

European conflict resolution policies: truncated peace-building



Fernanda Faria
Richard Youngs

About FRIDE

FRIDE is an independent think-tank based in Madrid, focused on issues related to democracy and human rights; peace and security; and humanitarian action and development. FRIDE attempts to influence policy-making and inform public opinion, through its research in these areas.

Working Papers

FRIDE's working papers seek to stimulate wider debate on these issues and present policy-relevant considerations.

European conflict resolution policies: truncated peace-building

Fernanda Faria and Richard Youngs

March 2010

Fernanda Faria, Independent Consultant.

Programme associate at the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) in Maastricht, and associate researcher to the Institute for Security and International Studies (IEEI) in Lisbon.

Richard Youngs, Director, FRIDE.

Associate professor at the University of Warwick in the United Kingdom.

Cover photo: ISAF/Flickr.

© Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE) 2010.

Goya, 5-7, Pasaje 2º. 28001 Madrid – SPAIN

Tel.: +34 912 44 47 40 – Fax: +34 912 44 47 41

Email: fride@fride.org

All FRIDE publications are available at the FRIDE website: www.fride.org

This document is the property of FRIDE. If you would like to copy, reprint or in any way reproduce all or any part, you must request permission. The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect the opinion of FRIDE. If you have any comments on this document or any other suggestions, please email us at fride@fride.org

Contents

The struggle to link security and development	1
Towards a fragile state strategy?	4
Politics and peace-building	5
EU policies in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR)	8
Conclusion	10

Many analysts have catalogued the paucity of European military deployments. Our aim in this paper is rather to interrogate the political and developmental dimensions of how Europe seeks to temper conflict and state fragility. The EU's commitment to holistic approaches, based on social and economic development and political inclusion, is well known. European commitments to build conflict strategies around development and governance initiatives have now been around for over a decade. A long succession of documents has flagged up the 'security, governance and development' trinity. The European Security Strategy and its 2008 update both identify these linkages as pivotal to more effective EU conflict resolution. Enough time has passed for a stock-take and an expectation that significant progress will have been made. But our analysis suggests that European policies in situations of conflict or fragility remain ineffectual, often unduly narrow in scope and at odds with the EU's declared holism. Most criticism has honed in on the problematic civil-military link in crisis management. But it is in the broader politics of peace-building that European policies are most seriously lacking.

The struggle to link security and development

It is well-known that the EU claims to have a particularly development-sensitive approach to security challenges. Endless speeches and policy documents insist that a unique strength of European approaches is the strong investment in addressing the developmental causes of conflict. The standard refrain is that development policies now feed more systematically into conflict mitigation, while conflict policies are structured so as to clear the way for development. It would be churlish to deny that policy design has genuinely evolved in an attempt to give substance to the development-security link. But the failings in this area are more resonant than the progress achieved.

Europe's overall development aid has recently started to increase, after several years of decline. Indeed, aid amounts reached record levels in 2008. By the end of 2008 EU aid was \$70 billion a year, an 8.6 per cent increase over the previous year. This represented 59 per cent of all global aid, up from 55 per cent in 2007.¹ If current commitments are met, EU development assistance will rise by 50 per cent between 2008 and 2011.

Some pockets of development assistance have been oriented towards key social challenges and security-related activities in conflict states. The Commission and national donors such as the UK and The Netherlands make much of the fact that a higher share of their aid now flows to states beset by serious conflict. Precise figures are hard to come by, but EU officials insist that the fragile state focus means that development programmes are continuing in insecure contexts where previously they would have been wound down. Additionally, large injections of funds have been forthcoming to underpin security strategies in places such as Kosovo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The UK has recently committed itself to channelling a full 50 per cent of its aid to fragile states.² There has been some shift away from big infrastructure projects to initiatives such as vocational training that can be presented as more germane to reducing societies' propensity to conflict. Diplomats insist that development aid is now deployed as a tool not just for poverty reduction but conflict resolution too.

The largest slices of funding go to activities that are redolent of highly traditional conflict prevention and peace support approaches. The EU's flagship support is for the African Peace Facility (APF), to the tune of 300 million euros for 2008–2010. Over 90 per cent of APF funding has been used for keeping African-led peace support operations running and more recently for mediation activities. The focus has not been on building African capacity to address peace and security challenges, as was originally suggested would be the

¹ *Europafrica Bulletin*, 1 April 2009, <https://europafrika.net>

² DfID White Paper, 'Eliminating World Poverty: Building our Common Future', 2009.

