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COUNTRY CASE STUDY: HAITI

WHAT ROLE FOR THE EU? FINDING A NICHE IN THE HAITIAN PEACEBUILDING PROCESS

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ACRONYMS

ACP	Africa, Caribbean and Pacific
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
DG	Directorate General
EC	European Commission
EDF	European Development Fund
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
GAERC	General Affairs and External Relations Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
HNP	Haitian National Police
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IFS	Instrument for Stability
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LAC	Latin America and Caribbean
LDC	Least Developed Country
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MIF	Multinational Interim Force
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
MPCE	Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe
OAS	Organization of American States
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSC	Political and Security Committee
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UNDOC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

What is the EU's role in the larger ongoing peacebuilding process in Haiti? How can the EU contribute to the promotion of sustainable security? Is there a need for a reinforced engagement in Security Sector Reform (SSR) or should the EU keep concentrating on addressing the root causes of fragility? The Haitian state is considered a fragile state because it does not deliver basic social services to the vast majority of its population and is unable to effectively legitimise violence (i.e. provide protection). The country is particularly vulnerable to internal and external shocks and domestic conflicts, and also suffers strong interference from international organised crime, with drug trafficking in particular acting as a significant spoiler of stabilisation and peace.

This paper suggests applying a comprehensive security concept in order to understand the current security situation in Haiti; a concept that equally allows for taking into account conventional state-centred security challenges, as well as people-centred (i.e. human security) challenges. While the core of the former lies in the establishment of an appropriate security structure – principally the conclusion of police reform, the strengthening of the justice sector (including the penitentiary system) and more effective border management – the latter cover a broad range of challenges – including the lack of economic opportunities, food, health and environmental problems, as well as personal, community and political insecurity.

One core argument of the paper is that, in spite of some generally acknowledged progress regarding the overall security climate in Haiti, relative stability remains very fragile and is challenged by the structural problems the country is facing: political, economic, social and ever more visibly environmental in nature. Haiti cannot be stable in the medium- and long-term if living conditions for its people do not improve within a rather short time horizon.

The above outlined “hard security areas” are addressed through SSR. The field of SSR in Haiti shows a clear division of labour among the actors of the international community in Haiti. Apart from the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti, or MINUSTAH), it is Canada, the US, France and, to a minor extent, Spain that are involved in SSR activities and cooperate on a bilateral basis with the Haitian government. The EU, understood as the European Community and the Member States, does not carry out any joint SSR activities in Haiti. This is mainly due to its traditional role as a development and humanitarian actor, as well as the lack of importance of Haiti in geo-strategic terms for Europe. The role of a security-informed development actor seems to be the most indicated for the EU, especially taking into account that MINUSTAH has the lead on SSR and is the primary interlocutor for the Haitian authorities regarding more conventional security issues. For several reasons, a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission is not only unlikely to be deployed, but would also bear the risk of hampering the existing division of labour within the international community on the ground. The EU should play a complementary role through its governance approach and cooperate with MINUSTAH and Member States already active in the area of SSR – stepping in where jointly identified as necessary – through its flexible funding instruments, in particular the Instrument for Stability (IFS).

EU's past experience as a development actor shows that changes in EU priorities and aid volatility must be avoided, as they risk further weakening the state. An additional recommendation – widely recognised, but still insufficiently implemented – is better coordination within the donor community in Haiti. In this regard, the EU should build on the positive coordination efforts among Member States and the Commission evidenced in Haiti (i.e. division of labour, joint assessment and programming etc.) and take on a constructive role. This is important in order to strengthen strategic partnership with the UN, as recommended in the Council Conclusions on the EU's response to fragility.

Keywords: European Union, Haiti, fragility, human security

INTRODUCTION

How can the EU contribute to the promotion of sustainable security in Haiti? Where do the comparative advantages of the EU lie in the larger ongoing peacebuilding process in Haiti? Should the EU be more involved in SSR in the Haiti context or instead concentrate on efforts to make (hard) security-targeted engagement more sustainable? SSR efforts, currently undertaken mainly by the Haitian government in cooperation with MINUSTAH, Canada, the US and to some extent also France and Spain, do not take place in a vacuum, but in a wider socio-economic and political context. Apart from serious coordination challenges, especially on the ground, progress achieved in the security field can only be sustainable in the mid and long term if the socio-economic situation in Haiti shows significant improvement, that is to say if the peace dividend translates into real livelihood improvement for the vast majority of Haitians, who suffer severe levels of deprivation in terms of human development and human security. The EU can be described as an increasingly security-informed development actor in Haiti. For the time being, it is an actor with different faces, lacking one voice. The need for better coordination with other multilateral and bilateral donors is recognised, but still needs to be implemented in practice. Haiti is a pilot country for the implementation of the fragile states approach the EU has developed in recent years, which implies that EU engagement in Haiti is located at the intersection of development and security.

The first section of this paper describes the context in which the EU operates in the country, providing historically relevant information on the Republic of Haiti and the manifold situation of fragility it faces. In the second section, the emphasis lies on the Haitian security-development context today and the key challenges faced in this regard. The paper suggests a comprehensive security approach that equally takes into account more conventional security, as well as human security challenges in Haiti. The author also addresses key actors on the ground, the existing division of labour among them and the challenge of coordination. The third section of this paper draws attention to the specific engagement of the EU in Haiti. It analyses the “different faces” of the organisation in Haiti, revises the added value of the ongoing pilot country exercise for the implementation of EU responses to fragility and provides an example of a security-sensitive development project currently being implemented. The final section offers conclusions and recommendations on the question of what role the EU should take in the Haitian peacebuilding process.

The information and qualitative analysis in this report is mainly based on primary data gathered in research interviews undertaken in European capitals as well as in Haiti during May and September 2008. It is complemented by secondary data collected through desk research drawing on relevant literature, media coverage as well as official policy documents and reports. During the research period, EU officials in Brussels as well as in the field were involved through interviews and informal conversations. The two-week field trip to Port-au-Prince, Haiti in September 2008 allowed for interviewing and consulting representatives of the UN, the European Commission, EU Member States, the Haitian government and Haitian civil society.

HAITI AND FRAGILITY

Alongside descriptions of Haiti¹ as the poorest country with one of the greatest disparities in wealth in the Western hemisphere, it has become almost commonplace to characterise the country as a “fragile” state. The inability of the Haitian state to provide basic social services to the vast majority of its population and to effectively legitimise violence in the Weberian sense do justify such a description. At the same time, the use of this term should not imply Haiti is condemned to failure,² but rather serve as a descriptive term to enhance understanding of the Haitian situation and the role the international community and specifically the EU can and should play.

Just like any other state, the Haitian state operates in two intersecting arenas: the world arena and the society that it seeks to rule (Migdal, 2001). The international community is part of the former, even if in Haiti it is present through multiple actors on the ground and Haitian politics suffers strong international constraints. It is of utmost importance to be aware of the often overestimated scope for influence of the international community in Haiti regarding the ongoing peacebuilding process (see also Einsiedel & Malone, 2006: 168; OECD, 2008: 7).

Haiti is a fragile state because it is significantly susceptible to crisis in one or more of its sub-systems;³ it is particularly vulnerable to internal and external shocks and domestic conflicts.⁴ Since the birth of the Haitian State as the world's first slave republic in 1804, different types of violence have flourished in the country in an ongoing “protection competition”. Yet, Haiti is not a typical post-conflict country,⁵ in that it has not had a civil war (Faubert, 2006: 4). Nevertheless, since 1946 the Haitian population has been affected by changing patterns of intra-state and one-sided categories of organised violence⁶ – of a particularly cruel nature during the dictatorship of the Duvaliers.⁷ Between 1989 and 2004, there were several peaks of internal armed conflict.⁸

Furthermore, Haiti's weak socio-economic structure, often associated with the legacy and aftermath of its period as a French colony (see for example Fatton, 2006; Hallward, 2007: 9), and its strategic geographical position

