacekeeping, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Germany.

Fernando Fernández-Arias - Director of the Human Rights Office, Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MAEC).

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José Ignacio López-Chicheri - Advisor, Cabinet of the Secretary of State for Security, Spanish Interior Ministry.

Alfonso Lucini Mateo - Ambassador Representative to the EU Political and Security Committee.

Marta Marañón - Deputy Director, Dara International.

Jordi Marsal Muntalà - President of the Petitions Committee, Spanish Parliament.

Antonio Martínez de los Reyes - Head of the Foundations Unit. Directorate General of Institutional Relations of the Defence. Ministry of Defence.

Aurora Mejía - Advisor, International Department, Cabinet of the Spanish President.

Stefan Meyer - Researcher, FRIDE.

José Javier Muñoz Castresana - Deputy Director General for Cooperation and Civil Defence, Directorate General of Defence, Policy, Spanish Ministry of Defence.

Nicolás Pascual de la Parte - Head of the Task Force United Nations/Latin America, Council of the European Union.

Luis Peral - Senior Researcher, Peace and Security Programme, FRIDE and CEPC, Spain.

Carmen Pérez González - Adviser, Cabinet of the Secretary of State of Immigration and Emigration, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.

Ignacio Pérez Caldentey - Deputy Director, FRIDE.

Jaroslav Pietrusiewicz - Head of the Operations Unit, Conflict Prevention Centre, OSCE.

Manuel Pombo Bravo - Ambassador at Large for Humanitarian and Social Affairs, MAEC.

Francisco Ramos Fernández-Torrecilla - Director, Spanish National Institute of Public Administration.

Gabriel Reyes Leguen - Desk Officer, Conflict Prevention and Resolution Programme, CITpax.

Estrella Rodríguez Pardo - Director General of Immigrants' Integration, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.

Fidel Sendagorta del Campillo - Head of Cabinet for Analysis and Forecasting of Foreign Affairs, Office of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Latin America, MAEC.

Rosalía Serrano - Technical Advisor, Directorate General of International Judicial Cooperation, Spanish Ministry of Justice.

Pedro Serrano de Haro - Director, DGE IX Civilian Crisis Management, Council of the European Union.

Fernando Soteras Escarpín - Technical Councillor, Crisis Management Unit, DISSC, Spanish President Cabinet Office.

Arturo Spiegelberg de Ortueta - Ambassador at Large for Peace Missions, Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation.

Leopoldo Stampa - Director General of Institutional Relations, Spanish Ministry of Defence.

Juan Enrique Taborda Álvarez - Head of the Spanish Police International Cooperation Unit, Spanish Interior Ministry.

José Ramón Tostón de la Calle - Head of the International Cooperation Secretariat, Spanish Civil Guard Technical Cabinet.

Civilian Dimension of International Crisis Management in Spain: Commitments, Alternatives and Advantages

REPORT

Abstract

- *Just as peacekeeping operations have contributed to the overseas projection of a State's military capabilities for helping the populations of another State, peacebuilding operations must involve the external projection of its civilian capabilities to the same end. The general trend within the EU, the OSCE and the UN, is to increase the civilian component of crisis management operations, which requires an active cooperation from the States involved.*
- *The most developed democratic States have started developing civilian instruments and mechanisms for international crisis management. The alternatives include coordination, advice and analysis bodies, rosters and lists of experts, as well as specific training institutes and programmes for civilians that could be deployed within the framework of international crisis management operations.*
- *The creation and deployment of civilian capabilities for international crisis management:*
 - *Increases the Government's political action capacity in the international sphere, allowing it to exercise direct influence in the conflict resolution and peacebuilding process in the beneficiary State;*
 - *Allows national interest to be compatible with multilateralism and international solidarity;*
 - *Introduces what could be called a constitutional hinge between the army and the NGOs within the contributing State, opening therefore new perspectives of non governmental action;*
 - *Brings prestige and capacity of influence to member States of International Organisations dealing with international peace and security, to which the State is an active member;*
 - *Guarantees the continuity of bilateral relations between the State deploying civilian teams and the receiving State, beyond the multilateral umbrella under which the deployment is taking place;*
 - *Stimulates the training of civil servants and favours the exchange of know-how and techniques between international organisations staff and national civil servants.*

Commitments

EUROPEAN UNION

1. Crisis management in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy has taken on a markedly civilian character. **Exclusively civilian missions established by the EU to tackle crisis situations in third countries –such as those deployed in Rafah, Transdnier or Aceh, in the latter case jointly with ASEAN States and Switzerland and Norway– now far outnumber missions of a military character.** Even leaving aside the classic civilian election monitoring, the catalogue of recent operations clearly shows this new European trend, which can also be considered a general trend in the international community. Of the ten operations launched by the European Council since the end of 2004, only one of them –EUFOR-ALTHEA, deployed in Bosnia Herzegovina– is military in character.
2. The trend is also to increase the weight of the civilian component in all European military missions. Among the most recent proposals, the report entitled *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe* recommended that a rapid response force be established within the EU to tackle situations of gross human rights violations in any part of the world. According to the report, this force should initially be 15,000 strong; of which one third should be police and civilian specialists¹. In its broader sense, however, civilian crisis management also comprises such aspects as the strengthening of democratic institutions and human rights protection mechanisms in Failed States or States in transition to democracy, thus fulfilling a preventive function to averting potential conflicts, a role that has taken on key importance in the international community.
3. As recently expressed by Javier Solana, Secretary General of the EU Council and High Representative for the CFSP, “If there is a “lesson learned” from interventions in crisis areas such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan/Darfur, the Congo and many others, it is the need to enhance our effectiveness through better coordination of civilian and military crisis management instruments”, adding that “we have learned that there is no simple sequencing of military first and civilians later. The strictly military phase of crisis management is never as short as one thinks or hopes. And the stabilisation and reconstruction efforts are never as civilian as one wishes. Thus we need both civilian and military tools from day one²”.
4. **The European Union has declared itself ready to share the responsibility “for global security and building a better world”, especially since the Council adopted the European Security Strategy in 2003³.** But European external action relies largely on the input of material and human resources by Member States, especially for carrying out international crisis management operations of a civilian character. The EU has therefore started to define policies and its own mechanisms for promoting the creation of national civilian structures.

Bodies created by the EU for articulating the civilian and military aspects of crisis management

Since 2001 and under the authority of the EU Council, the Political and Security Committee (CPS) deals with international crisis management in both the civilian and military dimension, and is also

Irresponsible for the political control and strategic guidance of crisis management operations. In the purely civilian dimension, the Council also established in 2000 the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis

Management (CIVCOM), which provides information, advice it and recommendations to the CPS, especially within the framework of police capabilities and the reinforcement of the rule of law.

In tandem of this committee, new administrative departments, of an auxiliary and technical character, have begun to emerge, emphasising the civilian dimension of crisis management. The Council has set up a *Joint Situation Centre* (SITCEN), with both military and civilian personnel, which keeps the Council informed of the development of crises outside the Union. The Council Secretariat can also count on a *Police Unit*. Finally a *Civil-Military Cell* has been established at the heart of the European Union's Military Staff (EUMS); this cell must be capable of becoming an operation control centre.

Together with the strictly military mechanisms, see the Headline Goal 2003 which complements the CIMIC concept⁴, the Helsinki European Council of 1999 decided to set up a parallel mechanism to coordinate civil protection resources. This mechanism, managing various databases, aims to coordinate and improve the efficiency of the various civilian crisis management resources –both from the EU and its member states, in particular, those dealing with civil protection– that could be deployed in the future outside of the Union's borders⁵.