case. Additional funds are now committed to a capacity-building programme for the Africa Standby Force, but funding for development activities in this area still represents the lowest share of all APF priorities. The Commission itself stresses that the Stability Instrument (a budget line dedicated to fragile and conflict situations) has not been designed to feed into development goals. Funding from this budget has gone to immediate crisis response priorities such as mediation, demobilisation, security cooperation, displaced persons and transitional justice.³ The Commission recognises that it has funded many projects on the demobilisation and re-integration of combatants that are ineffective because they are completely disconnected from broader development efforts.⁴ The problem extends to member states too; the UK's Stabilisation Unit has 800 'stabilisation advisors' available for deployment but has remained outside the planning of development policy priorities and approaches.⁵

Such traditional peace-building initiatives are, of course, valuable and important. But their prioritisation cuts across the supposedly more long term, socially-oriented approach to resolving conflict and state fragility. Acknowledging this imbalance and the lack of implementation of more coordinated and coherent context-based policies, the EU has been discussing an action plan on security, development and state fragility since 2009. But even the limited concrete commitments proposed in discussions for advancing 'whole of EU approaches'⁶ are questioned by many within the Commission. The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership – the new framework for European security policies on the African continent agreed in 2007 – also promises to enhance all the

routinely advocated linkages between security, development, governance and local ownership, but the Commission admits that it has so far had little tangible impact on concrete policy in individual conflict states.⁷ Most European donors still draw a sharper line than the US between 'development' and 'security' aid. The priority is still increasingly shifting towards crisis management rather than the development-security link. Some critics even suggest that the development-security nexus is promoted disingenuously by security policy-makers simply as a way of accessing new pots of funding.⁸ Even without going this far, the relative weighting of these two policy strands for EU in-country efforts must give rise to concern.

Most European donors still do not formally incorporate a remit for socio-economic questions into their conflict resolution units.⁹ The difficult switch from short term crisis response instruments to long term development efforts has atrophied in most cases.¹⁰ The Commission's 'Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development' (LRRD) approach,¹¹ aimed at making the transition from emergency to longer-term sustainable development, has by common consent had little impact on the ground.¹² Institutionally, the lead role in conflict policies played by the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the Politico-Military Group (PMG) has clearly militated against a focus on long term development issues, and rather

⁷ EU-Africa Ministerial Troika Meeting, 'Implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and its First Action Plan (2008–2010): progress and way ahead', 16 September 2008.

⁸ N. Bagoyoko and M. Gibert, 'The European Union in Africa: The Linkage between Security, Governance and Development from an Institutional Perspective', IDS Working Paper 284, Sussex: Institute for Development Studies; and A. Hadfield, 'Janus advances? An analysis of EC development policy and the 2005 amended Cotonou Partnership Agreement', *European Foreign Affairs Review* 12/1 (2007).

⁹ L. Specker, 'Integrating socio-economic recovery into post-conflict stabilisation programmes', CRU no. 7, December 2008, The Hague: Clingendael Institute, p. 3.

¹⁰ C. Gourlay, Community instruments for civilian crisis management, in Nowak A. (ed.), 'Civilian crisis management: the EU way', Chaillot paper no. 90, June 2006, p. 60.

¹¹ European Commission, Programming Guide for Strategy papers, 'Transition strategy: The Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) approach', 2006.

¹² D. Helly, 'Security Sector Reform: from Concept to Practice', *European Security Review* 31 (December 2006), p. 11.

³ Commission of the European Communities, 'Annual Report on the Instrument for Stability in 2008', July 2009, p. 4; and Commission Staff Working Document, 'One Year after Lisbon: The Africa-EU Partnership at Work', COM(2008)617, p. 3.

⁴ European Commission, 'Making the difference: Strengthening capacities to respond to crises and security threats', Brussels, 3-4 June 2009.

⁵ N. Bensahel, 'Organising for Nation Building', *Survival* 49/2 (2007), p. 49.

⁶ European Commission, 'Towards an EU approach to situations of fragility and conflict: Action Plan', pp. 4–5.

favours an emphasis on reacting to emergencies and immediate security concerns.¹³

Several donors are well behind on their promised increases in overall development assistance. Italy, Austria and Greece are particularly egregious laggards. In response to the financial crisis, the Commission has frontloaded 4.3 billion euros of budget support to the poorest states and the EU supported the \$75 billion credit made available through the IMF for developing countries in early 2009. But several member states are already cutting back on development aid as the financial crisis bites harder. The biggest post-crisis cuts so far have come in Italy (more than 40 per cent) and Ireland (30 per cent). The French government has planned to cut over fifty aid projects in Africa along with prospective reductions in funds more generally to some of the continent's poorest states.¹⁴ In July 2009 the Council shaved 80 million euros off the Commission's new aid budget. The EU has also held back from committing new funds to the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, making African states increasingly lukewarm towards this supposed 'partnership of equals.'¹⁵ Several donors, especially southern European ones, still use much of their development assistance for shoring up commercial relations with middle income states, and their funds do not evince any notable conflict-related distribution.