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- 1 The Republic of Haiti is located in the Greater Antilles. It shares one island with the Dominican Republic, and is bordered by the Atlantic Ocean to the north and the Caribbean Sea to the south. Haiti has a fast-growing population of almost 10 million people, of which approximately two-thirds live in rural areas.
 - 2 Several conversations maintained mainly in September 2008 in Haiti's capital of Port-au-Prince revealed that in particular Haitian government representatives do not feel comfortable with the fragility, but especially with the failure terminology widely used among international scholars and politicians. They fear getting locked or even stigmatised in a discourse and in a policy trap, which in their view will be very hard to escape from in the future. This does not mean that they do not recognise the weakness of the state, however. The term “failed state” is used in very contradictory ways in the policy community, and there is a tendency to label “fragile” or “weak” states as “failed”, a tendency that is rejected in this paper (see also Shamsie & Thompson, 2006).
 - 3 Those to be highlighted are: the economy, the environment, the institutional setup of the State - including the constitutional framework, the public health sector, as well as the security and justice sector.
 - 4 Drawing on definitions used by the Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics (LSE). See: Crisis States Workshop, London (March 2006). *Crisis, Fragile and Failed States Definitions used by the CSRC*, accessed on 12th October 2008, at <http://www.crisisstates.com/download/drc/FailedState.pdf>.
 - 5 A view widely shared by interview partners.
 - 6 According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP) Database, Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, Uppsala University, accessed on 11th November 2008, at <http://www.ucdp.uu.se/database>. One-sided violence is defined as the following: The use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organised group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths in a year. (Extrajudicial killings in custody are excluded.)
 - 7 Dr François Duvalier, known as “Papa Doc” was the president of Haiti from 1957 to 1971. In 1964, he made himself president for life and ruled until his death in 1971, in a regime marked by autocracy, corruption and state-sponsored terrorism through his private militia known as *Tonton Macoutes*. He is estimated to have caused the deaths of some 30,000 people and exiled thousands more. Jean-Claude Duvalier (“Baby Doc”) succeeded his father and ruled Haiti until his overthrow in 1986.
 - 8 According to the UCDP/PRIO *Armed Conflict Dataset*, there was armed conflict in 1989, 1991 and 2004. See: Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP)/International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) (2008). *Armed Conflict Dataset: Armed Conflicts Version 4*. Available at <http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/Armed-Conflicts-Version-4-2008/>.

along the major trade routes between Europe and Africa, South America and North America, have made the country extremely vulnerable to foreign intervention, especially from the US, but also from non-state actors – in particular, drug trafficking networks (Cockayne & Pfister, 2008; UNDOC, 2008: 34).

Since 1993, Haitians have witnessed seven UN missions⁹ in their country in what has been considered a rather unsuccessful “stop-start cycle”,¹⁰ international sanctions included (Gauthier, 2008; Einsiedel & Malone, 2006). In February 2004, the outbreak of political violence in Haiti¹¹ and President Aristide’s controversial departure into exile provoked an immediate US-led military intervention with Canadian, Chilean and French participation. The Multinational Interim Force (MIF) had a mandate from the UN Security Council¹² (UNSC) to stabilise the security situation. Three months later, on 1st June 2004, the UNSC authorised the deployment of MINUSTAH, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter¹³ and principally mandated to ensure a secure and stable environment.

In spite of some generally acknowledged progress regarding the overall security climate (Burke & Gauthier, 2008), the situation of relative stability in Haiti remains very fragile and has recently been seriously challenged.¹⁴ As a matter of fact, these challenges point to the structural problems the country is facing: political, economic, social and ever more visibly environmental in nature. At the beginning of April 2008, soaring world prices for food and fuel exposed the already extremely vulnerable Haitian population to severe additional hardship. Originally peaceful demonstrations against ‘*la vie chère*’ (expensive life) turned violent, mainly because of political and criminal manipulation. They were contained by MINUSTAH and the Haitian National Police (HNP), but ultimately provoked the censure of Prime Minister Alexis and his government by the Senate. It subsequently took more than four months until a political consensus could be forged and President Préval obtained legislative approval for Alexis’ successor Pierre-Louis. A new government was in place by 5th September 2008.

In the midst of this very delicate political situation, Haiti was severely hit by four hurricanes in less than four weeks starting in mid August 2008, which provoked a humanitarian emergency with several hundred people killed and around a tenth of the population in need of assistance. Floods furthermore seriously damaged infrastructure and crops.¹⁵

These events underscore the structural fragility of Haiti and show how external shocks, such as food crises and natural disasters, can potentially destabilise a country and trigger political crises.¹⁶ Such a danger is all the more relevant when common practices of political and criminal manipulation acting as spoilers of the Haitian stabilisation process are taken into account.

9 Two of them – the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH and MICAH) – were civilian missions in cooperation with the Organization of American States (OAS).

10 Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s special adviser on Haiti, Reginald Dumas. See: “Annan’s adviser recommends long-term UN presence in post-conflict Haiti”, *UN News Centre*, accessed on 11th November 2008, at <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=10261&Cr=haiti&Cr1>.

11 Qualifying for armed conflict according to UCDP/PRIO.

12 See: UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1529 (2004). Available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unscl_resolutions04.html.

13 Ibid.

14 The situation has suffered serious “setbacks” according to the UN Security Council report from 27th August 2008 on the Stabilization Mission in Haiti. See: United Nations Security Council (2008). *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations (S/2008/586)*. p.18. Available at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep08.htm>.

15 According to the World Bank, the storms caused nearly US\$1 billion of material damage.

16 The scope of negative impact of the global financial crisis on Haiti is yet to be seen.

THE SECURITY SITUATION IN HAITI TODAY

This paper suggests applying a comprehensive security concept in order to understand the current security situation in Haiti; a concept that equally allows for taking into account conventional state-centred security challenges as well as people-centred (i.e. human security challenges).

Based on a conventional security doctrine, in its condition as a fragile state, Haiti is considered a threat to international peace and security in the region.¹⁷ Fragile states or "state failure", as stated for example in the European Security Strategy (ESS, 2003: 4), represent one of the key threats for international security nowadays.¹⁸ State failure is considered to fuel or potentially aggravate other significant key threats, such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and organised crime, only the latter being relevant for the Haitian case. The rationale for engagement lies in preventing fragile states from turning into failed states. Seen from a more development-informed human security perspective, the fragility of the Haitian state is first and foremost a threat to its people, as it lacks capacity as well as political will (Stewart, 2006: 8-9) to provide basic social services and protection to the population.

The concept of human security is intrinsically linked to the concept of human development, originally developed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). It points to the underlying debate on the evident – although not automatic – link between security and development.¹⁹ As a matter of fact, insecurity necessarily hinders development, and lack of development makes it at least much more difficult to achieve sustainable security (see also Youngs, 2007).

Interview partners consulted in the framework of this case study²⁰ widely recognise the two-way linkage between security and development in the above-mentioned terms. Having said this, it is not surprising that policy-makers involved in the security field tend to emphasise the security/stability condition, while actors engaged in development stress the development condition. In fact, lack of development represents a type of insecurity in itself. On this note, the report of the Secretary-General on MINUSTAH, released on 28th August 2008, underscored the ever more urgent need for 'measurable progress in the area of socio-economic development' in Haiti, underlining the 'indissoluble link between advances in this area and the prospects for success in any other aspect of stabilization' in Haiti.²¹ In other words: Haiti can't be stable in the medium and long-term if living conditions for its people don't improve.²² The report observes that 'it is crucial that the current decline in socio-economic conditions be halted and reversed, and that the people of Haiti enjoy a basic level of services and some prospects for economic opportunity [...]'.²³

The following subsections subsequently address the security situation in Haiti in the wider and narrower sense. Splitting up the analysis in this way does not contradict the above outlined reflections, but is due to the

17 See: UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1542 (2004). Op. cit.

18 The terminology used in the European Security Strategy (ESS) is "weak" or "failing states" and "state failure". State failure is essentially defined as bad governance (i.e. corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability and civil conflict corroding states from within). See: ESS, 2003: 4.

19 It is not the purpose of this paper to overly engage in the conceptual debate on what comes first, if security pre-supposes development or vice versa. See OECD, 2005; Youngs, 2007.

20 Interviews held during May and September 2008 with EU policy-makers concerned with Haiti in headquarters and on the ground, with Haitian Government and civil society representatives; and MINUSTAH, as well as UN personnel.

21 United Nations Security Council (2008). Op. cit.

22 See also, 'Haiti facing "explosive situation" because of food crisis, UN official warns', *UN News Centre*, 18th April 2008. Available at <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=26391&Cr=haiti&Cr1>.