5. **The main challenge currently facing the EU in this sphere is to build up the widest possible range of capabilities and resources, both in the civilian and military dimension, in order to elaborate a quick, efficient and coherent response to the crises that emerge in third countries.** The Union and its Member States have to be capable of setting up conflict-prevention and peacekeeping operations as well as missions involving combat forces for imposing and re-establishing peace. But they must also be able to contribute towards the peacebuilding endeavour by the deployment of their own resources aimed at creating and strengthening democratic institutions in third States before, during and immediately after a crisis situation.
6. The creation of the European Gendarmerie Force is a clear sign of the commitment of some Member States to increase civilian European capabilities –albeit a police military corps– to ensure the effective protection of populations affected by armed conflicts and violations of human rights in third countries. The European Council of Santa Maria da Feira, held in June 2000, confirmed the States' undertaking that by 2003, they will be able to voluntarily provide up to 5,000 police officers for international missions across the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management operations, attributing 1,000 of them with a 30-day deployment capacity⁶.

European Gendarmerie Force (EGF)

The EGF draws from the police corps of a military nature in France (Gendarmerie), Portugal (Guardia Nacional Republicana), Italy (Carabinieri), The Netherlands (Royal Marechaussee) and Spain (Guardia Civil). This force will be responsible for running maintenance of security and public order operations, supervising and advising local police, criminal investigation, traffic regulation and border control. By the end of 2007 it has to build up the capability of deploying 800 officers in any part of the world within 30 days. The Spanish Guardia

Civil will supply the EGF with up to 400 of the former's future *Foreign Grouping*. This could mean the involvement of over 1,000 officers, including personnel of any expertise required for each EGF mission.

The General Headquarters of the EGF was opened in Vicenza (Italy) on 23 January 2006, while Spain took on the presidency of its governing body, the High Level Inter-Ministry Committee. Spain will also take charge of the general field test for the first EGF operation in a post-war scenario. The exercise will be held in Valdemoro (Madrid), including the deployment of a general headquarters and evaluation of the planning, management and running of real operations.

Although the EGF does not depend directly on the European Union, it will nonetheless be at the latter's disposition and also of the other institutions like the UN, NATO and OSCE, which can count on its backing for carrying out police missions even in areas of conflict.

- 7. The European Council of Feira also identified three civilian aspects of international crisis management which it deems to be top priority for the EU: rule of law, civil administration and civil protection.** Subsequently, in the framework of the Second Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference of November 2004, the 25 Member States went even further than the Feira targets, taking on the firm commitment of providing the European Union with 5,761 police, 631 experts on the rule of law, 562 experts on civil administration and 4,988 in the field of civil protection. The States also undertook to guarantee that the training and rapid-deployment capability of the designated personnel would be satisfactory. They also established new civilian capabilities for European crisis management, especially in the monitoring field, assigning 505 experts thereto, while also assigning 391 experts specialised in fields such as the protection of human rights, political affairs, gender and security force reforms. These experts will be able to buttress the work implemented by the EU Special Representatives for CFSP⁷.

Civilian Headline Goal 2008

The Goal adopted during the Ministerial Conference of 22 November 2004 incorporates the full range of instruments for civilian crisis management and aims to facilitate interaction between them. Its objectives are:

- To achieve a coherent use of civilian community instruments in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
- To build up the capability of carrying out missions not only in top-priority areas of civilian crisis management as agreed in the Feira European Council but also observation missions and back-up missions for EU Special Representatives.
- To develop the capability to deploy multifunctional civilian-crisis-management resources within an integrated framework.
- To develop the capability to deploy civilian missions which imply diverse levels of commitment and the use of different capabilities, and which include at least a large-scale mission of short-term substitution in a hostile environment.

- To build up the capacity to initiate a mission within the 5 days following the adoption of the Council decision and deploying specific civilian capabilities of the European Security and Defence Policy within the 30 days following the decision to initiate the mission.
- To deploy European missions of civilian crisis management in a joint and autonomous way and in close cooperation with military operations.

8. The EU's civilian crisis management action therefore incorporates ground-breaking areas, ranging from the observation of human rights to mediation, and from justice administration to border surveillance, but also, actions for the prevention of organised crime and human trafficking. The process of creating resources and extending the fields of civilian action abroad has taken on an unprecedented dynamism as demonstrated by the Brussels European Council of 15-16 December 2005. The Council endorsed the creation of rapid reaction teams made up by national experts able to provide technical and operational assistance to any Member State at times of high influxes of illegal immigrants or asylum seekers. During an informal meeting in Vienna on 15 January 2006 the Justice and Home Affairs Council decided that these "rapid intervention teams", made up of interpreters, administrative personnel and psychologists, would be up and running by the summer⁸. In this case it is a question of activities that would be carried out on the EU borders, but nothing prevents the teams from being sent to third countries where refugees and migrants directly or indirectly come from, as part of the foreign dimension of the common policy on migration and asylum⁹.
9. **In light of the most recent developments, it can safely be claimed that peacebuilding inputs of a qualitative character are now tending to outweigh the quantitative commitments, without downplaying the importance of the latter in the least.** Although the number of civilian personnel deployed for international crisis management tasks is sometimes high, as in the case of civil protection or police, in most of the new fields of action it is a question of identifying experts or creating small teams of highly qualified personnel capable of making an effective contribution to the task of strengthening the institutions of the State suffering the crisis. Thus the emergence within the EU of the groundbreaking conception of Civilian Response Teams (CRTs), which can carry out very specialised missions, either single-handedly or within the framework of international operations of an integrated character¹⁰. Norway collaborates actively with the EU in this area¹¹ and has already begun to set up these complete and quasi-autonomous teams of civilian personnel in the context of strengthening the judicial system and the rule of law, and will shortly do so as well in the field of Security Sector Reform (SSR).
10. The CRTs, predicted to be up and running by the end of 2006, show to what extent the EU depends on the Member States' readiness to make these inputs of civilian personnel. Each CRT is based on experts previously selected by the States and in accord with the particular needs of each mission. **It is therefore necessary to establish national processes for the selection and training of specialised and highly qualified civilian personnel to join the various European missions.** In the years to come, Member States will develop new national coordination structures and adapt existing ones in the interests of harmonising the processes of recruiting and training civilian personnel. This process should facilitate a considerable increase in the amount of information exchanged and lessons learned within the EU. Only by improving the national capabilities for planning and carrying out civilian crisis management missions will the EU be able to play a peacebuilding role proportional to its economic weight.