In many 'situations of fragility' the European development spend is pitifully limited. Nigeria is in per capita terms the most under-funded of all African states, with only the Commission and the UK operating a significant presence in the tension-prone Niger delta. In Sudan, the 2004 peace agreement between North and South has failed to unlock a considerable

investment in long-term development and institution building. Because Sudan has not ratified the Cotonou agreement – after objecting to a clause referring to the International Criminal Court – EDF funds are now held in abeyance. The figures actually suggest that overall the US puts in more development aid on the back of troop deployments than the EU does;¹⁶ the Obama administration is further boosting US international assistance by 9 per cent between 2009 and 2010.

Notwithstanding the political and security concerns over the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the latter still receives less development funding from Europe than do most small Latin American states. The UK has increased its aid programme to Pakistan to GBP 480 million for 2008–2011, double the amount for the preceding three year period, making this the UK's second largest aid programme. For a long time admonished for its limited aid presence in Pakistan, in 2009 the Commission allocated a EUR 50 million boost formally directed at helping the country move towards a counter-terrorist strategy based on the rule of law. However, even after the 2009 aid increase, the Commission still gives Pakistan negligible amounts for development. At the first EU-Pakistan summit in June 2009 aid was increased, but overwhelmingly only for humanitarian relief. The paucity of European aid was thrown into even sharper light after president Obama trebled US assistance to Pakistan in late 2009.

The reluctance of European donors to commit large scale resources to Afghanistan is well known. Of course, Europeans criticise the US approach as 'overly militarised'. But only the UK, Germany and the Commission have regularly given over EUR 100 million a year in development aid to Afghanistan. Others give very limited amounts. Some European development project operators have had to take US money to keep running as EU member states turn their backs. The US invests vastly higher sums in institution-building than do European governments. The UK military spend in Afghanistan for 2008–2009 was GBP 2.6 billion; its

¹³ Centre for European Policy Studies, 'Policy Coherence for Development in the EU Council: Strategies for the way forward', June 2006, p. 62; and International Crisis Group, 'EU Crisis Response Capabilities: An Update' (2002), p. 12.

¹⁴ *Le Monde*, 9 November 2008; and C. Mathiot, 'Afrique: comment Sarkozy va tronçonner les aides au développement', *www.libération.fr*, 24 September 2008.

¹⁵ V. Tywuschik and A. Sherriff, 'Beyond Structures? Reflections on the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy', European Centre for Development Policy Management, Discussion paper no. 87, February 2009, p. 12.

¹⁶ J. Dobbins, 'Europe's Role in Nation Building', *Survival* 50/3 (2008), pp. 83–110, at p. 108.

development aid totalled only GBP 207 million.¹⁷ Within DfID there remains significant reluctance to channel more funds to back up security aims in both Afghanistan and Iraq. One outgoing defence minister acknowledges that European countries have been 'fundamentally dishonest' in repeatedly claiming they were investing in 'comprehensive security' in Afghanistan.

In Iraq, over 90 per cent of European aid comes from coalition members; states that did not participate in the invasion remain reticent to make a civilian commitment. The EU provided Iraq with over EUR 800 million of aid between 2003 and 2007 and the Commission has given nearly half of all funding for the multilateral International Reconstruction Fund for Iraq (IRFFI). But European IRFFI funding is being phased out, and the Commission is only now just beginning to run a few direct aid projects of its own. Even key coalition members such as Denmark and Poland have not only withdrawn soldiers but also downsized aid efforts. France says it is re-engaging, but for 2007–2008 gave a derisory EUR 1.2 million. Famously, until well into 2007–2008 the UK was spending more on refurbishing its own consulate in Basra than on reconstruction projects in the city.¹⁸ And when the UK handed over to the US military in March 2009 they also scaled back their civilian reconstruction and capacity-building efforts. British diplomats insist that the UK urged more time and money to be devoted to practical development cooperation than did the United States.¹⁹ But by the time of the 2009 withdrawal, the British military and civilian officers were swapping mutual recriminations, both sides acknowledging their experience as a failure of security-development linkage.

Towards a fragile state strategy?

These development trends are reflected in the broader disjunctures of policy-making. Many accounts over-focus on institutional in-fighting in Brussels. But there is no getting away from the fact that these familiar turf battles continue to militate against a better 'politics of peace-building'. Some progress and streamlining has occurred. What might be termed the decision-making and instrumental 'mechanics' of EU fragile state policy have certainly evolved in significant measure in recent years. A plethora of innovations have been introduced. EU financial instruments and procedures have been simplified to render them more flexible and rapid in situations of fragility. The use of budget support in fragile states is being coordinated with the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the IMF. Conflict-related expertise and capacity has been boosted within Commission delegations. Coordination efforts across the Brussels institutions and with member states have to some extent overcome the limitations of the EU's pillar structure. Joint Council Secretariat and Commission policy papers and fact-finding missions are becoming the norm; in a couple of cases – Macedonia and the African Union – Commission heads of delegation (HoD) have assumed the role of EU special representatives (EUSR) and thus respond to both the Commission and the Council. A recent merging and restructuring of civilian and crisis management structures within the Council Secretariat has also improved the potential for coherence, even though major questions still remain over the power and role of the EAS.