23 United Nations Security Council (2008). Op. cit.

situation on the ground, where a sort of division of labour between “hard security” and “soft security” players can be observed.

THE HUMAN SECURITY SITUATION IN HAITI

The vast majority of the almost 10 million Haitian people (World Bank, 2007) are not secure. Quite the contrary: they suffer high levels of economic, food, health and environmental insecurity, as well as personal, community and political insecurity.²⁴ Haiti is ranked 148th out of 179 countries on the UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI).²⁵ It is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, and some of its social indicators are among the poorest in the world. According to the World Bank, 54 percent of Haitians live on less than US\$1 a day and 78 percent on less than US\$2 a day.²⁶ Gross National Income (GNI) per capita amounts to US\$560 (2007), compared to US\$4,008 in the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region (2006).²⁷ At least as striking as its poverty levels is Haiti's distribution of wealth, as it is one of the most unequal countries situated in the most unequal region of the world. Haiti's Gini coefficient is 0.65, while average income inequality in the Caribbean lies at 0.38 (with 0 corresponding to absolute equality and 1 corresponding to absolute inequality) (World Bank).

Recent hikes in world food prices have significantly increased hardship for the poor in Haiti, which ironically is a net importer of food. Before trade liberalisation began in the early 1980s, Haiti was able to meet most of its own food needs and was self-sufficient in rice production. The dominant neo-liberal doctrine and successive structural adjustment programmes imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international monetary institutions; i.e. Washington Consensus policies meant for the Haitian economy 'dramatic cuts in wages and in the size of public sector workforce, along with the elimination of import tariffs, the ongoing privatisation of public utilities and state assets and the reorientation of domestic production in favour of cash crops popular in North American supermarkets' (Hallward, 2007: 5). The loan conditionality stipulated by the IMF²⁸ required Haiti to reduce its tariff protections for rice and other agricultural products, and exposed the country's comparatively weak markets to international competition, a pressure impossible to hold up against. Within two years, US-subsidised rice flooded the market and destroyed domestic production. Furthermore, the Organization of American States (OAS) and UN sanctions regime in the early nineties was all but “smart sanctions”; this had a long and devastating impact on the Haitian economy in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and led to the abolition of jobs in the formal employment sector (Einsiedel & Malone, 2006: 162; Cockayne & Pfister, 2008).

Today, unemployment in Haiti is dramatic. According to *l'Institut haïtien de statistique et informatique* (IHSI), unemployment rates lie at approximately 30 percent for the whole country, but most probably reality is much worse.²⁹ The situation is even worse in the cities (45.5 percent in the country's capital, Port-au-Prince), among women (32.2 percent), and reaches the alarming level of 62 percent for Haitians aged between 15 and 19. As a matter of fact, the bulk of the Haitian population is unable to exercise basic economic, political, social and cultural rights. This is where the root causes of Haiti's situation of fragility lie – a view widely shared by interview partners consulted for this paper.

Almost two-thirds of the Haitian population live in rural areas and depend on the agricultural sector, mainly small-scale subsistence farming. But due to extremely hard living conditions and an increasing economic downturn and environmental insecurity, migration to the cities has considerably increased during recent years.³⁰ Historically, Haitian peasants have been politically excluded (Barthélémy, 1989). 'There are two categories of people in Haiti:

24 These are components of human security, based on the UNDP's broad definition: 'freedom from fear and freedom from want'.

25 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2008). *Human Development Indices: A statistical update 2008 - HDI rankings*. Available at <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/>.

26 In the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region, nine percent of the population live on US\$1 a day and 23 percent on US\$2 a day.

27 World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) Database, September 2008. Data for 2007. Available at: <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20535285~menuPK:1192694~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html>

28 In 1986, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) provided Haiti with a loan of US\$24.6 million.

29 It is hard to get reliable figures for unemployment in Haiti, but it is generally estimated that about two-thirds do not have a job in the formal economy.

30 See also: 'Haiti: La urbanización acelerada, una de las causas de la degradación del medioambiente en Puerto Príncipe' (Haiti: Rapid urbanisation, one of the causes of environmental degradation in Port-au-Prince), *AlterPresse*, 27th June 2007. Available at <http://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article6143>.

the citizens and the peasants. For the state, Haiti is Port-au-Prince. The state has formalised the exclusion all along the history of the country', says a Haitian civil society representative.³¹

Many interview partners from Haitian civil society and several advisers to the Haitian government³² highlighted the absolutely urgent need to at least contain the increasing migratory pressure on the already overcrowded and impoverished cities, whose infrastructure and economy don't offer any opportunities for migrants. Migrants, on the contrary, risk severe socio-economic marginalisation and could potentially turn into a 'critical explosive mass'³³ that 'any police would be unable to control'.³⁴ Opinions differ regarding the adequate policy options: addressing the rural areas in order to reduce the push factors for migration, or concentrating on the urban spaces to improve livelihoods and mitigate latent potential for unrest. In fact, a combined strategy is necessary. Regarding the short term, however, there are strong feelings that the urban areas exert more immediate needs. A recent International Crisis Group (ICG) report (ICG, 2008) also underlines that the Haitian government and donors need to put in place comprehensive violence reduction programmes that recognise the 'linkages between severe poverty, social deprivation and crime, particularly in the rural communities, where 70 percent of Haitians live, and the high density urban neighbourhoods'.

Another factor that drives farmers to migrate to the cities, but also towards the Dominican Republic and elsewhere, is severe environmental degradation and in particular deforestation (see also Roc, 2008). Charcoal is the main energy source in Haiti and today approximately only 3.8 percent (World Bank, 2008) or even less of the national forest coverage remains intact in the country. Deforestation has had a disastrous effect on soil fertility, given that steep hillsides on which so many Haitian farmers work are particularly susceptible to erosion. Vulnerability to hurricanes and tropical storms and flooding is extreme in Haiti, as recent events have evidenced once more.

When it comes to health security, the situation is equally alarming. Life expectancy at birth is 52 years and 17 percent of children under five suffer from malnutrition. The infant mortality rate lies at 74 per 1,000 live births (LAC 27). Only 54 percent of the population has access to improved water sources (LAC 91) and 30 percent to improved sanitation facilities (LAC 77).³⁵ Haiti has an HIV prevalence of 2.2 percent, the highest in the LAC region and, according to Amnesty International (2008), more women are infected than men.

The dimensions of political, community and personal security are addressed in the following subsection.

THE SECURITY SITUATION IN HAITI IN A NARROWER SENSE AND SSR

As mentioned earlier, political stability in Haiti suffered a setback due to the censure of Prime Minister Alexis in April 2008 and the following political bargaining process until reaching agreement on a new Prime Minister and government. The problem was not so much the bargaining process in itself, which in fact is a constitutive element of democracy, but the fact that the country at the time was struggling with two acute crises: the food crisis intrinsically tied to the global economy and the humanitarian emergency situation caused by the hurricanes and tropical storms. In part due to such crises, the international donor conference scheduled for April 2008 had to be postponed. The elections for one-third of the senate were also delayed and have been rescheduled for April 2009.³⁶ A general concern identified among Haitian interview partners³⁷ was that, as Haiti slithers from crisis into crisis, instead of putting forward a strategic vision and plans for implementation, the government will only deal with "emergencies".

For the time being, the Haitian state is unable to provide reasonable levels of personal security to the majority of its population. Serious crime persists, especially kidnapping and crime related to drug trafficking. Kidnapping has increased in 2008, albeit never reaching the 2006 levels, and is apparently primarily motivated by ransom.

31 Interview in Port-au-Prince, September 2008.

32 Interviews in Port-au-Prince, September 2008.

33 Interview with security advisor to the Haitian government in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, September 2008.

34 Interview in Port-au-Prince, September 2008.

35 World Bank: Development Economics, Development Data Group (DECDG) as of 8th December 2006.

36 Elections to renew the Chamber of Deputies, a second third of the Senate, as well as elections for municipal and local officers are due in November 2009. Presidential elections are scheduled to take place in November 2010.

