

Spain and Morocco: Towards a Reform Agenda?

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April 2005

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WORKING PAPER

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This paper was presented at the Workshop on 'Barcelona + 10' and the European Neighborhood Policy.
FRIDE, Madrid, 14-16th January 2005

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Abstract

This paper outlines the recent evolution in Spanish policy towards Morocco, pointing to the cautious nature of Madrid's support for democratic reform in the kingdom. During the latter part of the *Partido Popular* administration and under the current PSOE government, priority has been given to rebuilding diplomatic relations with Rabat. Support for reforms that have been implemented in Morocco has been relatively limited and reactive; pressure has been limited in response to Mohammed VI's increasing reluctance to contemplate far-reaching democratisation. Such caution on democracy and human rights issues has been compounded by the PSOE's apparent shift in policy towards the Western Sahara dispute – although, more optimistically, the paper suggests that this might also open the way for Spain to support reform through a focus on decentralisation in Morocco.

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Introduction

This paper¹ aims to assess the potential for enhancement of the political reform dimension to Spanish-Moroccan relations in the light of two developments: the change of government in Spain following the defeat of José Maria Aznar's *Partido Popular* (PP) by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero's *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE) in March 2004; and the new context provided by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in general and the proposed EU/ Morocco Action Plan in particular. It draws upon the findings of two research projects: a collaborative project with Richard Youngs, 3-4 years ago, which looked at EU democracy promotion activity in North Africa in general [Gillespie and Youngs, 2002], and a more recent project aimed at understanding the Spanish-Moroccan crisis of 2001-2003. The paper considers whether Spanish activity, either at the bilateral level or through the medium of the EU, might play some role in promoting a more vigorous political reform agenda in Morocco in the future.

The record of concrete achievement so far does not allow for easy optimism, whether one examines Morocco's own achievements in the name of democratisation or Spanish or EU policy against democracy promotion benchmarks. In the

¹ An earlier draft of this paper was prepared for the workshop on 'The European Neighbourhood Policy: Implications for the Mediterranean', organised by the *Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior* (FRIDE), Madrid, 14-16 January 2005. The paper is based on research for a project on 'The Spanish-Moroccan Security Relationship and the Euro-Mediterranean Context', funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) of the UK (RES-000-22-0432). It draws upon extensive interviewing in Spain, Morocco and Brussels during 2003-04, as well as documentary and press sources.

view of many European observers, the hopes of reform that were raised at the time of Mohammed VI's accession to the throne in 1999 have been rewarded only very partially in practice, although the political reform agenda remains open and thus one must acknowledge the differences between this case and that of the much deeper disappointment that ensued after the consolidation of power by Zine el Abidine Ben Ali (who had also generated hopes of political reform) in Tunisia. In Morocco, moves towards a more competitive political system had begun towards the end of the reign of Hassan II and this backcloth tended to heighten the expectation that the arrival of a young new monarch, with considerable exposure to European government and society, would produce qualitative changes in the system of government. Morocco under Mohammed VI has certainly seen some expansion of freedom of expression and public debate, but as yet no clear sign of regime change. As Haizam Amirah puts it, 'the control the Palace tries to exercise over all significant affairs tends to paralyze the other institutions of the State' [Amirah, 2004: 2].

Equally, Spain's own attitude towards democracy promotion activity has been relatively cautious, even in comparative EU terms, particularly in relation to the Maghreb [Gillespie, 2000, 2005; Núñez Villaverde, 2001]. The traditional Spanish concern has been that European democracy promotion policies that promise to bring more stability and development to North Africa in the long term might in the short run actually bring instability, from which Spain would be among the countries most affected owing both to its

geographical proximity and the vulnerability of Ceuta and Melilla, claimed by Morocco. More recently, the Spanish-Moroccan frontier has become a major international 'gateway' to Europe for migrants, not to mention illegal contraband in the form of drugs. In the wake of 9/11 and the successive bomb attacks in Casablanca and Madrid, concerns about security have heightened along with tensions between democracy promotion and a desire for Euro-Mediterranean (including Hispano-Moroccan) security collaboration [Jünemann, ed., 2003].