Notwithstanding such measures, the challenge of effective policy design has intensified. ESDP missions are still not actually 'integrated', but simply have military and civilian strands running in parallel – in awkward juxtaposition and rarely dovetailing well.²⁰ If anything, the 'nexus' of security, development and

¹⁷ HM Government, 'UK policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan: the way forward', April 2009, p. 8 and p. 20.

¹⁸ R. North, *The Ministry of Defeat: The British War in Iraq 2003–2009* (London: Continuum, 2009), p. 160.

¹⁹ For one UK account revealing these points, see H. Synott, *Bad Days in Baghdad: My Turbulent Time as Britain's Man in Southern Iraq* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008), p. 46, p. 148 and p. 162.

²⁰ D. Korski and R. Gowan, 'Can the EU rebuild failing states? A review of Europe's civilian capacities', ECFR, 2009, p. 27.

governance is now being taken forward more by the military, with development actors remaining highly sceptical; a trend of some concern, while the military acts without rationalised civilian oversight,²¹ and often in the absence of shared political strategies and priorities. All studies and evidence indicate a lack of coordination between episodic ESDP crisis management operations and longer-term development and governance issues.²² In the practitioners' parlance the focus is still narrowly on aid effectiveness rather than the whole development effort effectiveness.

Strategy papers and policy concepts on fragile states have multiplied, but articulating these into an effective approach, designed for each concrete situation and building on local actors and initiatives, remains a huge challenge. The 'deconcentration' of aid management from Brussels to the Commission delegations has rendered more serious the understaffing of local offices. With resources over-stretched and often with limited political backing by the headquarters, delegations tend to fall into a 'business as usual' approach, privileging infrastructure projects and their traditional role as aid managers rather than the more difficult and long-term conflict mitigation engagements. Beneath all the ritual commitment to 'coherence', disagreements persist between the Commission and the Council/member states, especially over matters of competence. The recent ECJ decision adjudicating on the division of competences in small arms security initiatives leaves the situation uncertain still, while pressing the case for increased institutional coordination. The linkages between development, security, trade and environmental damage – a major lacuna as the socio-economic impact of climate change begins to show its potential menace – are weak or merely nominal when they do exist, although partial exceptions can be seen in the Stabilisation and Reconstruction Plan for eastern DRC and programmes like 'Trading for Peace'.²³

²¹ E. Burke, 'The soldier-diplomat in Afghanistan and Iraq', FRIDE working paper, October 2009.

²² For the most comprehensive overview, see G. Grevi, D. Helley and D. Keohane (eds.), 'European Security and Defence Policy: The First Ten Years', Paris: ISS, 2009.

²³ See <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Global-Issues/How-we-fight-Poverty/Trade/Trading-for-peace/>

In practice, few actors are willing to subordinate their own bilateral agendas in fragile states in the name of 'policy coherence'. Nor do they all give the same priority to each area or objective.²⁴ Member states are still reluctant openly to discuss their bilateral policies with other actors when these are perceived to be under scrutiny or controversial. In many areas of EU policy, particularly in ESDP missions, the pressure to prove cost-effectiveness and show positive impact or success is strong. As a result, the review and reporting of ESDP missions encounters a number of filters that tend to smooth or eliminate criticism. Only three common country strategy papers and joint aid programming exercises have so far been agreed: South Africa, Sierra Leone and Somalia. This is a measure of the difficulties in putting comprehensive conflict resolution and fragile state policies into practice. Even where political will is strong and formal policy aims well designed, the EU still flounders in mobilising its resources in effective fashion.

Politics and peace-building

Flowing from this disjointed structure of policy-making, the political dimensions of European conflict resolution have remained especially indeterminate and uncertain. EU policy documents promise a focus on underlying governance reform in conflict states. As such commitments have taken shape, sharper criticism has been aimed at the 'liberal model of state-building' in conflict situations. A vast literature now argues against any prioritisation of 'Western' standards of governance, pluralism and modern state procedures as part of conflict resolution strategy. Experts insist that such approaches have been over-weaning, harmful and serve merely as a cloak of Western interests. The current failures of conflict resolution and state-

²⁴ ECDPM, 'Evaluation Study on the EU Member States' and Institutions' mechanisms for promoting Policy Coherence for Development. Final Report', May 2007; and SEC, '2009 EU report on Policy Coherence for Development', 1137 final, Brussels, 17/9/2009.