37 Interviews held in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, September 2008.

On a more general note though, it is worth mentioning that Haiti is less violent than it is usually portrayed to be. According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC) (UNDOC, 2008: 31), Haiti is not even among the top ten most dangerous countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.³⁸ What appears to be clear, however, is that there is a connection between crime and drug trafficking. Organised crime related to transnational drug trafficking networks represents a threat to the majority of the Haitian population as well as to the state itself. In the absence of a sufficiently large and fully operational HNP³⁹, and functioning justice and penitentiary systems, organised crime has serious potential to undermine the stabilisation process in Haiti,⁴⁰ and even more so when taking into account its intimate link to Haiti's corruption problem.⁴¹ In fact, some experts detect a shift from more traditional and territory-based forms of intrastate violence to the increasing importance of transnational threats in Haiti. An OAS study underlines that 'less crime means more growth and stability', and that Haiti could double its annual economic income if it could bring its crime rates down to those of Costa Rica (UNDOC, 2008: 1). In spite of recent trends regarding drug trafficking routes, UNDOC experts think that the Caribbean is likely to maintain its attractiveness for traffickers (UNDOC, 2008: 11-12). In 2005, it was estimated that about 20 tons of cocaine transited through Haiti and the Dominican Republic, showing an upward trend (ibid.). Border control and economic development along the border with the Dominican Republic are thus vital to security and to the economy.

Having said this, potential civil unrest and renewed armed conflict also remain important threats.⁴² Violence caused by armed gangs is generally considered to be under control after the MINUSTAH-led operations in the slums of Haiti's cities in 2006 and early 2007. But this does not mean that security and stability are consolidated,⁴³ given the lack of a visible peace dividend among ex-gang members and the poor in general, whose alternatives to make a living in the formal or even in the informal economy are extremely limited if not non-existent.⁴⁴

According to Amnesty International (2008), the human rights situation in Haiti remains dire. Impunity prevails for most abuses. Violence against women and the lack of access to justice and support services for survivors, particularly in rural areas, are serious concerns, and in 2007 journalists continued to be the target of threats and killings. Furthermore, thousands of people suffer detention in overcrowded prisons without charge or trial. At least 175,000 children continue to work as domestic workers in conditions equivalent to slave labour and nearly half a million are not in school.

The establishment of an appropriate security structure, including the conclusion of police reform, the strengthening of the justice sector – including the penitentiary system, which is considered a “time bomb”⁴⁵ – and instituting more effective border management, constitute the core “hard” security areas where progress is crucial for consolidation of stability in Haiti.⁴⁶ National strategy papers exist for all three areas of reform, but implementation has to be sped up whenever possible. The strategies have been elaborated in more or less joint exercises between the Haitian government and the international community, in particular MINUSTAH. The needs assessment in these areas seems to be quite clear, and interviews with representatives of the international community in Haiti and in European capitals on the one hand, and the Haitian government and civil society representatives on the other, did not reveal significant disagreements. A recently published report by the ICG about SSR in Haiti (ICG, 2008) recommends speeding up the process to create a 14,000-strong HNP and to increase transparency in the vetting process.⁴⁷ To strengthen the rule of law, it is identified as crucial to implement the legislation the Haitian Parliament passed in late 2007,⁴⁸ to conclude the vetting of the members of the Superior Judicial Council, and to establish special chambers to bring cases of serious crime to trial.

38 Based on murder rates, these include Venezuela, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Jamaica.

39 The HNP is the only remaining armed force in Haiti after Aristide dismantled the army.

40 Interviews with MINUSTAH representatives in Port au Port-au-Prince, September 2008.

41 In 2007 Haiti was ranked 177 out of 180 in Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index.

42 United Nations Security Council (2007). *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (S/2007/503)*, p.6. Available at <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep07.htm>; Center on International Cooperation, New York University (2008). *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. pp.112-3

43 Assessment based on interviews with MINUSTAH and Haitian government representatives, September/October 2008.

44 Assessment based on interviews with Haitian civil society as well as advisers to the government and representatives of the international community.

45 Interview at the MINUSTAH corrections unit, September 2008.

46 United Nations Security Council (2008). Op. cit. p.14. The other areas are the resolution of political differences through dialogue and completion of the election cycle; the extension of state authority; and improvements in socio-economic development.

47 There are ongoing allegations regarding widespread corruption within the PNH and complicity in kidnapping.

48 More information is available from the Haitian Parliament website at www.parlementhaitien.ht.

The state of Haiti's penitentiary system is alarming; both in terms of human rights and security aspects. The reform process of the HNP in general and the military operations against the armed gangs in particular, such as in the slum of Cité Soleil and elsewhere, led to increasing levels of detention and today prisons are desperately overcrowded.⁴⁹ Nationwide, more than 83 percent of detainees continue to be held in pre-trial detention, and in the national penitentiary of Port-au-Prince, more than 95 percent of inmates have never seen a judge.

Although there is growing awareness about the importance for long-term security, the reform of the penitentiary system in Haiti does not receive enough attention, neither from the Haitian government nor from the international community – including the EU. The countries most committed to this issue for the time being are Canada, the US and, to a certain extent, Norway. Concerning MINUSTAH, it is striking that alongside almost 2,000 police officers, there are only 22 correction officers on the ground. MINUSTAH officials have expressed their concern about this imbalance.⁵⁰

KEY ACTORS AND DIVISION OF LABOUR ON THE GROUND

The above outlined “hard security areas” are addressed through SSR,⁵¹ although the term is not systematically used on the ground. MINUSTAH does not have an explicit mandate to conduct SSR activities in Haiti, which means that there is no SSR unit on the ground.

EU Member States contribute on a bilateral basis to MINUSTAH.⁵² As of January 2008, five EU Member States were among the top ten providers of assessed contributions to UN peacekeeping operations.⁵³ However, only France and Spain are currently providing uniformed personnel to MINUSTAH, namely 60 French and 36 Spanish police officers.⁵⁴

The field of SSR shows a clear division of labour among the actors of the international community in Haiti. Apart from MINUSTAH, it is Canada, France, the US, and to a minor extent, Spain that are involved in SSR activities and cooperate on a bilateral basis with the Haitian government. This division of labour has its roots in the historical and political interests of the above-mentioned countries (see also Bretherton & Vogler, 2006: 162).

Regarding France, the pre-existing bilateral colonial ties speak for themselves; as for the US, Haiti lies in its so-called “backyard”, that is to say, in its traditional sphere of interference. Being a transit place for drugs – primarily destined for the US – and a country that generates considerable flows of migration, Haiti clearly represents a security threat according to US doctrine. Spain's only recently reinforced interest in Haiti is due to its aspirations to promote its role in the LAC region as a whole. It also responds to strong economic interests in the region in general, and in the Dominican Republic and Cuba in particular. Additionally, from a humanitarian perspective, it made sense that Spanish aid flows would reflect Haiti being the poorest country in the region.

The EU, understood as the European Community and the Member States, does not carry out any joint SSR activities in Haiti. This is mainly due to its traditional role as a development and humanitarian actor in Haiti, as well as the country's lack of importance to Europe in geo-strategic terms. Nevertheless, SSR, understood as

49 According to the UN, as of 31st July 2008, 7,530 inmates, of whom 325 are women, were held in 17 prisons, with only 4,884 m² of living space. In the national penitentiary in Port-au-Prince with a capacity for 450 inmates, 3,793 detainees occupied 1,995 m² of living space, a little more than half a square metre per prisoner, and far below the international norm of 2.5 m² per prisoner, which reflects a basic minimum in terms of human rights and safety. See: United Nations Security Council (2008). *Op. cit.* p.9.

50 Interviews held in Port-au-Prince, September 2008.

51 For the time being, there is no generally accepted definition of what SSR entails. This article uses the rather broad definition set out by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC): ‘The overall objective of security system reform [also know as security sector reform] is to create a secure environment that is conducive to development, poverty reduction and democracy. This secure environment rests upon two essential pillars: i) the ability of the state, through its development policy and programmes, to generate conditions that mitigate the vulnerabilities to which its people are exposed, and ii) the ability of the state to use the range of policy instruments at its disposal to prevent or address security threats that affect society's well-being’. Hänggi & Scherrer, 2008: 5; OECD, 2005: 16.

52 They contribute financially as well as via additional resources on a non-reimbursable basis in the form of transportation, supplies, personnel and financial contributions above and beyond their assessed share of peacekeeping.