11. In this increasingly dynamic context, some Member States, including Spain, have the potential and capability to become leading suppliers of civilian resources for international crisis management, thereby outstripping even the commitments embedded in the EU framework. **States currently have the possibility to play a leading role in chosen fields of crisis management, by developing a national foreign policy which can be more effective without being entirely European and multilateral.**

UNITED NATIONS

12. The resurgence of armed conflicts in a high percentage of countries in which UN peacekeeping operations had been established and the substantial increase in the number and size of these operations, have prompted significant changes in their design¹². In very broad terms, and leaving aside the temporary civilian administrations set up in Timor and Kosovo, the UN has progressively shed the model based on military intervention of a humanitarian character –designed to set up a safe space for providing humanitarian aid– in favour of increasing peacebuilding missions within the framework of what have become known as *integrated missions*¹³. According to an independent study conducted at the behest of the UN's Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA), published in May 2005, an integrated mission is “an instrument with which the UN seeks to help countries in the transition from war to lasting peace, or to address a similarly complex situation that requires a system-wide UN response, through subsuming actors and approaches within an overall political-strategic crisis management framework”¹⁴.
13. **The question is how to fill the void left by the UN's *blue helmets* or how to avoid the perpetuation of an international presence and therefore an external dependence without building a *strong* local democracy.** Peacekeeping missions offered at most a stopgap solution to the suffering of the victims of an armed conflict or violation of human rights but they have not proved capable of facilitating the transition to the democracy that would serve as the basis for building a peaceful State. There is, however, no more lasting and specific method of ensuring respect for human rights than that of creating State institutions that see to guaranteeing them once the UN mission has redeployed, or supporting the reestablishment of the mentioned institutions. **Integrated missions –under a single civilian command– incorporate new fields of civilian action, such as institutional strengthening or sustainable development, which have been developed at the heart of the UN and are today deemed to be a *sine qua non* condition for lasting peace.**
14. The UN intends to pay attention to all the factors determining the achievement of lasting peace without being detrimental to the operational agility and effectiveness of the missions. In particular, it aspires to introduce structural changes of diverse nature, some of which are already being implemented in areas such as planning or personnel selection and training, both in the missions and in the headquarters. Amongst the already implemented operational innovations, it is worth stressing the creation of the *Integrated Missions Task Forces (IMTF)*, a planning and coordination instrument used for the first time in Afghanistan in 2001. The IMTFs pool the different UN family's programmes and agencies to ensure a balanced deployment of all the components of an integrated mission.
15. In some areas of the new UN missions the qualitative aspect is beginning to override the quantitative aspect. As pointed out on 30 January 2006 by Mark Kroeker, UN Police Advisor, as the role of UN police in peacekeeping missions evolves towards capability building for local forces and away from strictly monitoring and observing, the need to recruit better quality officers becomes paramount. These officers need to have better leadership qualities, excellent training and be capable of transmitting

their knowledge to others¹⁵. **The creation of highly specialised civilian resources placed at the disposition of the UN by developed States, is perhaps the best way of addressing the current peacebuilding challenges.**

16. In the field of police action, which takes on special importance as the most specific guarantee of *human security* in crisis situations, the World Summit held in September 2005 advocated the creation of a standing UN police capacity. But the most far-reaching institutional innovation of the Summit was the approval for the creation of a UN Peacebuilding Commission; this decision is bound to have profound effects in this field in coming years.

The World Summit on UN Reform and Crisis Management

The Summit Outcome Document (Doc. A/60/L.1) aims to set up a line of continuity between peacekeeping and peacebuilding questions and concentrates on the measures and means that should be undertaken by the UN to thwart the threats to peace.

The Peacebuilding Commission, created by the Outcome Document, was formally established by the UN Security Council and the General Assembly on 20 December 2005. The Commission –the composition of which is currently being debated– is an intergovernmental advisory body whose main functions are: to propose integrated peacebuilding strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery, to help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and sustained financial investment, to identify the best peacebuilding strategies (doing so in collaboration with the General Secretariat, where a support office will be set up) and to extend the period of attention by the international community to post-conflict recovery, in the political, social and economic aspects. The Commission will include an Organisational Committee and country-specific committees, that will establish links with national stakeholders, civil society and other regional organisations.

The Document also refers to the need of setting up rapid deployment units to reinforce peacekeeping activities. Furthermore –and this is where UN is integrating the concept of *human security* to the response capabilities– the Outcome Document endorses the creation of a standing UN police corp to provide start-up capability for the policing component of UN peacekeeping missions and to assist existing missions through the provision of advice and expertise. This represents a recognition that the effective guaranteeing of human rights calls for the exponential increase of civilian capabilities in peace missions starting with the police component.

17. **Within the UN framework, the international community has expressed its conviction to consolidate these integrated missions, whose ultimate objective is to strengthen the democratic structures of the States within which they act.** It is currently the responsibility of the developed countries to make the necessary changes in their national structures to contribute towards the smooth operation of these new missions. Possible State inputs include providing the Secretariat with highly specialised civilian teams capable of joining in an integrated mission for creating or strengthening local democratic institutions and human rights protection mechanisms that could be of great help in achieving lasting peace. Just as peacekeeping operations have involved

the overseas projection of a State's military capabilities for helping the populations of another State, peacebuilding operations involve the external projection of its civilian capabilities to the same end.

18. Within the framework of military capabilities, the EU has proposed to the UN either providing *bridging operations*, which would involve the immediate deployment of European troops while the UN mounts a new operation or to reorganises an existing one –as occurred in 2003 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Artemis Case); or developing *the stand-by model*, hardly developed as yet, involving an “*over the horizon reserve*” or an “*extraction force*” which would enable EU troops to carry out certain complex and very specialised tasks in the framework of UN missions¹⁶. The EGF has come into being with the same aim of contributing towards the effective multilateralism advocated by the European Security Strategy in the context of police forces –whose nature is nonetheless comparable to a military force. **There is absolutely nothing preventing the EU and its Member States from providing the UN, on a case by case basis, with the newly developed civilian international crisis management capabilities through either of the two arrangements outlined above with regard to military resources.** The high qualification required for carrying out certain institution-building tasks as part of a UN integrated mission would make this EU contribution to multilateralism particularly useful.

OSCE

19. The OSCE has been the pioneering international organisation in developing a multidimensional security concept, which has also been put into practice in the form of civilian crisis management mechanisms. **The perceived need for a rapid deployment of qualified civilian personnel in OSCE operations prompted the creation of the *Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT)* programme.** This need had been expressed by Heads of State and Government of all OSCE States in the framework of the European Security Charter adopted in Istanbul in 1999. REACT came into being in 2001, since then, it has been selecting, recruiting and training experts in the fields of human rights, rule of law, democratisation, elections monitoring, economic and environmental affairs, press and public information, media development, political affairs, administrative backup, communications, information technologies, security, transport, provisioning and logistics, budgeting and finances, human resources, training facility management, personnel management and supervision, military affairs and civilian police.

OSCE Missions

The OSCE has a wealth of experience in organising missions of an exclusively civilian character, especially for the purpose of election observation. The missions depend on the mandate agreed upon by the organisation's Permanent Council. Its main functions are:

- Advising the host country on the organisation and supervision of elections.
- Providing support for strengthening the rule of law and building democratic institutions; maintaining and restoring public order.
- Helping to foster a negotiation-friendly climate favourable to the adoption of peaceful conflict-solving measures.
- Supervising arms control agreements.
- Providing support for the rehabilitation or reconstruction of diverse aspects or components of civil society.

The experts are selected by the Member States to join either long term or short term missions. The former, usually lasting six months, deal with matters related to conflict prevention, rehabilitation or reconstruction. The latter, usually last between seven and fifteen days, and focus on the closure of the election campaign, the voting procedure and vote counts. The authorities of each party State provide the OSCE secretariat with a list of national candidates for secondment to the missions to be deployed. It is therefore necessary to set up an institutional process for the selection of candidates.

As regards Spain's contribution, around twenty Spanish nationals are currently taking part in OSCE missions. The experts willing to participate in observation missions are selected by the Human Rights Office (Oficina de Derechos Humanos) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores). The list is drawn up from Spanish nationals who have registered in the election observation roster that can be found in the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' website. Candidates must meet certain general eligibility requirements such as a university degree, command of English as well as more specific requirements that might be laid down by the organisation deploying each specific election monitoring mission.