building in 'situations of fragility' are attributed to donors' blind faith in their own political templates.²⁵

Such critiques contain much merit. But set alongside recent trends in European policies they exude a sense of unreality. They are arguments to some extent tilting at windmills. The shortcomings of European conflict policies are more subtle in nature. Notwithstanding the rhetoric, in practice European approaches prioritise elite-mediated peace deals much more than underlying governance reform. Indeed, they generally seek to delay far-reaching political reform, for fear of democratisation's destabilising effect. They adhere to a framework for sequencing: stabilisation first, followed by basic state-building capacity, then governance reforms over the longer-term. The trouble is that, in practice, most European states fail to take sufficient steps along this transition phase, most commonly remaining at stage two.

European donors now rely more and more on 'traditional' structures, such as village councils. Donor support has increased for 'traditional rulers' and customary dispute settlement mechanisms outside state bodies.²⁶ In some cases, European support for such customary mechanisms risks locking in the sources of fragility preventing modernisation.²⁷ European donors still need to further deepen their support for traditional forms of justice and local militias, but more challengingly they need to ensure that these structures function in accordance with international human rights standards.²⁸ The key is to incorporate informal trust networks into the sphere of public policy, rather than conceiving them as a substitute for democratic politics – a mistake which most donors have so far made.²⁹

Evaluations have concluded that EU conflict interventions most commonly fail to address sensitive political issues.³⁰ DfID acknowledges that donors' state-building efforts have 'tended to strengthen or ignore predatory elites' and that support for peace agreements have undermined long-term state capacity.³¹ One recent Europe-wide project concurs that European donors have so far reduced state-building to the 'technicalities of building state capacity to supply services' and on the question of the underlying political causes of conflict, have 'fail[ed] to grab the bull by the horns'.³² A preference exists in conflict states for high-impact development projects rather than long term efforts to modify the patterns of decision-making.³³ It has even been suggested that the EU often finds itself pushing 'local ownership' to a greater extent than local regimes themselves are willing or able to handle.³⁴ In off-the-record interviews it is striking just how many politicians and diplomats now argue that the West should stop even trying to build impartial justice systems, help run freer elections or train security forces as a route out of conflict.

By far the largest share of European governance support focuses on building state institutions, in collaboration with partner governments. This is judged by policy-makers partly to reflect a desire for stabilisation through negotiated, consensual reform. This orientation is reflected also in the increasing preference for government-to-government aid and direct budgetary support. Without proper accountability and monitoring mechanisms, such direct budget support can actually deepen tensions by increasing the value that ruling parties place on

²⁵ For a review of the vast range of work making essentially the same points, see J. Di John, 'Conceptualising the causes and consequences of failed states: a critical review of the literature', LSE Crisis States Research Centre, working paper no. 2, 2008, pp. 23–5.

²⁶ DfID, 'Building the State and Securing the Peace', Emerging Policy paper, June 2009, p. 24.

²⁷ L. Anten, 'Strengthening Governance in Post-Conflict Fragile States', The Hague: Clingendael Institute, 2009.

²⁸ E. Scheye, 'Pragmatic realism in justice and security development: supporting improvement in the performance of non-state/local justice and security networks', The Hague: Clingendael Institute, 2009, p. 36.

²⁹ C. Tilly, *Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

³⁰ F. Faria and P. Magalhaes Ferreira, 'Situations of Fragility: Challenges for a European response Strategy', Maastricht: ECDPM, 2007, p. 48.

³¹ DfID, 'Building the State and Securing the Peace', Emerging Policy paper, June 2009, p. 9 and p. 15.

³² E. Bell, 'Society in State-building, Synthesis report', Initiative for Peacekeeping Project, May 2009, p. 11 and p. 16. Available at www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu.

³³ Commission of the European Communities and Soges S.p.A, 'Support Study in view of the follow-up to the 2007 Commission communication, Council conclusions and EP resolution on situations of fragility – Mapping of donors, actors, financial instruments and assessment tools in situations of fragility', 2009.

³⁴ From draft EDR 2009, 'Overcoming Fragility in Africa: Forging a New European Approach', p. 82.

retaining absolute control of state finances. Far from helping to temper conflict, development aid can aggravate conflict, far from helping to temper it.

Many initiatives carried out under the SSR banner look like fairly standard counter-terrorism programmes, with few tangible reform aspects. Indeed, the EU still lacks an SSR concept that would render operational the commitments of the European Security Strategy.³⁵ The big shift in resources and diplomatic attention has been towards short-term crisis management not long-term conflict resolution through political reform. The priority attached to operational crisis management has deflected attention from the structural prerequisites of both conflict prevention and resolution.³⁶ Commission 'Governance Profiles' supposedly conditioning European aid policies have so far failed to incorporate factors relating to state fragility or to ensure participative approaches to security initiatives.³⁷ The amount that European donors channel into strengthening social policies renders somewhat simplistic the standard criticism that the EU favours a procedural liberal democracy over social democracy. In some conflict states, the EU appears to favour socially *dirigiste*, mediated elite unity at least as much as reductive liberalism.