Nonetheless, both the change of government in Spain in 2004 and the new incidence of the European Neighbourhood Policy within Euro-Mediterranean relations are developments that make this an opportune moment to consider whether in the future Spain might become more engaged with political reform activity in Morocco.² Political alternation in Spain from PP to PSOE is potentially significant because of the crisis in Spanish-Moroccan relations that occurred during the second Aznar government and the much more amicable diplomatic relations that have been seen since then. Since 2003, Spanish dialogue with Morocco has acquired a broader basis, though it continues to shy away from discussion of problems associated with regime differences. Meanwhile, the ENP context is of interest because of the enhanced integration and engagement with Morocco that it promises, and its announcement of a more forceful political conditionality [European Commission, 2003a: 16].

² Here, one hesitates to use the term 'political reform process' since the pattern of reform activity in Morocco has been hesitant when not contradictory, and

From Aznar to Zapatero

Recent decades have seen a propensity of both the PSOE and the PP to steer clear of raising political reform issues in the course of bilateral dealings between Madrid and Rabat. Successive governments formed by these parties have welcomed reform initiatives or verbal pledges of reform when faced with them, but have been invariably reactive rather than pro-active in encouraging the Moroccan authorities to take steps along this road. Even concrete political reforms in Morocco have not been demonstrably 'rewarded' by Spain; for though the North African country has become a relatively privileged recipient of Spanish aid, for instance, this fact is open to various interpretations (mostly to do with Madrid's own economic and security objectives). Spanish governments have been content to deal with a Moroccan regime allowing relatively little space for the growth of representative political parties, and have tried to curry favour with its most senior representatives.³ The switch from PSOE to PP government in 1996 brought no marked changes in this regard: there was simply a new emphasis on the *economic* aspects of bilateral relations to complement the traditional political pragmatism [Núñez Villaverde, 2001]. Spanish-Moroccan relations at the elite level continued to appear satisfactory throughout Aznar's first term of government.

has given the impression of improvisation rather than any long-term strategic plan.

³ It is significant in this regard that neither the PP nor the PSOE has developed relations with the Party of Justice and Development (PJD), the only Moroccan party at present that in any way resembles a European party in organizational terms, notwithstanding its moderate Islamist orientation.

Following the PP's re-election to office in March 2000, with an absolute parliamentary majority, the deterioration in Spanish-Moroccan relations quickly began to reveal several shortcomings in the relationship.

- First, political pragmatism failed to deliver business as usual because Morocco ceased to reciprocate. By withdrawing Ambassador Abdeslam Baraka in October 2001 and later sending a small militarised force to Parsley Island in July 2002, Morocco showed a readiness to revert to pressure tactics in support of strategic objectives. At the end of the day, foreign policy initiatives were informed by the aim of reinforcing the domestic political position of the monarchy by pursuing national territorial ambitions that were a cause of concern to the country's northern neighbour. One of the justifications presented by Morocco for withdrawing Baraka was the threatening tone employed by Aznar following the collapse of the 2000-01 EU-Moroccan fisheries negotiations. While the discourse of senior Spanish politicians struck an intransigent note, close analysis of Madrid's diplomatic activity shows considerable efforts to reach an accommodation with Morocco prior to mid-2002.
- Second, the deterioration in Spanish-Moroccan relations seemed to show that too much faith had been invested in the basic idea - underpinning Spanish strategy - that growing economic interdependence between the two countries was capable of insulating the relationship from conflicts associated with territorial or sovereignty

disputes (Ceuta/ Melilla, Western Sahara, maritime limits).

- Third, in the course of crisis management, Spanish diplomats and politicians discovered the considerable disadvantages of trying to negotiate with a regime in which the formal positions held by Moroccan officials bore little resemblance to their real ability to deliver a response, let alone contribute effectively to a resolution of disputes: the more influential figures would often be those in technically subordinate positions, but within the King's inner circle.

It is hard to say whether the experience of these years led Spanish leaders and officials to become more critical of the established national policy towards Morocco. In many cases, diplomats and politicians confessed to being perplexed by Moroccan behaviour and not really sure what lessons were to be drawn from the episode. Some 'off the record' analysis made of the crisis, while acknowledging that Aznar's own personality might have been a factor, focused also on the poor leadership qualities of Mohammed VI and the unconstructive role of certain Francophile royal advisors, rather than on regime structures in Morocco. Yet Spanish elite attitudes also revealed considerable frustration over the difficulties encountered in dealing with Moroccan counterparts before, during and after the crisis and it is possible that cumulatively the long-term effect could be to erode Spanish patience and resignation when faced with political-institutional obstacles to bilateral cooperation in the future. In the past, when faced with postponements of bilateral summit meetings or official visits by