20. Apart from the already well established bodies that democracy and human rights within the OSCE, namely the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media or the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities –with a marked conflict-prevention character– Member States of the then Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) established in 1990 the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC). The CPC is responsible for direct liaison between the central bodies of the OSCE and the field operations with regard to the four main spheres of action: early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. In July 2005 the organisation was running 18 operations in 16 countries. The work of both, the CPC and the ODIHR might be strengthened by the setting up of civilian crisis management capabilities by the party States, especially the most developed ones, to contribute to the promotion of democracy and protection of human rights in the other party States.
21. Among the operations established in recent years by the OSCE, it is worth mentioning the rapid reaction unit for human rights violations in Azerbaijan detention centres, which was created in 2004 by the Baku Office in collaboration with the Azerbaijan Ombudsman. The aim of the programme was to monitor and verify reported cases and hand them over to the Ombudsman's office within a few hours, draw up a final report including recommendations and send it up to the Azerbaijan authorities; as well as training police officers, detention-centre officials, judges and public prosecutors in the rights of detainees. The OSCE created a rapid reaction team within the national institution and a permanently operative call centre for dealing with these matters. The more developed States could certainly offer the OSCE a highly valuable collaboration for this type of operations. The ODIHR is currently looking into projects that would be implemented by the crisis response mechanism for the handling of crisis situations in the justice sector, created by the government of Norway¹⁷, in Moldavia and Georgia.
22. As the State delegations made clear once again during the latest Security Review Conference, the OSCE is ready to cooperate with the various international institutions and organisations interested in achieving effective interaction in crisis management and rehabilitation in post-conflict situations, with special emphasis on strengthening the rule of law¹⁸. One of the most concrete proposals amongst those put forward during

the Conference was the possibility of establishing some type of association between the OSCE and the *Centre of Excellence for Stability Police Units* (COESPU), a project based in Vicenza, Italy, which is supported by the United States and aims to take advantage of the experience and expertise of the Carabinieri, the Gendarmerie and forces of the kind with the intention of setting up similar units in other countries¹⁹. It is no coincidence that Vicenza is also the headquarters of the EGF; this offers excellent opportunities of collaboration in this field, so that the creation of rapid deployment resources can be drawn on for the training and reform of State security corps in third countries. The example, still under study, could be extended to other fields of international crisis management.

Alternatives

COORDINATION, ADVISORY AND ANALYSIS BODIES

23. **The coherence of a State's foreign policy in crisis situations depends on the coordination of the various instruments and measures deployed in each case.** Perhaps due to the particular organisation of armies or because their protocol of action in crisis situations is by now well established, coordination is especially necessary when such instruments and measures have a civilian character. A considerable increase in the participation of civil servants from various ministerial departments closely connected to international and European crisis management will lead to the need to coordinate and supervise the civilian and military components deployed by States in each crisis situation. Besides the coordination aspects, the ever-changing nature of international crisis response means that advisory mechanisms need to be set up to guide the government's action. Finally, the crisis scenario where a State has deployed civilian missions should be monitored on a daily basis along with the response provided by international organisations or by other States.
24. **At a time when new capabilities are likely to be created, it is vital to ensure the coherent and coordinated action of existing capabilities. The best way of doing this is drafting a national Action Plan.** In January 2002, Spain adopted the National Plan on Violent Conflicts Prevention (Plan Nacional de Prevención de Conflictos Violentos) as a tool to complement existing instruments for strengthening the State's external action, and improve institutional coordination both, at national and international level. It is worth stressing that the plan's objective are now part of the priority areas of the new 2005-2008 Spanish Cooperation Plan (Plan Director de la Cooperación 2005-2008). In addition, on 30 November 2005, the Spanish Parliament passed the bill 27/2005 for the promotion of education and culture of peace, which *inter alia* foresees the promotion of "specialised training for men and women, on conflict resolution, negotiation and mediation" as well as the promotion of "peacebuilding tasks in conflict torn areas through the participation of specialised personnel"²⁰.

**Action Plan of the Federal Government of Germany on
"Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution
and Post Conflict Reconstruction"**

In May 2004, the Federal Government of Germany adopted the Action Plan aimed at coordinating its own international crisis management policy. The plan addresses the new nature of international conflicts, analyses the government's current capability vis-à-vis such situations, and identifies strategic approaches, fields of activity, and actors at

the global, regional, and national level. Specifically, it proposes to carry out 161 initiatives over the next five or ten years.

The plan breaks down the initiatives into three main strategic lines:

- creating stable State structures and enhancing the peacebuilding capabilities of civil society;
- improving Germany's contribution to multilateral crisis prevention efforts and
- developing the institutional infrastructure in Germany for civilian crisis prevention.

A member of the Federal Foreign Ministry (AA), Ambassador Ortwin Hennig, has been appointed as Federal Commissioner for Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding to fulfil the plan and to develop national capabilities. In September 2004 an Inter-ministerial Steering Group for Civilian Crisis Prevention was established, chaired by the aforementioned Commissioner. The Steering Group is made up by the AA, the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the Ministry of Defence (BMVg). The Steering Group is an advisory and coordination body that works towards the coherence of government activities in this field, favours the establishment of coordinated procedures between ministries and enhances the government's capability for carrying out a crisis management policy. The Steering Group has set up an Advisory Board, whose role is to act as mediator between the government and civil society and also to furnish the Steering Group with specialised information. The Advisory Board is comprised of representatives of a series of NGOs, research centres and also representatives of the private sector, including Siemens, BASF and Deutsche Bank.

25. Coordination –markedly technical in character– is the responsibility of government authorities. Thus, its effectiveness will be directly proportional to the coordination entity's closeness to the decision-making body dealing with the crisis management mission on the ground, which decides when to send or maintain a mission or adapt it to the changing circumstances. **In the case of Spain, general objectives need to be established in this field, together with a minimum institutional structure for coordinating the actions undertaken, and monitoring compliance with the government's objectives and adherence to the response that needs to be given to each particular crisis situation.** The goal is to create a complete overview of available capabilities as the first step in taking political decisions and thus to elaborate a general overview of the contribution made to each crisis under the umbrella of the various international organisations, as a means of ensuring compliance with political decisions.

An example of a coordination mechanism in the peacebuilding field: The British Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit

According to the official Foreign Office documents the aim of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU), established by the British government in April 2005, is to "ensure that the UK's contribution to post-conflict recovery is better designed, faster and more flexible". The PCRU was created above all to meet the need to coordinate

relevant past efforts. The PCRU enhances coordination by including representatives from the three most relevant governmental departments in this area (the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence and the Department for International Development). The three teams within the PCRU are also led by members of the various departments. The Policy and Strategy Office is run by a diplomat from the Foreign Office; the Operation Planning Office by a Colonel from the Ministry of Defence and the Financial Resources Office by a programme manager from the Department for International Development (DFID). The variety of functions and perspectives that are brought together in the PCRU is also reflected in its extensive database of Deployable Civilian Experts. This database now boasts about 200 professionals from 120 specialities, including health, public finance or local government.

26. Advisory and analysis tasks can be carried out by existing government structures or bodies created ad hoc or they might also be outsourced to external bodies and institutions of a public or private character. Mixed systems might also be established. The initial fact-finding operation must always be backed up by an international organisation or a democratic State deployed on the ground, and in any case, it must always be supervised and crosschecked as far as possible by the State subject to analysis. This means that, apart from the strictly logistic aspects, the more independent the experts and bodies in charge of providing analysis and recommendations, the more valuable the strategic analysis and ideas on the crisis response, in terms of the political decision-making process.

The Clingendael Institute of Holland: Analysis for the Government

The Clingendael Institute of International Relations is a non-profit organisation funded by the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence. Most of its revenue, however, is generated by its activities. Guarding its independent status and autonomy, Clingendael promotes the understanding of international relations, pursuing this objective by means of studies, reports, projects and acting in an advisory capacity to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The latter function is part of the Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme (CSCP), which carries out research and analysis projects at the behest of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in particular the Peacebuilding and Good Governance Section (DMV/VG).