Space precludes any detailed examination here of individual cases of this limited focus on political reform, but the basic trends are evident across different regions. It is the political dimensions of ESDP missions that have most struggled to gain traction and have been diluted. Local elites and security forces have managed to push ESDP rule of law and security sector missions into a practical operational focus away from reform questions, and the EU has failed to build into the missions any broader focus on political reform and state-building. This has happened from the DRC to

Iraq, from Georgia to Palestine. The Concordia mission in Macedonia was not linked into the political reform requirements of the country's pre-accession process. The rule of law mission in Georgia consisted of only ten experts advising on technical operational capacities and doing little to address the declining independence of the judiciary witnessed while the mission was on the ground. Seven years into the EU police mission in Bosnia, police reform and rule of law commitments were downgraded. In Kosovo, the EULEX mission has provided a mainly executive function of delivering justice rather than pressing for judicial reform as such. The monitoring of the Aceh peace accords is cited as an ESDP success story, but involved a notable dilution of the human rights elements of the peace deal, at the behest of the Indonesian federal government.³⁸

In Somalia the EU presence is limited to a scattering of civil society projects and has failed to shore up a political process now at risk from Islamic militants. The Atalanta maritime mission off Somalia is perhaps the clearest case of a focus on symptoms rather than the political causes of conflict: the EU's contribution to internal Somali problems remains negligible while a naval force has been mobilised to protect Europe's own trade through the Horn of Africa. The 2006 EU military mission in support of DRC elections was widely interpreted locally as providing backing for Laurent Kabila's incumbent regime in the face of its manipulation of the political process. The ESDP mission that oversaw these elections was withdrawn immediately after the poll, just as a further cycle of violence erupted: key opposition leaders were forced to flee the country shortly after the elections. The head of the EU's security sector reform mission in the DRC left his post as a result of the failure to get to grips with governance blockages. European governments have also sought to improve relations with the Sudanese regime, trading humanitarian access to Darfur for any pressure on national-level democratisation. In Guinea-Bissau the EU could only muster 14 security officers for an extremely limited, technical mission. France and

³⁵ J. Lindley-French, 'Stabilisation and Reconstruction: Europe's chance to shed its 'junior partner' status', *Europe's World*, no. 13, Autumn 2009, p. 44.

³⁶ E. J. Stewart, 'Capabilities and Coherence? The evolution of European Union conflict prevention', *European Foreign Affairs Review* 13/2 (2008), p. 253, at pp. 229–53, 2008.

³⁷ European Commission, 'Towards an EU approach to situations of fragility and conflict: Action Plan', p. 6.

³⁸ For details on the political aspects of ESDP missions, see chapters 4–24 of Grevi, Helly and Keohane, *op. cit.*

the Commission have supported the postponement of elections in Ivory Coast since 2005, after having failed, along with other international community actors, to speak out and exert pressure against discriminatory nationality and land laws in 2002 that predictably spurred conflict.

European governments have moved towards pragmatic deals with Talib leaders and support for 'traditional structures' in Afghanistan. They have engaged directly with tribal elders in the context of Yemen's descent into conflict. They have singularly failed to invest any significant effort in strengthening the rule of law in Pakistan. They have encouraged the Palestinian Fatah leadership to delay elections. European member states present in the UNIFILII operation in southern Lebanon have watched passively while Hizbollah has re-armed and maintained parallel state structures. In southern Iraq the British largely gave up on democratisation in preference for cooperation with Shia militia, acceptance of parallel Sharia legal process and practical cooperation through local 'notables': and watched as such flexibility merely engendered a frightening downward spiral of violence. The British military even failed to realise that their indulgence of Sadrists in the south was itself a brake on democratisation at the federal level in Iraq, to the extent that it repelled cooperation from Sunni parties. In none of these cases is it convincing to argue that the EU's main fault lies in its over-emphasising a rigid, pristine liberal-democratic state-building template.

EU policies in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR)

Chad and CAR provide valuable examples of the EU's ostensibly comprehensive approach to situations of fragility, as well as an illustration of its shortfalls and difficulties. In different ways, both are very weak states, riddled with poverty despite their natural resources and unexploited economic potential, rocked by internal conflict and affected by instability in neighbouring countries. The EU has engaged here with political, development, humanitarian and military instruments, and has tried to develop synergies across different instruments and actors.