King Hassan, this had tended to be associated by Spanish officials with the personality of the Moroccan monarch [Gillespie, 2000: 59-60]. The expectation was that these kinds of problems would be less likely under his heir, who had all the makings of a 'modern' monarch, capable of playing the kind of role that King Juan Carlos had played during the transition to democracy in Spain. Disillusionment set in fairly quickly, however, as a result of the general hesitancy and political cautiousness displayed by Mohammed VI during the preparation of his first official visit to Spain (September 2000). The young King and his authoritarian advisors seemed anxious above all to avoid all possibility of protest demonstrations during the visit. When the Spanish government offered Morocco's ruler the rare honour of addressing Parliament, King Mohammed declined the opportunity.

Equally, during the Parsley Island conflict, the fact that Moroccan decision-making centred upon the monarchy caused considerable difficulties to Spain purely in terms of communicating expeditiously and securing agreement with those capable of ending the crisis. Clearly, there were people in both countries who made huge efforts to restore the bilateral relationship to normality, but a major obstacle within Morocco was the fact that ministers (even of foreign affairs) ultimately had less authority than more shadowy figures, technically their subordinates but closer to the King. The problematic nature of the Moroccan political system, purely in terms of efforts to transact effectively with it in the course of bilateral relations, led to more critical political attitudes towards Morocco within the second Aznar administration, without translating into a

positive shift towards reassessing the Spanish posture on democracy promotion. Towards the end of Aznar's government, the prevailing attitude was simply one of relief that normal diplomatic relations had been restored, at least at the formal level (with ambassadors returning to embassies in February 2003). Until the general election campaign started a year later,⁴ the prime Spanish concern was to get the relationship working once more through institutional channels and to avoid any moves that risked a regression.⁵ What may have been a useful learning experience for Spanish diplomats thus seems to have had no lasting impact on the political class, given the PP's departure from office relatively soon after the bilateral crisis ended.

The PSOE then returned to office under a young leader totally lacking government experience, though with some familiarity with Morocco as a result of PSOE initiatives to rebuild bridges during the bilateral crisis. The main contention of Zapatero's Socialists was that Aznar's government had exacerbated the conflict through clumsy handling of the bilateral relationship, involving the counterproductive use of threats. Although the PSOE supported the government throughout the Parsley Island crisis, it placed some of the responsibility for the deterioration in relations on the Spanish government. Zapatero himself avoided any negative references to the political situation in Morocco both during and

⁴ Controversy returned during the campaign when PP leaders began to present the *dénouement* of the conflict as a military triumph for Spain over Morocco.

⁵ Spain's strategy at this time is well summarised in the title of an article by Andreu Claret: 'Spain-Maghreb: Heading Toward More *Structured* Relations' [Claret, 2004: 46] – emphasis added.

after his controversial visit to the country in December 2001; when faced at a press conference with a question from journalist Ali Lmrabet about whether it was democratic for the Moroccan government to have clamped down on his magazine *Demain*, Zapatero - after urging prime minister Yousouffi to allow questions to be asked - avoided discussing the issue but declared that the PSOE was always willing to listen to complaints (*El País*, 19 December 2001).

Since the Socialist election victory, consistent with the party's line on the bilateral crisis of 2001-2003, neither Zapatero nor any other Spanish representative appears to have raised political reform issues in their dealings with Morocco. Indeed, the concern of some critics has been that the new prime minister has been *too* accommodating of the Moroccan regime in the course of a much more vigorous (though to date unsuccessful) exploration of ways to end the deadlocked Western Sahara dispute.⁶ The manner in which the Socialist administration has gone about this diplomatic initiative has caused particular concern to democracy and human rights NGOs because of Madrid's efforts to collaborate with Paris over the dispute. France has not only been in the forefront of efforts to steer the EU towards a more pro-Moroccan position on the Western Sahara [Gillespie, 2004]: it has also appeared to condone authoritarian political systems in North Africa (most ostentatiously through President Chirac's endorsement of the Tunisian regime as a champion of human rights).