53 France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands and Sweden are among the top 20.

54 Figures as of 30th September 2008. See: United Nations (September 2008). *UN Mission's contributions by country*. Available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2008/sep08_5.pdf.

police, judicial and penitentiary reform, and the reinforcement of democratic control over the security apparatus, has recently been identified as one of the issues for EU to include in its political dialogue with the Haitian government; an idea put forward by France.

France explicitly addresses SSR in its Framework Partnership Document (*Document Cadre de Partenariat*, or DCP) for Haiti, framing SSR as democratic governance, stressing the link between the Haitian population and the institutions in charge of protecting it. French bilateral cooperation concentrates on the HNP, the justice sector as well as institutional support for the Parliament (i.e. training to exercise democratic control over the security sector) and local governance related to decentralisation.

Generally speaking and less so for France, MINUSTAH's lead on SSR in Haiti seems to be well accepted among the relevant donors on the ground. However, the integrated mission is very much criticised for the role it is taking in the field of socio-economic development. Europeans especially tend to think that MINUSTAH should limit its activities to guarantee security and stability in Haiti in a narrower sense, i.e. take care of the immediate security situation. There are even voices that express concern that MINUSTAH has "monopolised" the dialogue between Haitians and the international community, and created "a barrier". A certain rivalry between the EU and the UN on the ground would be difficult to deny.

For the time being, MINUSTAH's presence is indispensable (Einsiedel & Malone, 2006: 161 ff; Gauthier, 2008).⁵⁵ It is not the aim of this paper to reflect on an appropriate exit strategy for MINUSTAH or the difficulties uniformed personnel from contributing countries face in their national contexts in order to get mandates renewed. Sooner or later the mission will leave Haiti, and it seems rather unlikely that the country will become a UN protectorate.⁵⁶ The remaining actors committed to Haiti's recovery need to be prepared for that scenario and better coordinate their efforts in order to consolidate MINUSTAH's achievements. Once the mission leaves Haiti, the remaining actors will in fact share with the Haitian government and society the responsibility to sustain the country's stability in the mid- and long-term, which will not be possible without addressing the lack of socio-economic development. In this context, it is of utmost importance to raise awareness among donors and the government that the momentum to forge such a pact and agree on a realistic strategy has a very tight timeline.⁵⁷ So-called "windows of opportunity" in post-conflict or post-violence situations usually don't stay open for several years.

Donors in Haiti can roughly be divided into three groups: International Financial Institutions (IFIs), such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the World Bank; UN agencies (integrated in the UN mission that includes MINUSTAH); and multilateral and bilateral donors, among them the European Commission (EC) and the EU Member States. These donors are engaged in all seven dimensions of human security. However, the predominant opinion regarding aid effectiveness in Haiti is that it still faces enormous challenges. In November 2007, and responding to a request from the international donor community, the Haitian government issued its "own" Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), named 'Document de Stratégie Nationale pour la Croissance et pour la Réduction de la Pauvreté' (National Strategy Document for Growth and Poverty Reduction). The document identifies three priority areas, namely growth vectors, human development and democratic governance. The three vectors of growth are agriculture and rural development, tourism and infrastructure. The human development pillar comprises education and training, health, water and sanitation, persons with disabilities, childhood poverty, young people, HIV and AIDS, and finally gender equity. The democratic governance pillar addresses the justice system, the reform of the HNP and the modernisation of the state. Opinions about the quality of the document as well as implementation of the participatory approach vary among Haitians and among the donor community.⁵⁸ Having said this, the more crucial question is nevertheless if and how the Haitian government is going to translate the agreed strategic aims into concrete programmes for the different sectors and operational roadmaps for implementation. The international donor conference, which should originally have taken place in April 2008 and is now scheduled for the first half of 2009, must be the forum to make the strategy operative and enhance donor coordination.

55 See also the comments of the Secretary-General's Special Advisor on Haiti, John Reginald Dumas, in Bill Gamer and Glenn Hall, 'UN peacekeepers should stay in Haiti for 20 years, envoy says' *Bloomberg*, 30th March 2004. Available at <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/haiti/2004/0330envoy.htm>.

56 Morneau argues that 'the international community must establish a UN protectorate or trusteeship, or, to be more politically correct, a transitional administration, for a period of ten to fifteen years'. 2006: 81

57 See also OECD Factsheet, "Ensuring fragile states are not left behind", December 2007.

58 Interviews in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, September 2008.

Field interviews have revealed a series of dysfunctional communication dynamics between representatives of the international donor community and their Haitian interlocutors, which often translates into stereotyped statements about the respective “other”.⁵⁹ On the one hand, donor representatives tend to complain about a lack of interlocutors and their capacity and/or will in terms of strategies and action plans, as well as about Haitians being very “proud” and difficult to talk to. On the Haitian side, perceptions prevail that donors lack understanding of the country and its history, that they do not want to listen but impose their own agenda and keep thinking that no matter what, engagement must be useful for the country. These perceptions and dynamics are clearly an obstacle to operationality.

59 In Port-au-Prince, Brussels, Paris and Madrid during the period of April 2008 to October 2008.

THE EU'S ENGAGEMENT IN HAITI

As stated earlier, the engagement of the EU in Haiti is traditionally centred on development cooperation and on humanitarian assistance;⁶⁰ that is to say, it is livelihood focused. The EU is clearly not a security actor in Haiti in the conventional sense of the term, nor what could be called a “hard security actor”. This paper argues that the EU's role in Haiti lies at the intersection of security and development.

The EU in Haiti *is* the EC, represented via the delegation of the EC and several EU Member States, among which France, Germany and Spain are of particular relevance. This means that the EU does not speak with one voice in Haiti. This is perceived as detrimental to its visibility as a unitary actor and clearly not conducive to a more effective dialogue with Haitian authorities.

The EC has different faces in Haiti, in the sense that it is present in various policy areas. Within the institutional structure of the Commission, characterised by the fragmentation of external policy between several Directorates-General (DGs), Haiti as part of the group of Africa Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries is primarily dealt with in DG Development and EuropeAid, but also in DG External Relations and DG Trade⁶¹. The EU is thus present as a development and humanitarian actor, an economic actor and as a political actor in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). As Bretherton and Vogler (2006:163) point out, ‘CFSP cannot be regarded as a common policy in a sense analogous to the Common Commercial Policy, rather it is a highly institutionalised and complex process of consultation and cooperation between Member State governments’.

HAITI ON THE EU AGENDA

How important is Haiti for the EU? Answers to this question shed light on the role the EU is assuming and will possibly assume in the future.⁶² From an overall perspective, it can be stated that Haiti is not a priority for the EU. The country is far away geographically, is little known and it is not perceived as a significant threat to European security. From a development perspective, however, and especially in its condition as a Least Developed Country (LDC), it is a priority. But again within this group, Haiti seems to suffer a certain lack of attention at the highest level in comparison to certain African countries, although signs of improvement become apparent, for example Development Commissioner Louis Michel's visit to Haiti and the reopening of a EC humanitarian office in Port-au-Prince in February 2009.⁶³ On the other hand, less development-related areas of engagement are scarcely taken into account, and one could raise the question if Haiti would get more political attention if it were located on the African continent.

The fact that Haiti is still quite visible on the European agenda is mainly due to France, or rather French interests as well as renewed EC attention. The French EU Presidency⁶⁴ has translated into significantly more attention for the Caribbean country, with Haiti being one of the pilot countries for the EU's response to situations of fragility, for example. Sweden and Germany are also relatively committed, although in the context of the Paris agenda,

60 A detailed description of the EU as a humanitarian actor in Haiti lies beyond the scope of this paper.

61 It is clearly beyond the scope of this paper to address the question of how EU trade policy towards Haiti (i.e. the Economic Partnership Agreement that is currently being negotiated) would impact on Haiti's situation of fragility. Nevertheless, and given the limits of aid in helping to produce growth, the issue clearly deserves more attention among researchers and the policy-makers.

62 The following insights have mainly been drawn from interviews with EC and Member State officials in Brussels, Paris, Madrid and Port-au-Prince.

63 For 10 years the EC had managed its humanitarian aid from its office in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.

64 July to December 2008.

Haiti is no longer a focus country for German development cooperation. Meanwhile, Spain has significantly boosted its aid and also political attention to Haiti. Aside from humanitarian reasons, Spain has strong interests in a stable Caribbean region, in particular due to its foreign direct investments in the Dominican Republic and also Cuba.