The Clingendael Institute is a fine example of how a government can complement its in-house analysis instruments through an independent centre capable of keeping up a very high degree of objectivity and pooling the opinions of all stakeholders in the crisis management process (ministries, armed forces, NGOs). The recommendations and analyses made by centres of this type are free from outside pressure and even from the distrust that can sometimes exist between government bodies. The risk, which must be avoided at all costs, is turning these centres into mere instruments of legitimisation for the Government's foreign policy objectives.

ROSTERS AND POOLS OF EXPERTS

27. A country's decision to send its own civilian personal to carry out peacekeeping and peacebuilding tasks abroad is a very delicate matter and has to be based on a painstaking short-listing of candidates. The system generally followed in these cases, increasingly widespread since the end of the 1990s, is to draft rosters or pools of experts on the basis of applications made by those who are prepared to participate in international crisis management operations. **These rosters guarantee a rapid deployment and are currently considered to be the best way of managing national human resources and making an effective contribution to the increasingly complex and specialised missions of civilian crisis management.** Under the supervision of the State-response coordination body, these rosters have to be updated at least yearly and have to be run in such a way as to ensure that they are useful and mutually complementary.
28. The systems for recruiting experts for international crisis management and placing them on standby vary from country to country and even within countries in terms of speciality and sector. Rosters might include individuals from the private and public sectors –NORDEM in Norway or CANADEM in Canada– or only tenured officials of the State, as it is usually the case in the police or justice fields due to the special nature of their duties and the special conditions of those responsible for carrying them out. The *sine qua non* condition is the candidate's proven track record of being able to work in multinational teams dealing with matters such as rule of law and civil administration, election monitoring, the protection of human rights or security sector reform. **In Spain, there is still scarce involvement of civilian personnel from the central government in peacebuilding tasks. It would therefore be best to set up rosters of an exclusively public character or to create incentives for the participation of tenured government officials in common lists.**
29. Possible models might include: one great unified database for all specialised activities, sectors and ministries; specialised rosters for each ministry or activity; or across-the-board rosters, including experts capable of covering the same aspect across different dimensions of the same phenomenon –such as organised crime or post-conflict reconstruction. In any case, the recruitment of experts for international crisis management calls for a high degree of coordination and a complex administration, a rigorous personnel selection system based on unified criteria, hands-on updated training for all selected candidates, a system of professional and social incentives and a framework guaranteeing the rapid availability and deployment capacity of selected personnel for a long enough period to carry out the task at hand. The key here is to establish the right balance between all these prerequisites.

The Crisis Response Pool for Affairs of Democracy and the Rule of Law of the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police

Date of Creation: March 2004.

Composition: 30 professionals (most linked to the judicial sector) ten judges, five military and civilian prosecutors, six police lawyers and nine prison officials (a third of them with a wealth of experience in EU, UN and OSCE international missions).

Selection Process: The selection process is run by the institution employing the expert, following an initial invitation of applications within the various concerted institutions, on the basis of criteria and procedures laid down by the Ministry of Justice.

Recruitment Eligibility Requisites: The members of the crisis response pool have to have a track record of at least four years as a judge, prosecutor, police lawyer or prison official. They commit themselves to remain on the list for at least two years and half the roster members may be called up for deployment at any time it is deemed necessary the list for at least two years. Half the roster members may be called up for exercising their peacekeeping operations at any time it is deemed necessary.

Training and Incentives: The selected members receive specific training lasting one week and must be ready for deployment within four weeks of notification of the mission. The system is based on a relation of trust between the member of the pool and the public institution they work for, given that a previous agreement has been reached in which the institution gives its employees leave of absence to participate in the mission without thereby harming their career in the institution. Experts retain their salaries during the mission while also receiving the corresponding maintenance allowances, although their temporary employer remains in all cases the Ministry of Justice. The members of the pool may be deployed on international missions as individuals or as complete teams.

Fields of Action:

- Advice and assistance with institution-building in every part of the judicial system in connection with democracy-building in countries that have been subject to war or internal conflict and in countries that are in transition from totalitarian regimes to democracy.
- Advice and assistance with training at all levels in international Human Rights law and the application of international human rights conventions.
- Participation in operational assignments in connection with the administration of justice in countries placed under administration by the international community during a transitional phase until local institutions have been established.

30. The General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union has recently established its own expert-recruitment mechanism for international crisis management. While in line with the efforts made by some Member States, this mechanism strives to avoid duplication with these efforts. The EU's constant and committed involvement in the civilian-action response to crises outside its borders calls for a permanent expert-recruitment mechanism to be created without impinging on the action taken by Member States. According to current proposals, an EU-wide standby force of up to 100 experts will be set up by the end of 2006. These could then be drafted into the Civilian Response Teams together with personnel of the Secretariat and, where applicable, from the European Commission. In keeping with the principles of coherence and subsidiarity, the CRTs should be complementary to the EU civil protection mechanism and civilian resources for international crisis management created by the Member States, but it is clear that the supranational composition of expert teams acting in third countries is likely to offer comparative advantages.

The European Union's Civilian Response Teams (CRT)

The CRTs are rapid reaction resources for civilian crisis management, of flexible composition and size, comprising of experts from the Member States and, in principle, with the participation of the General

Secretariat of the Council. In order to ensure coherence of the EU's external action, experts from the European Commission will be invited to participate, where possible, in the CRTs. Each one of the experts making up a CRT has to be previously selected by his/her Member State, using agreed procedures and criteria. Before their first deployment, the team experts have to be given specific CRT induction training. The teams will be deployed and will act in accordance with generic terms of reference and pre-agreed methodology contained in a CRT Handbook drawn up for that purpose.

31. **The efficiency and opportunity of a national roster of experts therefore depends on the extent the former complements the initiatives of other States and international organisations, as well as the flexibility that would enable selected experts to be drafted into multinational integrated operations.** The most useful contribution could be the creation of rosters, not of individual experts but rather of small State-run rapid-deployment teams, which could take on highly specialised tasks as part of larger scale supranational teams or wide-ranging international arrangements. Unlike other inputs in which the quantitative aspect is paramount –such is the case for military and police units– some of these teams could be made up by as few as three or five members. The teams would carry out highly specialised work of advice and support for the efforts of international agencies and the local authorities working towards the creation of a true democratic state based on the rule of law. The impact of these teams on the beneficiary State could be more far-reaching and longer lasting than any other individual State measure.

SPECIFIC TRAINING PROGRAMMES

32. The highly specialised character of civilian crisis management resources lends particular importance to the training of the individuals and teams who are to be deployed in crisis situations. The training for international crisis management should therefore be specific, intensive and brief, given that the candidates have already been shortlisted on the basis of their professional experience and the relevance thereof for performing certain tasks as part of international missions. **As foreign missions are public in character, the training received has to be supervised by the ministerial department promoting the resource deployment and/or the central coordination body. It also has to be certified by the various organisations whose multilateral operations the civilian personnel are going to take part in.**

Towards a European framework for crisis management training

Approved by the Council on 17 November 2003, the European Union's ESDP training policy defines the political framework and overall operational arrangements for EU training activities in this area. The policy encompasses the civilian and military dimensions and has been set down in the 2005-2007 training programme. The aim of this policy is to furnish the necessary resources and procedures for analysing the general requirements in terms of planning, execution and evaluation of ESDP training. In practice, the 2005-2007 programme is a catalogue of training activities organised by several leading countries in this field.