⁶ See, for example, the invariably hostile commentaries on government policy towards Morocco posted on the website of the right-wing *Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos* (GEES), at <http://www.gees.org>

However, owing to its prioritisation of the Western Sahara issue and persistent exploration of possible ways forward, we must leave open the possibility that Spanish policy under Zapatero could have the effect (whether deliberately sought or not) of helping to provoke debate in Morocco about the advantages of regional devolution. Over the last three decades, the PSOE has shifted its position on the dispute, reacting to a changing situation on the ground and internationally, while also becoming less ideologically-driven as a party. Today the only viable solution in the opinion of most (though not all) Socialist leaders would be some form of Saharawi autonomy within Morocco.

As far as future perspectives are concerned, various scenarios are possible. Notwithstanding Rabat's initial reservations, it is still conceivable that international efforts to resolve the Sahara conflict could lead to some kind of autonomy formula, which would have more far-reaching implications for political reform in Morocco. But at least as plausible as this is the scenario in which there is no breakthrough at all and the current stalemate continues, particularly if the US and EU are preoccupied with other issues. If the impasse continued and the current Spanish initiative were seen to have failed, then the Socialists - having invested considerable energy in this high-profile initiative - might be led to conclude that the political system of Morocco was not going to change fundamentally simply through 'reform from above', and that more political conditionality should be introduced into the EU's (if not Spain's own) collaboration with Morocco.

The Euro-Med and European Neighbourhood Dimensions

The European Union collectively has gone further than Spain has bilaterally by developing a regular dialogue on democracy and human rights issues with Morocco at the level of an Association Council sub-committee, established while the ENP plans were still on the drawing board.⁷ The European Commission has been in the forefront of efforts to make the Union's democracy promotion more operational (as opposed to merely declaratory) by developing criteria for the benchmarking of progress [European Commission, 2003b]. The ENP is consistent with the Euro-Med tradition in that full emphasis is placed on 'positive' forms of conditionality, rewarding achievement rather than punishing infractions or shortcomings. The potential for success will now grow thanks partly to the principle of 'differentiation' among the neighbours/ partners (those that align most with European norms are being promised the greatest benefits) and partly to the level of scrutiny associated with it (Action Plans will be monitored by the Association Councils and their committees and will be reviewed after two years). As one observer puts it, 'The Action Plans are more flexible than the multilateral instruments, increasing the chances for the informal use of democratic conditionality' [Meyer-Resende, 2004: 11]. On an optimistic reading, the ENP

⁷ In reference to this, a Moroccan foreign ministry representative told me in 2004 that his country had already been moving 'in the direction' of the ENP before it was launched and was one of the few Mediterranean partner countries that was willing to collaborate in all three baskets of the EMP. On the democracy and human rights content of previous EU-Morocco agreements, see Haddadi [2002].

approach should encourage competition among Europe's neighbours - at least among those that see integration with the EU as fundamental to the progress of their country. Among these neighbours is Morocco, which has long aspired to a *statut avancé* and may even still cherish some hopes of eventual membership. On a more pessimistic reading, the EU's promotion of reform may in fact fall short of actually promoting democracy in Morocco, constrained by immediate concerns about political stability and a fear of Islam [Dillman, 2003]. Moreover, conditionality under the ENP may not in fact encourage democratisation efforts. Both in Morocco and elsewhere in North Africa, conditionality until now has been based primarily on economic rather than political criteria [Youngs, 2001; Tanner, 2004] and there is every possibility that Morocco may continue to receive relatively favourable EU treatment in reward for aspects of the Action Plan that do not involve or imply basic changes in the domestic power structure.

How is Spain responding to this new opportunity? Before the launch of the ENP, Spain was a firm supporter of sub-regional cooperation within the EMP, its own focus being on the Maghreb. Within that region there was a desire in Madrid to press ahead with EU cooperation with Morocco and Tunisia at a time when domestic conditions prevented real progress in Euro-Algerian relations (not to mention those with Libya). Spain has also been among those countries that have argued against the use of negative forms of conditionality by the EU in its relations with Mediterranean partners [Feliu, 2003]; positive forms of conditionality have meanwhile received Spanish endorsement and Madrid has welcomed the

relatively handsome proportion of MEDA funding that has gone to Morocco. However, it should be noted that during the genesis of the ENP, Spain was not an 'active champion' of increased European integration with Morocco or with the Maghreb [Martín, 2004: 525], even though it had a clear opportunity to nudge the 'Wider Europe' perspective in this direction during the 2002 Spanish Presidency of the EU Council. The bilateral crisis with Morocco, and perhaps too the diversion of Spanish attention in a transatlantic direction, prevented the second Aznar government from playing an influential role in actually shaping the Neighbourhood Policy, thus going beyond an insistence that 'Wider Europe' had to be extended to the Mediterranean. Throughout the crisis with Morocco, the perspective from the Moncloa was that it was the southern neighbour that had been responsible for the quarrel and that it was up to Rabat to rectify and make amends in order for relations to return to normal. Such circumstances were hardly likely to lead Spain, even on the basis of enlightened self-interest, to champion the cause of an enhanced Euro-Moroccan relationship.