EUFOR Chad/CAR, launched on 15 March 2008, has been the largest military ESDP mission to date, deploying 3700 troops in eastern Chad and north-eastern CAR. Its role was to bridge and protect the deployment of the UN mission (MINURCAT) that took over a year later, to improve security and thus contribute to the protection of civilians and the delivery of humanitarian aid. The underlying rationale of the ESDP and UN missions was also to stem the regional dynamics of conflict and underpin efforts for regional political negotiations in which the EU participates, including the Dakar talks for peace in Darfur and the broader region, where the EU has an observer status. Furthermore, the EC head of delegation was the mediator in the internal political dialogue in Chad that led to the August 2007 peace agreement aimed at creating suitable conditions for elections.

Despite its political role, no firm political mandate and backing has been forthcoming from the Council to its representatives on the ground. The limited presence of European actors (only the Commission and France, plus Germany in Chad, have diplomatic

representations) would in principle render coordination and agreement on a clear political and implementation strategy more straightforward. However, in practice this has not been the case. In the absence of a clear political 'storyline', the multiple envoys and channels for political dialogue unlikely to improve the current level of clarity. The only real common strategy was the need to push for a deeper UN engagement in Chad, CAR and Darfur, as a means of passing on responsibility.

The planning undertaken for EUFOR Chad/CAR is considered exemplary within EU institutions. It was the subject of much coordination with the UN. Member states and the European Commission undertook a joint fact-finding mission prior to deployment. Consultations were undertaken locally and among Brussels institutions before and during deployment. Coordination with humanitarian actors in the field was regular and generally positive. Societal analysis of the eastern Chad region bordering Darfur was conducted by the EU and made available to other concerned actors. Similar societal and conflict analyses were conducted in north-eastern CAR. LRRD approaches were implemented in both countries. Development activities were also planned for the areas of intervention of the ESDP/Minurcat mission to support the stabilisation of the region and the return of displaced populations.

However, the stated aim of giving actors in the field a greater say and role in planning and implementing the EU strategy was realised only to a limited degree. For instance, humanitarian workers argued for a police, rather than a military mission, to address banditry and lawlessness. President Déby welcomed EUFOR, but was adamant concerning the limited scope and circumscribed area of EU and UN interventions inside Chad. Both the EU and the Chadian regime were keen to depoliticise the mission: this freed up Déby to use his forces to attack rebels over the Sudanese border, while hoping to use EUFOR as a deterrent to rebel groups transiting in and out of Darfur; and cleared the EU from being perceived as intervening in internal politics. The general perception was that the ESDP mission

ended up intervening on Déby's behalf, despite his lack of domestic political legitimacy.³⁹

The EU lacked a united understanding of the socio-political local and regional dynamics, or of the ways to address these. In both countries, governance reform is a stated priority of European aid cooperation, with support for security sector reform and elections high on the agenda. In Chad for instance, the Stability Instrument provided EUR 10 million for police reform, on top of European Development Fund (EDF) and humanitarian aid totalling an average of EUR 100 million per year, including for justice reform projects. Still, such efforts represent far less than the overall estimated cost of the ESDP mission. European actors diverged over the priority that should be given to internal political and governance problems in Chad, with some alluding to bad governance as a reason to *reduce* engagement, rather than to work harder to encourage reforms.

Chad also demonstrates the challenges of linking governance, security and development reforms in the absence of political will by the local regime and of a clear political strategy by the EU and international partners on how to tackle these challenges. Support to the justice and police sectors was ongoing, albeit with slow and very limited progress. Reform of the army was, however, not on the EU agenda, even though this significantly risked undermining any chances of progress in the political dialogue, and police and justice reform. The development and governance strands of the strategy suffered in parallel. Such reforms may not move forward without the buy-in of key local actors, but they are hardly a priority when regimes are more concerned with their own survival. On the European side, priorities were at least for a period dominated by the need to placate criticism over the perceived lack of transparency of France's policy in Chad, which fuelled concerns over the 'manipulation' of EU instruments for a French bilateral agenda. On the other hand, few European and international actors have been willing to fund security sector reform (and especially reform of

³⁹ European Security Review, no. 37, March 2008, p. 2.

the army, as such support cannot be counted as Official Development Assistance) in fragile or conflict situations, despite the political declarations of the priority such areas deserve in peace-building strategies.

Chad and CAR also provide striking examples of the EU's failure to broaden its understanding of 'ownership' and engage with local actors beyond government institutions. Chad and CAR are, in different ways, typical cases of fragile states in which institutions lack strong and legitimate presence beyond the capital. The Commission's strategy in CAR has certainly aimed at state-construction and peace-building through 'deconcentration' and 'delocalisation', linking the central government with local authorities aiming at creating development poles in areas of the country with higher population and economic potential, but also in areas beset by rebellion. In practice, however, local actors complain that such an approach remains too focused on the central state (for example on raising its capacity to collect taxes, on 'institution creation', on developing 'strategies on paper') and far too little on boosting local economies without which no state-building efforts are sustainable.