An ESDP mission is unlikely to be deployed to Haiti,⁶⁵ although the idea has been on the table of the Council of the European Union's Political and Security Committee (PSC) – in the form of a rule of law or customs and border mission – and Haiti is on the “watchlist”, the primary early warning tool within the Council.⁶⁶ But due to limited financial resources and, more importantly, a lack of political interest,⁶⁷ this has never materialised into action. On the one hand, there is at least scepticism among EU Member States regarding financing a European mission suspected of essentially being equipped ‘with a French flag’, for a country that is generally not considered a priority or what is often called a “hot spot”. With MINUSTAH on the ground, European countries that have strong interests in Haiti prefer to contribute via the UN. Furthermore, Europeans do not want to start a “mission competition”, and less so considering the fact that MINUSTAH is under Latin American leadership.⁶⁸ Probably an ESDP mission would increase the EU's visibility in Haiti, but visibility for visibility's sake should not be the criteria to act upon.

This paper argues that the EU should not engage in SSR through an ESDP mission, as such an engagement would hamper the existing division of labour within the international community on the ground and most probably further complicate the dialogue between the international community and Haitian authorities. It should, nevertheless play a complementary role through its governance approach and cooperate with MINUSTAH and Members States already active in the area of SSR, stepping in – where jointly identified as necessary – through its flexible funding Instruments, in particular the IFS. There was interest among MINUSTAH officials that the EU engage further in the field of corruption and drugs, as well as border and customs management – including communications in the border zone.⁶⁹ In this regard it was pointed out that Europe was developing as a market for drugs that transit through the Caribbean and that a policy choice had to be made between early intervention in the trafficking routes or attacking the problem once within the borders. Intelligence, followed by funds to act, was underlined as the best leverage.

ROOT-CAUSE CENTRED DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND NEED FOR COORDINATION

European development cooperation in Haiti is root-cause centred. Today the EC ranks fourth within the top ten donors of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in Haiti, US and Canada being the most important bilateral donors, ahead of France (fifth) and Spain (ninth).⁷⁰ Over the last 15 years, the EC disbursed €711 million to Haiti, although there was a significant cut in aid flows in 2001, when the Council of the EU imposed restrictive measures on its development aid to Haiti after irregularities in the May 2000 elections.⁷¹ These measures meant that direct budget support programmes were suspended and €84.4 million from the 8th European Development Fund (EDF) was principally channelled through non-governmental bodies; allocations from the 9th EDF for Haiti were also suspended, as was the signature of the corresponding national indicative programme.⁷² Channelling aid through bodies other than the government is a common and, to a certain degree, understandable practice for donors that are reluctant to provide money to a government they consider corrupt, not fully representative and incapable of absorbing the money in a way that benefits the population. However, Ball (2002: 731) points out

65 This conclusion is mainly drawn from several interviews held with EC and Council officials.

66 Watchlist documents are Council-owned, confidential and reviewed every six months. They provide information on countries either in, or with the potential to fall into, crisis to encourage joined-up actions within the European Council of Ministers and across Member State foreign policies. See: International Alert & Saferworld, 2005: 23.

67 A European Council official also points out that in the Council, Haiti is almost exclusively seen from a development perspective and that in general the country's reality is very little known.

68 Strengthening Latin American actorness on the regional as well as global scale lies at the heart of European policy towards Latin America, a region that is perceived as one of the most promising partners for effective multilateralism.

69 Interviews in Port-au-Prince, September 2008.

70 According to OECD, World Bank. See <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/26/1877775.gif>.

71 Within the framework of the Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, the Council of the EU applied a set of so-called appropriate measures (Council Decision of 29th January 2001).

72 See also ‘Commissioner Nielson meets interim Prime Minister of Haiti’, *Europa Press Releases RAPID*, 12th May 2004. Available at http://www.europa.eu/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=IP/04/634%7C0%7CRAPID&lg=EN.

that ‘if the donors postpone substantially strengthening institutions and building human-resource capacity until a new government is elected, or if they turn preferentially to non-governmental bodies to design and execute peacebuilding programs, there is a strong probability that the post-election government will be no more prepared to carry out key tasks than was the pre-election government’.⁷³ In hindsight, it is worth reflecting on whether in the end it would have been less costly for the EU to stay engaged in development activities channelled through the government as well as in a political dialogue and remain “close” to the political process in Haiti.

In the EC’s Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for Haiti, which refers to the period 2008–2013, the three identified focal areas for community development cooperation are infrastructure, governance and education.⁷⁴ From the 10th EDF, €173 million (60 percent) is foreseen to be spent on infrastructure, €36 million on governance (decentralisation and rule of law) and €48 million on general direct budget support for the Haitian government. The latter can be seen as a vote of confidence from the EU, which has been recognised in a very positive way by Haitian government officials from the MPCE.⁷⁵ A further €8.8 million is expected to be allocated for a programme to support non-state actors. The CSP is a product of a joint programming exercise between the EC, France, Spain and, to a certain extent, Germany and Sweden.

A Haitian government representative consulted for this paper⁷⁶ stated that the only sector perceived as ‘somewhat imposed’ was governance, i.e. the area of decentralisation. The sectors of infrastructure and education were said to be in line with the priorities of the Haitian government, outlined in their strategy for poverty reduction and growth. Decentralisation was revealed as being an issue on which there is little understanding or agreement between European and Haitian authorities.⁷⁷ On the Haitian side, the question often put forward is how to decentralise a state that barely exists. There is clearly a need for further discussion on this issue, especially when taking into account that according to an OECD study (2008), most decentralisation work fails to adequately consider issues of centre-periphery relations and the complexity of centre-periphery political settlement.

As with many fragile states, Haiti is highly dependent on international aid and at the same time has been suffering from high levels of aid volatility.⁷⁸ The country is sometimes pessimistically described as an ‘open-air museum of failed projects’. The lack of donor alignment, one of the principles of the Paris Declaration,⁷⁹ is striking and has been acknowledged by almost all interview partners. It is widely recognised that donors are not sufficiently coordinated and that their engagement is mainly driven by their own agendas, this is to say supply-driven. The rationale that because Haiti’s needs are so great, any donor assistance must be useful (i.e. something is better than nothing) has proved to be wrong. This sort of “donor philosophy” has been severely criticised by nearly all Haitian interview partners and has also been critically acknowledged as being the case by many of the donor representatives interviewed. In addition, on the Haitian side, there is a serious lack of government capacity to formulate priorities, strategies and plans for implementation (see also Moita, 2008), as well as at least a lack of capacity to efficiently coordinate and absorb international funds.

There is a considerable degree of awareness that lack of donor coordination on the strategic, programming and above all implementation side, is counterproductive to the overall goal of ameliorating the living conditions of the Haitian population. This awareness has triggered some important initiatives.

A UN Humanitarian and Resident Coordinator for Haiti was appointed in December 2006, and a formal mechanism led by UNDP has been set up to assist the Haitian Ministry for Planning and External Cooperation (*Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe*, or MPCE)⁸⁰ in the massive task of coordinating the highly fragmented and dispersed “donor community” on the ground, i.e. setting up an operational structure that facilitates work. For the different sectors of engagement of the international community, UNDP proposes a

73 On the topic of international aid undermining state- and/or peacebuilding efforts, see also Call, C. T. (2008), “Ending wars, building states”. In C. T. Call with V. Wyeth, *Building states to build peace*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p.12.

74 In the framework of the division of labour, Member States are in charge of education.

75 Based on interviews in Port-au-Prince, September 2008 and in Madrid, October 2008.

76 Interview in Madrid, October 2008.

77 Assessment based on interviews with EC and Member State officials in Brussels and Paris, and Haitian government representatives, held between May and September 2008.

78 See also http://www.oecd.org/document/12/0,2340,en_2649_33693550_34601932_1_1_1_1,00.html (accessed 2 February 2009).

79 Haiti and the most important donors on the ground have signed the Paris Declaration for Aid Effectiveness. In addition to that, Haiti is an OECD pilot country for the implementation of the Paris Declaration in a fragile state.