33. Spain runs some specific training courses for participation in crisis management operations. Worthy of particular note is the *Course on International Relations in the Field of Development Cooperation*, designed for civil servants and run by the Spanish National Institute of Public Administration and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. It lasts ten days and is taught in two sessions (spring and autumn). Also noteworthy is the *Course for Peacekeeping Observers*, taught by the Army Warfare School. While the course is designed for officers of the Armed Forces, a few places are kept free for civilian personnel. In general, however, training initiatives tend to be scattered and the most important and valuable courses are geared mainly towards military personnel. Moreover, there is very little assimilation of the advances being made in other countries in terms of studying and knowledge-transmission techniques. It is therefore essential to establish networks between the centres and to centralise the information on programmes and handbooks and other training material existing in Spain and other countries. **In particular, permanent liaison with existing training centres in other EU Member States should lead to joint initiatives in the training field.**
34. Training on international action in crisis situations has to be conceived in any case, as a necessary complement to the individual's established expertise developed in his or her daily job for the government or his or her professional experience acquired in the civilian sphere. The syllabi should include *a common core* on the characteristics, problems and actors in international action, in the framework of the multinational actions into which the candidates are to be incorporated. The general framework must then be fleshed out with shorter courses of a more specific character, bound up with particular characteristics of crisis situations and the particular task to be carried out. It is highly recommendable for the advisory and analysis centres to be actively involved in this phase of the training, both in designing the syllabi and in giving the courses. Finally, a briefing system should be set up to give candidates specific information on the crisis they are to be sent to and the tasks they are to be assigned. A debriefing system at the end of the mission should also be included to give the central coordination body detailed information on the problems found in practice.

The Case of Norway: Training programmes associated with various rosters of a civilian character

NORDEM (The Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights): The organisation offers a basic six-day training course on international mechanisms for the protection of human rights and practical fieldwork training, based on a rigorous manual, eminently practical in character, drawn up for that purpose by the University of Oslo's Norwegian Institute of Human Rights. There is also an additional three-day election-observation training course. Briefings are organised prior to deployment and there is regular liaison with NORDEM staff during the mission. Secondees submit a final report and the mission is assessed by NORDEM.

International Police Department Pool (Norwegian Police Directorate): Two-week training course for crisis management operations; specific training on the destination country by the head of the police mission on the ground; informal coordination with the action lines emanating from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Democracy and Rule-of-Law Pool of the Ministry of Justice and the Police: One-week training in consulting and assistance for creating and strengthening the institutions of the judicial system; training on human rights and the application of international human rights treaties and training for carrying out operational tasks in the framework of local justice administration.

Advantages

EFFECTIVENESS OF FOREIGN CRISIS-RESPONSE ACTION

35. The efficiency of a developed and democratic State's foreign policy in crisis situations is increasingly tied to effective and direct participation in the building of *strong democracies* through civilian agents (or military in the corresponding tasks) working in the public sector. **The creation of civilian resources for peacebuilding action by developed States therefore represents an increase in the capability of its government's political action in the international arena.** From the viewpoint of the State that creates them, the new specialised civilian crisis management resources represent the most concrete chance of taking an active part and exerting an influence in the conflict resolution and peacebuilding process in the beneficiary State. **If the effectiveness depends on the capacity to adapt the response to each particular situation without forfeiting overall coherence, developed States are bound to diversify the action resources for international crisis management and guarantee the coordination and integration of these resources in the framework of the international response.**
36. The current trends in international crisis management lead to different and less costly participation possibilities than the deployment of large contingents of troops, thus facilitating governments' decisions to become involved. These new options do not limit the effectiveness, they in fact enhance it. Indeed, the effectiveness of foreign policy in crisis situations does not depend on sending a greater number of troops or police officers, to be deployed without having established any bilateral communication channels; nor does it depend on an increase in Official Development Aid –especially if it is simply a case of increasing the financing of the NGOs based in the contributing State. **The dispatching of small, highly specialised teams, to be drafted into international peace operations could exert a greater influence on the conflict-solving and democratisation process than other contributions based simply on the number of personnel deployed.**
37. **Civilian crisis management resources are nothing more than tools available to the Government of the contributing State.** They can also be pooled, offering a wide range of possibilities for foreign policy in crisis situations. The government can thus *modulate* the level of its involvement in third States' crises, without necessarily committing to sending troops. It can also use its specialised civilian resources as a complement to the deployment of military or police units. In the latter case, the quantitative efforts made in terms of funds and human resources could be compensated by the parallel deployment of suitable instruments for exerting greater influence in the international response to the crisis situation in question. **In the case of Spain, the Government's reform of the Foreign Service, currently underway, could be a good opportunity to include provisions for the creation of civilian resources with external projection, since their predominantly public character means that such resources can be seen in some way as substituting and/or complementing diplomatic action in crisis situations.**

MAINTAINING RELATIONS WITH BENEFICIARY COUNTRIES AND ENHANCING INFLUENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

38. **The continuity of bilateral relations between the State sending the highly specialised civilian crisis management teams and the State hosting them is guaranteed from the start and throughout the international intervention, beyond the multilateral umbrella under which the operation is undertaken.** The relation with the beneficiary government in the statebuilding phase is also useful for the citizens, companies and NGOs of the contributing State, all of whom find national public liaison contacts directly involved in the consolidation of the State in which they intend to act. In line with the experience of CIMIC cooperation and bearing in mind the high visibility that a small, highly specialised institution-building team might acquire in the local environment, companies based in the contributing State engaged in the peacebuilding effort in a third State could also build up a positive reputation among the authorities and population of that country.
39. **In light of the above arguments, it is therefore possible to harmonise the *national interest* with multilateralism and international solidarity.** The continuity of bilateral relations in crisis situations favours fluid relations in the future between the contributing and the beneficiary State. Since the beginning of the 1990s, however, and up to 2006, the humanitarian strategy has tended to break off the civilian intergovernmental link until an eventual normalisation favours the full reestablishment of diplomatic relations. This strategy has spawned tensions and problems that still linger on between the armed forces and the NGOs. Although it is the UN bodies that are formally carrying out their international mandates, it is the NGOs that are often responsible for the implementation of programmes on the ground, and therefore usually end up liaising directly with the armies. **In the new context, civilian crisis management resources could act as the *constitutional hinge* between the army and the NGOs. This possibility in no way conflicts with the work of the NGOs, but rather opens up new perspectives of non-governmental action associated with the action of the civilian crisis management resources deployed by the contributing State.**
40. **Finally the creation of civilian capabilities for international crisis management could enhance the State's prestige and influence at the heart of the international organisations working in the field of international peace and security.** These organisations currently guarantee –besides the essential international legitimacy of the intervention– an umbrella that greatly facilitates the coordinated deployment of the States' contribution towards each crisis situation, even in cases where there is consent of the beneficiary State. The archetypal case today is NATO's action in Afghanistan, which has also become a test for the organisation's own credibility. In practice, and under NATO's auspices, the contributing States have set up Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), whose success will depend on their ability to act as catalysers or embryos of a local democratic administration. Bearing in mind the current concern about this matter, the States whose PRTs are the most effective in this sense would gain significant prestige within NATO.
41. **It goes without saying –for the contrary would clearly be a contradiction in terms– that the new task of building government structures cannot be the responsibility of non-governmental organisations.** The establishment of PRTs leads to questions of a constitutional scope, for the administration of a territory in another country entails exercising the *effective control* of the former and hence the full responsibility for respecting and enforcing the respect for the human rights of the local population. In the case of Spain, bearing in mind that it was a question of creating *ex novo* a local civil administration, the military personnel deployed in Afghanistan have had to implement, manage or coordinate the work of NGOs; a task that would rightfully

correspond to public powers. There is certainly a need for the direct involvement of civil servants from the State responsible for running a foreign territory on an interim basis. In the sphere of education, for example, the independent status of NGOs could clash with the need for the school curriculum in the administered territory to abide by the constitutional imperatives of the State responsible for the PRT. It would also seem reasonable for military personnel to be responsible for enforcing this requirement. The State that eventually solves these dilemmas and proves capable of meeting these new challenges by projecting abroad the main spheres of its public policy will undoubtedly become an international reference.