'coherence for what?' remains a disputed matter. The ESS has shone little light on this question. The 2008 report on the implementation of the ESS acknowledges as much, but offers little guidance.

The EU's commitment to address the root causes of conflict through development and governance has in most cases failed to materialise or have any substantial impact. Member states remain resistant to open self-criticism or revision of their bilateral idiosyncracies. The Lisbon Treaty is held out as a panacea, but the problems run deeper. It is the political 'story-line' that still lacks clarity within European conflict resolution policies. While the standard critique is that Western powers blindly and inappropriately seek to foist one-size-fits-all political templates onto fragile states, the bigger concern is that a policy of ultra-pragmatism has left the EU floundering for effective means of tackling the underlying political causes of conflict. In sum, tallying the virtues and vices of European conflict resolution, a muddling-through drift can be identified as an increasing concern.

Conclusion

This run-through of EU policies suggests that, in some senses, Europe's commitment to preventing and resolving conflict in distant regions seems to have atrophied. Doubts among policy-makers have grown that the EU can make much of an impact in many 'situations of fragility'; that it knows what to do to mitigate conflict; and even over whether it should be intervening in any political fashion at all. Of course, every report and article on EU policies calls for better coordination between different European institutions and policy instruments, and policy documents have long promised improved coherence. But, our evidence suggests that the familiar problems of disarticulation persist. The disconnect between EU policies, actors, instruments and practice remain. Coherence and coordination is the 'holy grail' of EU politics, but

WORKING PAPERS

- 94 European conflict resolution policies: truncated peace-building, Fernanda Faria and Richard Youngs, March 2010
- 93 Why the European Union needs a 'broader Middle East' policy, Edward Burke, Ana Echagüe and Richard Youngs, February 2010
- 92 A New Agenda for US-EU. Security Cooperation, Daniel Korski, Daniel Serwer and Megan Chabalowski, November 2009
- 91 The Kosovo statebuilding conundrum: Addressing fragility in a contested state, Lucia Montanaro, October 2009
- 90 Leaving the civilians behind: The 'soldier-diplomat' in Afghanistan and Iraq, Edward Burke, September 2009
- 89 La empresa como actor de la reconstrucción post bélica, Carlos Fernández y Aitor Pérez, Agosto de 2009
- 88 A criminal bargain: the state and security in Guatemala, Ivan Briscoe, September 2009
- 87 Case Study Report: Spanish Humanitarian Response to the 2008 Hurricane Season in Haiti, Velina Stoianova and Soledad Posada, July 2009
- 86 Governance Assessments and Domestic Accountability: Feeding Domestic Debate and Changing Aid Practices, Stefan Meyer , June 2009
- 85 Tunisia: The Life of Others. Freedom of Association and Civil Society in the Middle East and North Africa, Kristina Kausch, June 2009
- 84 'Strong Foundations?': The Imperative for Reform in Saudi Arabia, Ana Echagüe and Edward Burke , June 2009
- 83 Women's political participation and influence in Sierra Leone, Clare Castillejo, June 2009
- 82 Defenders in Retreat. Freedom of Association and Civil Society in Egypt, Kristina Kausch, April 2009
- 81 Angola: 'Failed' yet 'Successful', David Sogge, April 2009
- 80 Impasse in Euro-Gulf Relations, Richard Youngs, April 2009
- 79 International division of labour: A test case for the partnership paradigm. Analytical framework and methodology for country studies, Nils-Sjard Schulz, February 2009
- 78 Violencia urbana: Un desafío al fortalecimiento institucional. El caso de América Latina, Laura Tedesco, Febrero 2009
- 77 Desafíos económicos y Fuerzas Armadas en América del Sur, Augusto Varas, Febrero 2009
- 76 Building Accountable Justice in Sierra Leone, Clare Castillejo, January 2009
- 75 *Plus ça change*: Europe's engagement with moderate Islamists, Kristina Kausch, January 2009
- 74 The Case for a New European Engagement in Iraq, Edward Burke, January 2009
- 73 Inclusive Citizenship Research Project: Methodology, Clare Castillejo, January 2009

FRIDE

Many documents have highlighted the importance of the 'security, governance and development' trinity to Europe's attempts to temper conflict and state fragility. The European Security Strategy and its 2008 update both identify these linkages as pivotal to more effective EU conflict resolution. Enough time has now passed for a stock-take and it is expected that considerable progress will have been made. Our analysis suggests, however, that European policies in situations of conflict or fragility remain ineffectual, often unduly narrow in scope and at odds with the EU's declared holism. Most criticism has focused on the problematic civil-military link in crisis management, yet it is in the broader politics of peace-building that European policies are most seriously deficient.

www.fride.org