80 According to its French denomination, *Ministère de la Planification et la Coopération Externe*.

coordination structure around three axes that take into account Haiti's strategy for growth and poverty reduction: vectors of growth; human development and social services; democratic governance and justice and security. In spite of an apparent awareness of the urgent need for better coordination and some positive tendencies, notably among the core donors,⁸¹ the fundamental problem remains a lack of will and commitment, and the lack of an explicitly defined common objective. Divergent political interests lead to divergent and potentially conflicting political agendas, and also, eagerness among core donors to take on the role of coordinator presents an additional challenge. The EU should build on the positive intra-EU coordination efforts it has realised regarding Haiti (i.e. division of labour, joint assessment and programming, etc.) and take on a constructive role in the wider UN-led coordination exercise.

Furthermore, it would be of utmost importance to set up a donor database, i.e. promote conditions for more transparency and accountability in order to have reliable data on who gives how much for what and who does what. For the time being, there is said to be little interest from the side of the Haitian government. The EU might consider increased pressure on national authorities regarding such an exercise.

TOWARDS A SECURITY-SENSITIVE DEVELOPMENT POLICY?

As mentioned above, an ESDP mission is very unlikely to be deployed to Haiti. Nevertheless the EU has a tendency to assume a role as a more security-informed development actor; an actor that addresses the root causes of Haiti's situation of fragility but is aware of the more conventional security challenges the country is facing. This tendency is manifest in the revitalisation of the political dialogue, as well as in some concrete projects the EC is financing through its relatively new IfS.⁸²

The short-term or crisis response component⁸³ of the IfS is a rapid and flexible tool⁸⁴ at the disposal of the EC to engage in the fields of conflict prevention, post-conflict political stabilisation and early recovery after a natural disaster. The instrument's rationale is to re-establish the conditions necessary to implement the EC's development assistance under other long-term instruments.⁸⁵ The IfS, which can only be triggered in a situation of crisis or emerging crisis, covers a wide spectrum of activities in the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, direct consequences of violent conflict, promotion of stabilisation through good governance, as well as activities of early recovery, which ensures that basic development needs are addressed soon after a crisis.

Although Haiti is not considered a political priority for the EC and the development focus prevails, in 2007 the sum of €3 million from the IfS⁸⁶ was assigned to the country. The project identified by the EC delegation in Port-au-Prince⁸⁷ has a post-violence rehabilitation rationale, is people-centred and has entered the early implementation phase. It consists of urban rehabilitation efforts in Martissant, a very densely populated and extremely poor neighbourhood of Port-au-Prince with over 300,000 inhabitants. Apart from the abject living conditions, the population of Martissant has been especially exposed to violence. Neither the state nor MINUSTAH had been able to protect citizens from armed violence among different armed groups with varying political and criminal affiliations;⁸⁸ a situation that culminated in July 2006 in a massacre of 22 people. By 2007 and after several military security operations, MINUSTAH and the HNP had largely regained control of Martissant and other slums in Port-au-Prince.⁸⁹ Nevertheless, from a human security perspective, people remain extremely vulnerable,

81 Core donors are the EU, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the IFM, the UN, ACDI, Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional al Desarrollo (AECID), USAID, Agence Française de Développement (AFD) and a representative from one of the so-called ABC-countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile).

82 The Instrument for Stability (IfS) replaced the Rapid Reaction Mechanism. The legal base for the IfS is Regulation (EC) No. 1717/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

83 The budgetary allocation for the IfS for the period 2007-2013 amounts to €2,062 million, of which €1,487 million is for its short-term or crisis response component.

84 No annual programming is done for the IfS, given that it is an ad hoc and highly political instrument.

85 It is complementary to long-term programmes under relevant geographic financing instruments, providing support in two phases: emergency response measures and interim response programmes with a duration of no more than 18 months.

86 According to the needs assessment, the EC delegation in Haiti had originally asked for €5 million. Of the €3 million assigned, more than €1 million is already contracted.

87 The initiative of delegations on the ground is crucial for getting funds out of the IfS.

88 See also: Michael Deibert, 'Haiti: The terrible truth about Martissant', *AlterPresse*, 13th February 2007. Available at <http://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article5681>.

89 Namely in Cité Soleil and Bel-Air, two other slums of Port-au-Prince.

insecure and isolated, and many are seriously traumatised by violence.

The project funded under the IfS aims at rehabilitating key infrastructure and public spaces in Martissant, improving livelihoods and enhancing job creation, especially for young people. The project has three components: urban planning – in particular, the construction of a park in the heart of the neighbourhood; water and sanitation; and training and jobs. It has entered the early implementation phase⁹⁰ and conversations maintained with members of the three operating organisations indeed gave the impression that the project very much addresses peoples' needs, and that they have been actively consulted and involved in the design of the project. A further added value of the project is that it does not privilege ex-gang leaders or members, but offers opportunities to those that have been victims of violence, who often feel frustrated because they receive relatively less attention from the international donor community.

Findings from a study conducted by L'Institut Interuniversitaire de Recherche et de Développement⁹¹ in Cité Soleil in 2008 about the impact of international aid on the living conditions of the inhabitants of Cité Soleil, underlines the urgent need for a participatory approach in order to identify the real needs of the population on the ground. Too many development projects fail or do not prove sustainable because donors do not listen to the voices of the people, and the Haitian government is not necessarily fulfilling its role as an agent to represent their interests. In Cité Soleil, for example, large amounts of international aid was spent on the construction of a new market that people now are avoiding because, besides some technical shortcomings, the place has a violent history and has remained unsafe for clients and salespersons.

The gap between people and donors tends to be huge in Haiti. In the first place, donors usually do not implement the projects, which is the case for the EC. Furthermore, donors tend to pay more attention to interlocutors from international NGOs and/or the national government, who might not necessarily be the most appropriate voice for what the people need. A Haitian civil society representative pointed out that there is an urgent need for 'real projects for the people' and that 'too many projects systematically exclude and marginalise people'. Education as well as employment opportunities seem to be extremely high situated on the people's agenda.

THE “FRAGILITY EXERCISE”

The question of aid effectiveness is particularly at stake in situations of fragility. Following the adoption of *Council Conclusions on a EU response to situations of fragility* by the EU's General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC),⁹² Haiti has been chosen as one of the pilot countries where the EC is currently testing the EU response to situations of fragility.

As a matter of fact, it is not the fragility concept itself that can potentially add value to the EU's response to the situation in Haiti.⁹³ Fragility is not a new phenomenon at all; the problem remains how to effectively deal with it. The main objective of the pilot approach is to address fragility in Haiti and its root causes more rapidly, efficiently and effectively. Responding to the EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in Development Policy⁹⁴ and the Consensus on Development,⁹⁵ it is about improved donor coordination, alignment to national processes and increased division of labour; it is about procedures not about substance, and about making the principles of the fragility communication operational.

90 Thanks to the European Commission Delegation in Port-au-Prince, the author of this paper was able to visit the part of Martissant where the park will be built. It was also possible to meet with three of the operators of the project from FOKAL (Fondation Connaissance et Liberté), Oxfam GB in cooperation with SOOPA (Solidarité des Organisations de Producteurs et Artisans Haitiens) and GRET (Research and Technological Exchange Group).

91 See also the website of the Institute at: http://www.zellig.net/site_inured/int_en.html.

92 Adopted during the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) of November 2007. See: EU General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) (2007). *Council conclusions on a EU response to situations of fragility*, 2831st External Relations Council meeting in Brussels, 19th-20th November 2007. Available at http://www.eu2007.pt/UE/vEN/Reunioes_Eventos/ConselhosMinistros/CAGRE5.htm.

93 This idea has been repeatedly emphasised by European Commission and Member States officials during conversations held between May and September 2008 in European headquarters and Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

94 Commission of the European Communities (2007). *EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour in Development Policy*, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Brussels, 28th February 2007, COM(2007) 72 final. Available at <http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r13003.htm>.

95 European Parliament Council Commission (2006). 'The European Consensus on Development', *Official Journal of the European Union*, 2006/C 46/01. Available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:046:SOM:EN:HTML>.

The fragility pilot country approach is essentially an opportunity for joint assessment, to engage in a dialogue, improve coordination and map the activities of the EC, the Member States and other relevant actors in Haiti. This is done in the framework of an informal process at working group-level between the EC and interested Member States, in Haiti and in capitals and headquarters.