With Spain experiencing more cooperative relations with all governments in the Maghreb (including Libya) since 2003, there is now the prospect of strong Spanish involvement in ENP Action Plans in this region. But it is unlikely that Spain will suddenly become much more vocal on themes such as democracy, human rights and freedom of expression. A substantial part of the agenda contained in the proposed EU-Morocco Action Plan is devoted to such matters but there is little there to suggest a major new reform initiative. In relation to the 'shared values' of

democracy and the rule of law that are proclaimed in the document, the immediate agenda is concerned with the *consolidation* of administrative reforms [European Commission/Morocco, 2004: 4]. Meanwhile, the references made to the principles of free association and free expression must also be viewed in the context of the actual reform of political parties announced in November 2004, which prohibits the creation of political parties on the basis of religion (*El País*, 18 November 2004). Moreover, although the proposed Action Plan points to decentralisation as a goal, this is clearly with a view to *local* government reform in the medium term - there are no references to regional devolution at all.

While the establishment of a more accountable form of local government (and some aspects of the political parties law) could herald an eventual expansion of political pluralism in Morocco, a more immediate prospect for enhanced Spanish influence within the Euro-Moroccan relationship is the provision in the proposed Action Plan for trans-frontier cooperation. This goes well beyond collaboration to strengthen policing of the border (linked to cooperation in migration management and efforts to counter international terrorism and contraband) to projects to develop transport and energy infrastructure in regions that border on Europe. Having experienced some of the disadvantages of providing part of the EU's external frontier with the South, geographical position could now enable Spain to benefit from this aspect of the ENP. The country already has some valuable experience of trans-border projects, chiefly through the *Plan de Desarrollo Transfronterizo* (PDT) undertaken by the *Junta de Andalucía* (the regional government of Andalusia)

with the Moroccan authorities [*Junta de Andalucía – Reino de Marruecos*, 2003]. Andalusia, along with other regions, participates too in developing Hispano-Moroccan links at the level of civil society. Through the new ENP framework (so long as it is adequately funded), Spain in general could benefit from a reinforced cultural and economic presence in northern Morocco, building upon the legacy from the colonial period and upon more recent Spanish (and specifically Catalan) commercial and cultural promotion activity.

In the long term, exploitation of its comparative advantage in northern Morocco (where French influence is less decisive than in the rest of the country) could conceivably lead Spain to play a role in democracy promotion. For example, although many of the projects in the North *faute de mieux* involve collaboration with delegations subordinate to national Moroccan ministries, active Spanish participation in future ENP trans-frontier projects would bring greater involvement with locally-based actors and provide opportunities for Spaniards to contribute to capacity-building at local and regional level. It is also possible that the many functional difficulties encountered by Spanish cooperation personnel and investors as a result of institutional asymmetry between a centralised and a decentralised (or democratic and authoritarian) state could little by little increase Spain's own interest in promoting a political reform in Morocco influenced to some degree by European practice.⁸ As Laura Feliu [2004] comments, the

⁸ Several regional government officials and NGO representatives involved in development cooperation with Morocco, including those involved in eminently technical projects, maintain that aid would be much

lack of democracy in Morocco is a source of unpredictability in bilateral relations that cannot be eliminated simply by reinforcing them.

more effective if democracy was a reality in Morocco (personal interviews, 2003-04).