TRAINING ENHANCEMENT AND MODERNISATION OF PUBLIC SERVICES

42. Just as peacekeeping operations have had the salutary effect of bringing the training of Spanish troops into line with international standards, peacebuilding operations and the creation and reinforcement of civilian crisis management resources could act as an incentive to the training of Spanish civil servants. Language learning is one example: taking into consideration the poor results of State school system up until recent years and which are still far from satisfactory today, it is worth noting the high percentage of officers and non-commissioned officers that now have a good command of English (90% and 80% respectively according to sources consulted in the Army Warfare School). Above all, tenured Spanish civil servants would be able to swap notes on experiences and working techniques with representatives of international organisations, assimilating the advances in the field of foreign policy in crisis situations from the very moment they occur and also contributing to such headway.
43. The system of expert rosters for international crisis management allows States to tap into resources and instruments that for the most part are already in place and offers an opportunity for improving the training and capability of national personnel. **International missions therefore tend to improve public action in the national territory, especially in sectors where senior officials liaise little with international bodies or similar services in other countries.** In the case of the police and civil protection services, the participation of their personnel in multinational operations serves as effective training for carrying out internal security tasks or for mitigating the effects of any crisis situation that may emerge in the national territory. In other areas such as health, education, migration management, the protection of human rights or security sector reform, the national personnel drafted onto international missions gain access to new ideas and experiences that can also be fed back into their daily work at home. Furthermore, the possibility of being part of a crisis management team for a brief period of time acts as a personal and professional incentive to those most open to innovation and the improvement of working methods.
44. The imminent creation of European rapid reaction teams made up by national experts to assist any Member State during times of high influxes of illegal immigrants or asylum seekers²¹, constitutes a clear example of the use of crisis management resources in the benefit of States that created them. The often dramatic situations recently witnessed on the borders of the cities of Ceuta and Melilla would have greatly benefited from the deployment of such teams, for such situations have prompted their creation. There is no doubt that the deployment of these European teams where necessary would reinforce Spain's response capability and help it to ensure that border control and the reception of immigrants can be carried out without jeopardising human rights. It would also instigate efforts being made to modernise this response capability in the various fields of action.
45. **In the case of Spain, the creation of new international crisis management**

resources would not necessarily entail any further budget increases. In accordance with the government's commitment of building up Spain's ODA to 0.5% by the end of the present legislature –the Monterrey Summit laid down the commitment of building up the ODA to 0.33% of GDP by 2006– these funds will have to reach the figure of 3 billion euros in 2006 and about 4.5 billion euros by 2008²². **The creation and deployment of civilian resources for crisis management could be financed as part of this sharp ODA increase already pledged.** Furthermore, the criteria of the activities that can be charged to the ODA are being broadened to take in activities related to security sector reform as well as conflict prevention and resolution. At the behest of the Dutch government, the OECD has added six new activities to the list of those eligible for financing with these funds: democratic control and supervision of security expenditure, enhancing civil society's role in the security sector, support for laws and measures to prevent the recruitment of child soldiers, improving governance in the security sector and promoting civilian activities in peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution as well as the fight against the proliferation of small arms. **Finally, it should be remembered that all ministerial departments have funds for the training of personnel, a suitable part of which could also be spent on the induction training of teams for international deployment.**

46. The creation of civilian resources for international crisis management also allows funding possibilities to be harnessed within the EU, at least in the initial deployment stage. In 2001, the EU Council set up a financing mechanism taking in the rapid deployment of civilian crisis management resources known as the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) whose budget for 2006 is 30 million. The RRM may be triggered for financing the initial deployment of civilian international crisis management resources on the condition that cases occur "in situations of crisis or emerging crisis, situations posing a threat to law and order, the security and safety of individuals, situations threatening to escalate into armed conflict or to destabilise the country and where such situations are likely to jeopardise the beneficial effects of assistance, cooperation policies and programmes, their effectiveness and/or conditions for their proper implementation"²³. The RRM is implemented during the six-month period following the identification of one of the above mentioned crises. It aims at bridging with other financial mechanisms unsuitable for tackling the emergency phase of any crisis due to the cumbersome processes of assignment and release of available funds. In its five years of operation, the RRM has financed operations as far apart as the development of civil society in Bolivia or media capacity building in Afghanistan.
47. **The endeavours to create and strengthen civilian resources for the management of international crises would have widespread grassroots support in Spain, especially among the young.** Government action in favour of international solidarity is always very well regarded by the Spanish public opinion. In the case of the army, its participation in peace operations has greatly helped to vindicate it in the eyes of the public and even to bring it fully within the constitutional fold. The moment might now be ripe for extending Spain's crisis management endeavours to civilian aspects, thus helping to complement the efforts made by the international organisations Spain belongs to, especially the EU, by implementing reforms along the lines of those already undertaken by some of the most developed countries in the world.

Notes:

- ¹ The report *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe*, drawn up by a group of international experts and academics led by Narcís Serra, was presented to the High Representative of the European Union for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, on 15 September 2004. The report defines human security as the protection of persons from the consequences of grave and massive violations of human rights (See the text on http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/solana/040915CapBar.pdf, consulted on 22 January 2006).
- ² UK Presidency Seminar on Civilian-Military Coordination, Opening Address. London, 17 October 2005 ; CFSP Press Release S336/05, p. 1 and 2 (see document in http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/discours/86615.pdf); (our italics).
- ³ See *A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy*. Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 1 (complete text on <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/031208ESSIIIES.pdf>)
- ⁴ The Headline Goal 2003 aimed to endow the EU with the capability of deploying up to 60,000 personnel within 60 days and to sustain that deployment for at least one year (Rapid Reaction Force) and with a catalogue of the military capabilities required for that purpose. This Goal was revised in late 2004, resulting in the Headline Goal 2010, which enshrines the States' commitment to build up the necessary resources for responding to all crisis management operations provided for in the European Union Treaty –*Petersburg Tasks*– as well as those mentioned in the European Security Strategy –joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in the fight against terrorism and security sector reform. The three mainstay concepts of the 2010 Headline goal are interoperability, deployability and sustainability.
- ⁵ See Resolution of the Council and of the representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council of 26 February 2001 on strengthening the capabilities of the European Union in the field of civil protection
- ⁶ Presidency Conclusions, paragraph 11.
- ⁷ *Civilian Capabilities Commitment Conference - Ministerial Declaration* (Brussels, 22 November 2004), paragraphs 3 and 4.
- ⁸ On 30 November the European Commission adopted its document COM (2005) 621 final, *Priority actions for responding to the challenges of migration: First follow-up to Hampton Court*, endorsed by the Brussels European Council by means of a recapitulation of its main proposals in Annex I of the Presidency Conclusions under the title *Global Approach to Immigration: Priority actions focussing on Africa and the Mediterranean*, which provides for the creation of these teams (p. 10). For more information on the informal meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council in Vienna, see: http://es.today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2006-01-13T133537Z_01_PAN349125_RTRIDST_0_OESTP-UE-INMIGRACION.XML, consulted on 16 January 2006.
- ⁹ See *ad. ex. Determining an Approach for the External Dimension of the European Asylum Policy*. Working Document, Informal Meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Ministers, Luxembourg, 27-29 January 2005 (http://www.eu2005.lu/en/actualites/documents_travail/2005/01/2701docstravailinfojai/infojaifr1.pdf, consulted on 16 January 2006).
- ¹⁰ See paragraph 12 below.
- ¹¹ See *Agreement between The European Union and The Kingdom of Norway establishing a Framework for the Participation of The Kingdom of Norway in The European Union Crisis Management Operations*, of 22 November 2004 (<http://odin.dep.no/europaportalen/english/speech/032191-290002/dok-bn!30005988.html>, consulted on 20 January 2006).
- ¹² Roughly half of all countries that emerge from war lapse back into violence within five years (See <http://www.un.org/spanish/peace/peacebuilding/questions.htm>, consulted on 10 January 2006).
- ¹³ The concept was coined by the former Secretary General of the UN, Boutros Ghali, 10 years ago (See *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations*, Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1, ad. ex. para. 48).
- ¹⁴ *Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations. Independent Study for the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group*. Geneva, May 2005, p. 3 (<http://ochaonline.un.org/GetBin.asp?DocID=3352>, consulted on 15 January 2006).
- ¹⁵ See “UN police strive for quality over quantity as role changes – top adviser”, in <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=17331&Cr=police&Cr1=peacekeeping>, consulted on 30 January 2006.
- ¹⁶ The European Council of June 2004, held in Brussels, established these two arrangements in the document building on the *Joint Declaration on Cooperation between the EU and UN in the Field of Crisis Management, of September 2003, entitled EU-UN Co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations. Elements of Implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration. Adopted by the European Council (17-18 June 2004)*.
- ¹⁷ See the table on pages 29-30 below.
- ¹⁸ *2005 Annual Security Review Conference. Chair's Report*. Vienna, 21 and 22 June 2005, p. 22 (Doc. PC.DEL/814/05, of 1 August 2005; See text in http://www.osce.org/documents/cpc/2005/11/16814_en.pdf, consulted on 16 January 2006).
- ¹⁹ COESPU has now begun to operate in seven States of Africa and Asia (Cameroon, India, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Morocco and Senegal), which have applied to participate in the training programme (*ibid.* p. 17 and 18).
- ²⁰ Art. 2 paragraphs 7 and 8, in addition, the bill foresees the promotion of specialised institutes as a concrete means to collaborate with the United Nations (*ibid.* par. 5)
- ²¹ See paragraph 8 above.
- ²² See Silvia Hidalgo and Fernando Espada: *Hacia una nueva cooperación española*. FRIDE, Policy Papers, n. 2, December 2004, p. 3 and 4.
- ²³ Council Regulation (EC) No 381/2001 of 26 February 2001 creating a rapid-reaction mechanism, OJ Series L 57/5, of 27 February 2001, article 3.

ABOUT THE TOLEDO INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR PEACE

(www.toledopax.org)

The Toledo International Centre for Peace (CITpax) seeks to contribute to the prevention and resolution of violent or potentially violent international or intra-national conflicts and to the consolidation of peace, within a framework of respect and promotion of Human Rights and democratic values. Thus, the CITpax contributes to the establishment of cooperation pathways and communication channels between the parties involved, governments, NGO's and representatives of all sectors in the civil society.

ACTION PATHWAYS

In order to achieve its objectives, the CITpax employs various tools specially designed for each particular situation, including the following:

- **Second Track Diplomacy**, through the direct facilitation in negotiation processes between relevant political and economic actors, in conflicts where a dialogue pathway becomes necessary to complement or break the deadlock in the official track.
- **Multi-Track Diplomacy and Dialogue Facilitation**, through the creation of dialogue platforms among scholars, experts, activists, local authorities and governing bodies, as well as assisting the development of peace-building capacities in conflict areas.
- **Field Projects**, aimed at improving the capacities for conflict prevention and resolution through confidence-building, research and advocacy of feasible peace policies.
- **Research and Policy Development** of peace-related issues.
- **Professional Development and Training**, seeking to enhance the capacities of practitioners from different institutions working on peace-related issues.
- **Public Awareness and Advocacy**, through information dissemination, policy-oriented publishing and participation in the public debate.

PROGRAMMES

Notwithstanding a progressive extension of its working field to other areas, such as Southeast Europe, the CITpax current activities and projects are divided into three main programmes: two geographical programmes, one centred on Africa and the Middle East, and the other on Latin America, and the Conflict Prevention and Resolution Programme, which thematically complements and supports the regional programmes.

Africa and the Middle East Programme

In the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, CITpax is exploring Track II diplomatic tools to enhance ongoing negotiations and the status of the peace process. The Programme also intends to progressively address some of the core challenges of the region, such as the conditions for the establishment of a cooperation and security system in the Middle East. Addressing regional conflicts, discreet efforts are being made to bring regional parties to explore venues for strengthening local peaceful resolutions. Focusing on the reconstruction of post-war Iraq and the enhancement of civil society in several

countries in the Middle East, CITpax is also engaged in the North Africa context, with an emphasis on the Western Sahara conflict and the future of economic integration in the Maghreb.

Areas of the Programme:

- Regional Stability in the Middle East
- Emphasis on the Palestinian Israeli conflict
- Economic Integration of the Maghreb
- Transition to democracy

Latin America Programme

Activities include second track diplomacy to narrow differences between parties in conflict, convening or supporting dialogue to promote consensus and generate confidence in situations of tension, monitoring and assessing facts and trends that cause instability and in which CITpax can make a positive contribution. In order to identify specific areas of intervention and to strengthen cooperation with local interlocutors, CITpax carries out missions to conflict areas. The three main fields of programme activity are: (1) in Colombia, CITpax facilitates dialogue between groups on pivotal issues emanating from the internal conflict and promotes the consolidation of relevant institutions and mechanisms; (2) in the Andean area, it undertakes initiatives of a subregional scope to strengthen the understanding of and respect for political, cultural and ethnic diversity and to foster confidence; and (3) it strengthens dialogue among countries in the region as a means to ease bilateral tensions and overcome the fragmentation that afflicts Latin America.

Areas of the Programme:

- Political regional dialogue
- Institutional stability in the Andean Region
- Alternatives to the Colombian conflict
- Promotion of "benign borders"

Conflict Prevention and Resolution Programme

The programme concentrates on the study and support of negotiation processes and peace agreements, as well as on the facilitation and elaboration of recommendations to those countries going through post-conflict situations. CITpax's activities, which are based on the idea of human security, fall within a long-term global perspective. Thus, the projects designed within this programme intend to contribute to building and consolidating peace in those contexts where violence has been formally overcome. It also aims at formulating strategies that may prevent potential conflicts by trying to address the causes and by proposing solutions for their symptoms. The programme will also study and analyse multinational peacekeeping interventions and work to improve the tools for training those professionals that participate in peace operations. This includes UN Peacekeeping Operations as well as other multilateral interventions that result in regime change

and/or post-conflict reconstruction focusing on both civil-military relations and the civil roles conducted by military personnel.

Areas of the Programme:

- International civil administration
- Rule of law, institution-building and strengthening of democracy
- Transitional justice
- Humanitarian assistance
- Electoral processes
- Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)
- Strengthening of civil society and support for the most vulnerable sectors
- Early responses to crisis situations
- Socioeconomic dimension of conflicts
- Regional dimension of conflicts
- Development Cooperation as an instrument for conflict prevention and peace-building



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