Two meetings have been held so far, and a “fragility roadmap” has been set up which aims at developing a structured EU political dialogue with the authorities on a selected number of priority topics; promoting an inclusive process with the government and other donors to address the root causes of fragility; strengthening local coordination processes and enhancing interaction between the field and responsible policy-makers in headquarters and capitals; as well as improving the efficiency and effectiveness of EU involvement, by continuing to apply flexible procedures where appropriate and by addressing human resource difficulties.

Having said this, it is worth noting that the pilot exercise can only be as useful as its participants are committed. In fact it has been lacking commitment from Member States, and the EC and France have been the driving forces for this initiative. It would be appropriate to maintain and further explore it in order to benefit from the informal dialogue channels that have been established.

Regarding political dialogue between the EU and Haiti, political attention had drifted away after the departure of Aristide in 2004 and the following deployment of MINUSTAH. This means that Haiti had disappeared from the Council working group agendas.⁹⁶ The elections in 2006 received considerable attention though, and currently the EU is making efforts to revitalise its political dialogue with Haiti. It was the Slovenian EU presidency that requested a Head of Mission (HoM) report on Haiti in 2008, and the following French presidency showed a strong commitment. Indeed regular political dialogue may be the best early warning tool available to the EU in its relation with Haiti. In the framework of the pilot country exercise on fragility, SSR – understood as police, judicial and penitentiary reform, and the reinforcement of democratic control over the security apparatus – has been identified as one of the issues the EU would like to include in its political dialogue with the Haitian government. Other identified issues include institutional capacity-building, strengthening of the constitutional system, reinforcing the electoral system, supporting human rights – with a special focus on the situation of children, fighting corruption, public finance management, economic governance and policy, as well as agriculture and food security. It would be important to include the sensitive issue of relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic in the political dialogue.

Such political dialogue would probably take place two or three times a year and consist of meetings with the European Heads of Missions from France, Spain, Germany and the EC and the government of Haiti, i.e. the president, the prime minister, and the presidents of the two chambers of parliament.

96 The relevant working groups in the European Council are COLAT and AMLAT.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The security situation in Haiti can only prove sustainable in the mid- and long-term if the socio-economic situation in Haiti shows significant improvement; that is to say, if the peace dividend translates into real livelihood improvement for the vast majority of Haitians who suffer severe levels of deprivation in terms of human development and human security. Therefore, the biggest challenge for Haiti remains the structural transformation of the local political economy, which implies the crucial need for a feasible national strategy for socio-economic development and the political will and capacity to implement it.⁹⁷ Development must not necessarily be state-led, but in spite of all its shortcomings, the Haitian state appears to be the most adequate actor to put forward a national development project, including the necessary bargaining process with the private sector. Ultimately, it is the Haitian state that needs to forge a social pact between the different agents that hold power in Haiti. It is unlikely though that this highly challenging endeavour can be successfully addressed without external support.

Regarding the role of the international community, and the EU in particular, it should be recognised that its scope for influence in this struggle is limited, albeit important. Neither MINUSTAH nor the international donor community can “fix” Haiti’s fragility, but they can assist the process of doing so and have assumed that responsibility, especially towards the Haitian people. In this spirit of shared responsibility, the sustained commitment of the international community is crucial. Changing donor priorities and aid volatility must be avoided, as they contribute to further weakening the state and ultimately play into the hands of peace and development spoilers, such as organised crime related to drug trafficking and corruption. This recommendation goes for the international community as a whole and for the EU in particular. In comparison to MINUSTAH, with its budgetary and mandatory constraints, donors in general and the EU in particular have a comparative advantage, as their engagement is more long-term by definition and less constrained. There is a possibility that for the medium and the long term, Haiti could receive more rather than less funds, given that there is a tendency within the EU to significantly reduce aid flows to middle-income countries and concentrate instead on the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the poorest countries in the world. The European Parliament in particular is lobbying for a reorientation of aid policy along these lines.

Stability and peace are precarious, given Haiti’s acute vulnerability to external shocks and the devastating effects of the food crisis and the hurricanes in 2008. That is why any proposed public action – ideally coordinated between the government, the international (donor) community and the private sector – must have quick pay-offs that have direct impact on the lives of ordinary people. In the best case, these pay-offs should be attributable to the government, rather than to donors, and help forge the legitimacy of the state. Even if of limited scope, it is important to help generate hope for the future and in the same breath, confidence in the ongoing peacebuilding process among the population.

An additional general recommendation – widely recognised, but still insufficiently implemented – is better coordination within the donor community. The international donor conference to take place in the first half of 2009 in Haiti is the appropriate forum for better donor alignment and constitutes an important window of opportunity. The EU has recognised the need to speak with one voice, and the pilot country exercise could pave the way to reach this objective.

⁹⁷ See also Collier, P. (2008). “Postconflict economic policy”. In C. T. Call with V. Wyeth, *Building states to build peace*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p.103.

Regarding the wider UN-led coordination exercise, which reflects the priority areas identified in the Haitian Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy paper, the EU should build on the positive intra-EU coordination efforts it has realised regarding Haiti (i.e. division of labour, joint assessment and programming, etc.) and take on a constructive role. This is important in order to strengthen strategic partnership with the UN, as recommended in the GAERC's *Council Conclusions on a EU response to situations of fragility*.

As mentioned earlier, the EU might consider increasing pressure on the Haitian government regarding the setting up of a donor database to promote conditions for more transparency and accountability in aid assistance.

The role of a security-informed development actor seems to be the most apparent opportunity for the EU, especially taking into account that MINUSTAH has the lead on SSR and is the primary interlocutor for the Haitian authorities regarding more conventional security issues. Given Haiti's marginal geo-strategic role for the EU and the configuration of EU Member States' interests, an ESDP mission is very unlikely. Such a mission would also hamper the existing division of labour within the international community on the ground and further complicate the dialogue between the international community and Haitian authorities. The EU should instead play a complementary role through its governance approach and cooperate with MINUSTAH and Members States already active in the area of SSR, stepping in – where jointly identified as necessary – through its flexible funding Instruments, in particular the IfS.

The IfS is considered to be a good opportunity for Haiti and fully applicable to some aspects of the development of the law-and-order sector in Haiti. Its full potential has yet to be assessed by the international community on the ground. Among MINUSTAH officials, however, there seemed to be interest in the EU engaging further in the field of corruption and drugs, as well as border and customs management, including communications in the border zone. This should be further examined in the Council of the EU. The risk of Haiti turning into a “narco-state” should not be underestimated, both from a human security and a conventional security perspective.

Having said this, the EU's strength in Haiti remains in its engagement in addressing the structural causes of fragility, as well as in its humanitarian response. The project currently being implemented in the Martissant slum focusing on urban planning, water and sanitation, and job creation reflects the mainstreaming of a human security-inspired post-violence and conflict prevention rationale by the EC. Furthermore, the project very much appears to respond to peoples', and especially young peoples', needs on the ground; namely and above all, employment and urban revitalisation. The existing gap between donors and people is hard to reduce, as donors are not the implementers and have very limited time for a people and/or community-centred needs assessment. Dialogue with the Haitian authorities does not necessarily offer a solution to this dilemma. Independent research that relies on a participatory approach is thus crucial.

The EU's effort to re-establish political dialogue with Haiti is vital and can only be encouraged. A structured and regular political dialogue is probably the best early warning tool available. The relative lack of visibility of the EU can also be seen as an advantage, as it is usually perceived as more dialogue-orientated and less eager to impose its agenda. Furthermore, the inclusion of Haiti in the dialogue with emerging actors and/or donors, in particular Brazil, but also Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, is important, especially when taking into account the role of Brazil in MINUSTAH. The need for a long-term engagement in Haiti must be addressed within the dialogue with emerging actors, as they are facing strong constraints from within their national context. A recent OECD publication (OECD, 2008: 46) highlights the need for 'sustained policy engagement with the major emerging economies and regional actors' when addressing situations of fragility.

Last but not least, the EC delegation in Haiti is currently significantly understaffed. This is most likely due to a lack of interest and consequently resources. The shortage of human resources urgently needs to be addressed, as it hampers or at least slows down the implementation of activities on the ground. In terms of recruitment, the EC should aim at a reasonable mix between high-potential young and more experienced personnel with a significant background in conflict-affected and/or development countries. Recruitment procedures should be sped up in reflection of the crucial need to respond rapidly to situations of fragility like in Haiti, that offer certain windows of opportunity to avoid a relapse into violent conflict.

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