Conclusions

In the short to medium-term, the most promising area for Spain to encourage political reform in Morocco lies with regional reform as opposed to any across-the-board classic liberal democratic recipe - though existing projects at civil society level could and should be expanded as well. To raise the issue of democracy as one of total regime change would mean questioning the powers and privileges of the monarchy and would most likely result in a swift halt to various forms of bilateral cooperation that Spain (and the EU) want to see maintained and enhanced in partnership with Morocco.⁹ Regional reform has the advantage of being an idea that can be presented in practical terms of functional advantage and as part of a trend that is gaining ground (up to a point) in Western Europe. Devolution is also central to one of the formulas promoted by the UN as a possible basis for a solution to the Western Sahara dispute. Furthermore, it is an area of comparative advantage for Spain, whose post-Franco model of autonomous government has attracted praise from around the world. At the same time, the promotion of regional reform can be accommodated far more easily in the European Neighbourhood Policy than in the original framework of the Barcelona Process, owing to the new emphasis on cooperation with regions on the outer periphery of Europe. Finally, though the idea of an externally-supported process of regionalization in Morocco may seem an unlikely possibility in the short term, it is surely in Spain's interests to encourage such a vision. The

expanding activities of Spanish regional and local governments, and NGOs, in Morocco may create problems of coherence and coordination for Spanish representatives based in Madrid, but they contribute to an expanding volume of cooperative activities that in general is positive for Spanish-Moroccan relations.

This vision would only be promising if Spain itself manages to reach a consensus over the political status of its regions, particularly Catalonia and the Basque Country. What has been a largely successful experience with devolution is at present being revisited, mainly owing to demands from these regions that the 1978 constitutional settlement be revisited, together with the contents of their autonomy statutes. This has to be seen not only in terms of the evolution of centre-periphery relations within Spain but also in the European decision-making context, with developments at the EU level having brought a degree of 're-centralisation' of power in Spain since its EC accession in 1986, owing to the monopoly held by Madrid in the European representation of Spanish interests. Thus, current Spanish government proposals to make the Senate a chamber of regional representation are being developed in tandem with an initiative to give Spanish regions a role in European decision-making. With the PP opposing several aspects of the government proposals while its support is necessary for any constitutional reform, this is a moment of considerable controversy, fed also by differences over how to respond to the Ibarretxe Plan for a model of 'free association' for the Basque nation within the Spanish state. Spain

⁹ Clearly the perspective would be very difficult if French policy were to change as well.

already raises the issue of regional reform in the limited context of its Western Sahara diplomacy, yet it seems unlikely that Spanish authorities will bring the issue of regionalism into Spanish-Moroccan political dialogue more generally now that the national question has again become so delicate within Spain. For the moment at least, the external promotion of the CCAA ('Autonomous Communities') model looks less plausible than in the 1990s.

The vision of regionalization playing a part in the democratisation of Morocco also faces the obstacle of Rabat's instinctive fears over what regional devolution may bring. Morocco's leaders remain concerned that any autonomy formula they agree to for Western Sahara could provide a stronger basis for the territory's independence later on; and might also fuel demands in the north of the country. Spain could play an important role here (not least through the quasi-diplomatic and generally pragmatic role of regional presidents) in reassuring Moroccan elites that the Spanish experience with devolution has on the whole been a success story. Moroccan leaders have been preoccupied with the risks of regional reform; Spanish representatives could aim to convince them of the tangible benefits to be had, both by referring to the Spanish experience and to ENP opportunities that may also provide safeguards. Moroccan thinking on the matter might change if decentralization were seen less as a domestic zero-sum game and more of a project that would be supported materially as well as politically by the EU.

There is thus some potential for Spain to play a constructive role in promoting political reform in Morocco, but a number of difficulties surround it

and there is no sign or guarantee that Spain is yet shaping up for such a role. Working through the EU rather than bilaterally offers Spain a degree of political 'cover', but also raises the question of the authenticity and effectiveness of the Union's own democracy promotion activity, which some commentators see as being directed towards the creation of 'hybrid' regimes combining some democratic and some authoritarian features, notwithstanding the commitment to democracy expressed in the proposed EU-Morocco action plan [Holden, 2005]. The entry into the Euro-Med equation of the 10 new member states (mostly young democracies) may or may not modify the degree of EU democratic intent concerning the southern neighbourhood. The other major development here, namely the initiation of the ENP, could also affect democracy promotion efforts, but this is far from guaranteed and one must always assume that enhanced Euro-Moroccan integration through the Neighbourhood framework will have unintended as well as intended consequences. The new Neighbourhood Policy, however, will at least bring a multiplication of areas of attempted cooperation between Spaniards, other Europeans and Moroccans - Euro-Mediterranean partners whose declared commitment to 'shared values' must be qualified by their divergent political traditions and outlooks. In this regard, one may speculate that the practical difficulties that will be encountered in undertaking the ENP's ambitious agenda could over time persuade a growing number of the political actors involved to see Morocco-EU regime differences as a problem.

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